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Nihil Obstat, Nº 23
Revista de historia, metapolítica y filosofía
Tarragona, otoño/invierno 2014
21×15 cms., 160 págs.
Cubierta impresa a todo color, con solapas y plastificada brillo
PVP: 15 euros
Sumario
Editorial: Rusia, la gran esperanza / José Alsina Calvés 5
Algo más sobre metafísica / Alberto Buela 7
Un relato sobre ‘Nouvelle Droite’ y el ‘Front National’ / Jesús J. Sebastián 19
¿El imperio de la duda? / Juan de Pinos 33
¿Tiene el Occidente una idea de sí mismo? / Julius Evola 41
Ética tradicional y rebelión contra el mundo burgués / Cámille Bercyen 47
DOSSIER: La Cuarta Teoría Política
La Cuarta Teoría Política / José Alsina Calvés 57
Notas sobre la Cuarta Teoría Política / Léonid Sávin 67
La izquierda vista desde la Cuarta Teoría Política: el caso español / Fernando Rivero 75
Eurasia, socialismo y tradición / Jordi Garriga 85
Las ecúmenes y el pluralismo / Alberto Buela 89
Algunas reflexiones sobre la creación del eurasianismo intelectual / Gábor Vona 95
La iglesia católica en Galicia ante la II República y la Guerra Civil.
Nacionalcatolicismo y nacionalsindicalismo / Álvaro Rodríguez Núñez 103
José Antonio, creador de una nueva retórica / Félix del Río 113
Abel Bonnard / Jean Ferré 119
La marcha del Fascismo sobre Roma / José Plá 123
La revolución a paso gentil / Rafael Sánchez Mazas 125
La entrevista de José Antonio Primo de Rivera con
Mussolini / Giorgio Pini y José Antonio Primo de Rivera 129
El fenómeno anarquista / Pierre Drieu la Rochelle 135
Tradiciones europeas: Samhain y Yule / Carmen M. Padial 139
El paganismo de Alain de Benoist y la filosofía de Martin Heidegger / José Alsina Calvés 147
¿Ha inventado Francia el Fascismo? / Renaud Dély 153
Fuente: Ediciones Fides
00:05 Publié dans Nouvelle Droite, Revue | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : revue, espagne, nihil obstat, alexandre douguine, nouvelle droite, nouvelle droite russe, russie | | del.icio.us | | Digg | Facebook
Robert Stark interviews Paul Gottfried on Dugin & Neoconservatives
Ex:
http://www.starktruthradio.com
Audio:
http://www.starktruthradio.com/?p=934
Paul Gottfried recently retired as Professor of Humanities at Elizabethtown College, PA. He is the author of After Liberalism, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt and The Strange Death of Marxism His most recent book is Leo Strauss and the Conservative Movement in America.
Topics include:
Alexander Dugin and Martin Heidegger
The definition of Liberalism
The Eurasian school of thought
National Review’s Hit Piece on Dugin
How Neoconservatives attack their enemies such as Dugin as Fascist or Nazis
How Neoconservatives are a faction of the left
The Neoconservative View toward Russia
The Cold War and whether it was a mistake
The conflict with Russia in the Ukraine
Why Paleoconservatives tend to dislike Israel
Paul Gottfried’s upcoming book Fascism: The Career of a Concept
00:05 Publié dans Actualité, Entretiens, Eurasisme, Nouvelle Droite, Théorie politique | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : politique internationale, nouvelle droite, nouvelle droite russe, alexandre douguine, paul gottfried, russie, entretien, théorie politique, sciences politiques, politologie, philosophie, philosophie politique, eurasisme | | del.icio.us | | Digg | Facebook
Ex: http://www.levraipost.fr
Dans son dernier discours aux représentants de la nation russe, Vladimir Poutine a rappelé que l’union économique eurasienne va être opérationnelle en janvier 2015. Il est intéressant de revenir ici sur les fondements théoriques et géopolitiques possibles de cette union continentale qui nous est (...)
Dans son dernier discours aux représentants de la nation russe, Vladimir Poutine a rappelé que l’union économique eurasienne va être opérationnelle en janvier 2015.
Il est intéressant de revenir ici sur les fondements théoriques et géopolitiques possibles de cette union continentale qui nous est présentée comme une alternative au monopole et à l’hégémonie occidentale. Qu’en est-il en réalité ? Quelle place pour les français et les européens dans une telle alliance ? La Russie peut-elle être la figure de proue d’un nouveau non-alignement civilisationnel face au nouvel ordre mondial ? Voire dans le nouvel ordre mondial ?
Même si la théorisation de l’Eurasisme ne se superpose pas exactement aux froids enjeux à l’œuvre derrière l’union eurasiatique, en tant que théoricien majeur de l’Eurasisme contemporain, Alexandre Douguine est un interlocuteur majeur sur les questions relatives à l’unité continentale et à la multipolarité.
Nous avions eu l’occasion de rencontrer le professeur Alexandre Douguine le lendemain de sa conférence à Paris de mai 2013.
Cet entretien a été réalisé il y a plus d’un an dans cette période un peu spéciale pour les patriotes français qui allait du départ de Dominique Venner à la dernière grande "manif pour tous" de 2013. Nous publions aujourd’hui hui cet entretien plus que jamais d’actualité.
Nos remerciements à qui a permis cette rencontre et la réalisation de cette vidéo.
Les Non-Alignés.
00:09 Publié dans Actualité, Affaires européennes, Entretiens, Eurasisme, Nouvelle Droite | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : multipolarité, nouvelle droite, nouvelle droite russe, alexandre douguine, entretien, russie, politique internationale, eurasisme, eurasie | | del.icio.us | | Digg | Facebook
Woensdag 12 november 2014, 19 uur!
17:58 Publié dans Eurasisme, Evénement, Nouvelle Droite | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : événement, leuven, louvain, nouvelle droite, alexandre douguine, nouvelle droite russe, eurasisme | | del.icio.us | | Digg | Facebook
00:05 Publié dans Actualité, Affaires européennes, Géopolitique, Revue | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : russie, revue, géopolitique, politique internationale, alexandre douguine, ukraine, europe, affaires européennes | | del.icio.us | | Digg | Facebook
13:39 Publié dans Eurasisme, Evénement | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : événement, bruxelles, eurasie, eurasisme, alexandre douguine, russie, nouvelle droite, nouvelle droite russe | | del.icio.us | | Digg | Facebook
Dugin on the Subject of Politics
By Giuliano Adriano Malvicini
Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com
Dugin’s Social Constructionism
The claim that there is no biological basis for the concept of race, or that it is not useful in explaining contemporary reality, is of course patently false. But Dugin follows postmodern thinkers like Foucault and Althusser in arguing that not only race, but all political subjects are constructs.
Race is a product of society, rather than society a product of race. Man, he argues, exists as a subject only within the political realm. “What man is, is not derived from himself as an individual, but from politics. It is politics that defines the man. It is the political system that gives us our shape. Moreover, the political system has an intellectual and conceptual power, as well as transformative potential without limitations” (The Fourth Political Theory, p. 169). In other words, the subject does not create itself, nor is it a natural given like race or the individual. The subject is a construct, existing only within a political system.
It follows that ultimately, there is no master subject who creates or exercises conspiratorial control over the system. On the contrary: subjects exist only as functions, produced by subjectless political structures. As the political system changes, shifting from one historical paradigm to another — from traditional society to modern society, for example — it constructs the normative type of subjectivity it requires to function. “[T]he political concept of man is the concept of man as such, which is installed in us by the state or the political system. The political man is a particular means of correlating man with this state and political system. […] We believe we are causa sui, generated within ourselves, and only then do we find ourselves within the sphere of politics. In fact, it is politics that constitutes us. […] Man’s anthropological structure shifts when one political system changes to another” (The Fourth Political Theory, p. 169). In other words, the subject does not bring about a political paradigm shift on its own — it is the new paradigm that will call a new subject into being through a process of “interpellation.”
The study of the anthropological shift from the type of man belonging to traditional society to the type of man belonging to modern society leads to the relativization not only of modern man, but of modern rationality as such. This relativization of modernity is “postmodernity.” The modern idea of progress towards a humanity unified on the foundation of universal Reason is shown to be an illusion, and this implies that traditional societies are placed on the same level as modern society.
Dugin’s reasoning appears to be as follows: the subject cannot radically break through the system (carry out a revolution or “paradigm shift”) and go beyond it if it is itself a product of the system, and can only exist within the limits of that system. This was why class, race, and the individual, all of which are subjects constituted and defined within the horizon of modernity, failed to overcome the crisis and impasses of modernity. In other words, the subject would have to be grounded in a reference point outside of the political system, in order to have the leverage needed for any radical political agency. There would have to be a “radical subject,” and for Dugin the “radical subject” seems to be chaos [2]. Chaos is freedom beyond its capture within the limits of the bourgeois or humanist conception of the individual. The shattering of the liberal individual is not the negation of freedom, but the revelation of the essence of freedom as anarchic, sovereign chaos, a chaos that will be mastered only through the emergence of a new kind of subject.
The political subject acts within the realm of politics, but must be founded in a realm beyond and before the political – in the case of modern, secular ideologies, the realm of nature. The subject of politics must transcend the sphere of politics in order to be able to master it, define it, and set its boundaries and goals. For example, liberal ideology posits the existence of the individual as a natural given, prior to the existence of the social order. Only in this way can it found the political order on the individual and its universal, natural rights.
Analogously, National Socialists view race as a biological given existing prior to and beyond the political, and the state as possessing meaning only insofar as it is an instrument through which a race is protected, preserved and its potentialities are actualized and enhanced. This means that for National Socialists, race transcends the political realm, subordinating it to itself. The political consciousness they strive to awaken others to is racial self-consciousness, much as Marxists attempt to awaken the proletariat to class consciousness.
For Marxists, the means of production transcend the political realm, forming its material basis and driving force. A class constitutes itself as a political subject by taking control of the means of production. Marx defined labor as “the metabolism of nature.”
“The definition of a historical subject is the fundamental basis for political ideology in general, and defines its structure” (The Fourth Political Theory, p. 38). For example: for nationalists, the real subjects of history are nations, viewed as a sort of supra-individuals with a will and a destiny of their own. History is the history of nations. Identity is primarily national, and the friend/enemy distinction (which is constitutive for the political) goes along national lines. For racism, on the other hand, the true subjects of history are the various races, locked in a Darwinian struggle for life. This view of history is determined by the modern concepts of biological evolution and progress. Identity is primarily racial, and the friend/enemy distinction goes along racial lines. For Marxism, the subjects of history are classes, again viewed as forms of collective subjectivity, and consequently, the whole of history was interpreted as the history of class struggle. Identity is class identity, and the friend/enemy distinction goes along class lines.
The political subject is also an historical subject. This means that each modern political ideology corresponds to a “grand narrative” — an over-arching interpretation — of history. History as a whole is viewed as created through the agency of a certain historical subject. It then becomes obvious that political ideologies are secular substitutes for a theological interpretation of history, and that the historical subjects posited by them are substitutes for divine Providence as the transcendent subject of history. As Carl Schmitt argued, all the fundamental concepts of politics are secularized theological concepts.
The place of the political subject — a kind of vacuum left by the withdrawal of God from the world and history — is the site of contestation between the various modern political ideologies. Each of them fought to occupy that vacant place with their own concept of the political subject. Each of them claimed to master the destructive and creative forces liberated by modernity, bringing modernity to its full actualization. Communism saw itself as the final, inevitable and culminating phase of modernity, towards which industrial capitalism had only paved the way. Liberalism views the progressive liberation of the individual, along with the processes of secularization, modernization, and globalization, as an historical necessity. Fascism saw itself as an avant-garde, revolutionary movement, dismissed liberal, bourgeois democracy as a doomed residue of the nineteenth century, and claimed that the organic state was the only adequate form through which the masses could be mobilized in modern societies. Both Italian Fascism and German National Socialism modernized and revolutionized their respective nations, and would not have been politically successful if they had not done so. Early Fascism was influenced by the avant-garde modernism of Futurism, which called for the nihilistic destruction of the past and unconditionally worshipped modern technology and “progress.” (This lead Evola to reject Futurism as a form of “Americanism.” Marinetti retorted that he had as little in common with Evola as with “an Eskimo.” Bizarrely — for someone who claims to be a traditionalist — Dugin views Futurism as one of the admirable elements of early Fascism that he wishes to recuperate.)
Each of these political systems, then, claimed that it was the most appropriate form for modern, technologically advanced society. This form corresponded to a certain figure or human type, an embodiment of a certain political project, the normative “man of the future”: be it homo sovieticus, the new Fascist man, the racially purified Aryan superman, or the enlightened, bourgeois individual. In other words, each of these ideologies or “political theories” posited a normative subject as the basis of its political vision and its interpretation of history. The transition into fully realized modernity was not only a political revolution, but also an anthropological revolution: the production of a “new man.”
According to Dugin, in the crisis of the end of modernity, not only race and class, but also the nation-state ceases to be an authentic political subject, even though he recognizes that the will to preserve national sovereignty is, in the current situation, a natural locus of resistance to globalism. The de-sovereignization of the nation is its de-subjectivization. After 1945, European nations ceased to be sovereign, independent historical actors, and effectively also ceased to exist as historical subjects with a real identity.
However, Dugin sees this de-sovereignization/de-subjectivization as inevitable, even inherent in the nature of the nation itself. He fully accepts the postmodern idea that the nation is an artificial, ideological, and political construct, an “imagined community” created as a means of unifying fragmented, modern societies. The nation is, in his view, merely a simulacrum, an artificial substitute for the lost totality of traditional society (presumably, he views race similarly, as being a modern simulacrum of the “ethnos”). Historically, its emergence corresponds to the precise moment when traditional society enters into crisis. It is a compromise, a transitional form, a ruse.
Moreover, he views the function of the nation as a device for facilitating the transition from pre-modern, traditional society to fully modern, liberal, civil society. As a result, it cannot constitute an enduring force of resistance to liberal globalization. He views the nation as a dispositive of power geared to producing a certain standardized, normative type of political subject: the bourgeois individual (citizen). In doing so, it destroys regional, organic, ethnic communities (for example, through the suppression of regional autonomy, traditions, and linguistic variation in Italy and France, and the imposition of a standardized national language) as well as liquidating the last residues of traditional elites (the aristocracy).
Thus, the concept of “ethno-nationalism” is, in his view, ultimately an absolute contradiction in terms: the nation is inherently “ethnocidal [3].” It destroys the ethnos and replaces it with a “demos.” Nationalism, according to Dugin, must be condemned not just because it has been the cause of pointless, destructive wars, but because the nation itself is inherently violent — violent in the sense that it is an arbitrary construct without any sacred, transcendent basis. Its violence is the violence of modernity itself. (Certainly, this is true of many nations, perhaps most notably of the nation of Israel, which is an entirely modern, artificial construction, as is perhaps the idea that Jews are a unified, homogeneous race or ethnic group.) Nothing, however, so far assures us that the idea of Eurasian empire dominated by Russia would be less artificial, violent or “ethnocidal.”
(The new European post-war order projected by the dominant faction of the Waffen SS was not based on the nation-state, but on a pan-European federation of culturally autonomous regions. Dugin fails to mention this fact, but his characterization of National Socialism is tendentious.)
In any case, the ultimate incompatibility of Eurasianism with ethno-nationalism is clear. David Beetschen of the Eurasianist artists’ association has given poetic expression to this incompatibility in the following (stirring!) lyrical effusion:
Have you dreamt of the eurasian parliament
for which all energy we have joyfully spent.
There isn’t any discriminatory segregation
in class, race, sex or in any form of a nation.
As for the fascist concept the organic state, based on Hegel’s philosophy of the state, Dugin does not discuss his reasons for rejecting it as a credible candidate for the political subject. In general, Dugin simply takes the defeat of both the second and third political theories as axiomatic, without providing much in the way of substantial argument for this. The third political theory simply does not exist after 1945. “Each and every declared fascist after 1945 is a simulacrum” (The Fourth Political Theory, p. 174). In his view, modernity has been fully actualized in liberal society, and consequently, the ideological contest of modernity is over.
This view is more credible with regard to communism than with regard to fascism. The death of communism was, as Dominique Venner has written, an “inglorious demise.” Its collapse was due to its own bureaucratic inertia and utter failure to effectively manage economic development. Fascism and National Socialism, on the other hand, were spectacularly successful as political experiments, and, perhaps for this very reason, had to be militarily destroyed by their international rivals.
Dugin clearly views the defeat of National Socialist Germany as a consequence of its anti-Russian and anti-communist policies. Since Dugin views both of these policies as connected with the infection of National Socialism by atlanticism and Anglo-Saxon, biological racism, he views the defeat of the third position as a consequence of ideological errors, and not simply as an historical contingency. Not only was Nazi Nordicism a vulgar, materialist misinterpretation of the traditional doctrine of the north as the pole of tradition, National Socialism was anti-communist and anti-Slavic because it was anti-Eastern, that is, pro-Western (modern).
Today, according to Eurasianists (who in this respect are inheritors of National Bolshevism), European nationalists are repeating the disastrous errors of the German National Socialists when they again oppose “the East” in the form of Islamisation. Generally, Eurasianists try to downplay the idea of a “clash of civilizations” or any claim that there is a sharp opposition between Islam and European civilization. They accuse nationalists who view Islam as incompatible with European values of confusing “Europe” with “the West.”
Any interpretation of European history that sees some enlightenment values as rooted in the European tradition itself — in classical Greece, for example — is accused of trying to legitimate “the West” by inventing historical precedents and falsifying the true European tradition, which is rooted in Eurasia and in no way opposed to Islam. This is undoubtedly consistent with a Traditionalist position, which only recognizes those elements of European civilization as valid that are derived from the unitary, universal Tradition, of which Islam is viewed as a part. However, the exclusivist claims of Islam, especially in its modern, radical form, are wholly non-Traditional.
Dugin sees the triumph of liberalism as a necessary, fatal triumph, in a sense. Liberalism has triumphed because it can legitimately lay claim to being the most successful actualization of the potentialities of modernity. Liberalism did indeed succeed in modernizing the West to a much greater degree than communism succeeded in modernizing the countries of the Eastern bloc, so much so that “the West,” and particularly the United States, is today more or less synonymous with modernity. In the decades after the second world war, capitalism, using economic means, modernized Western European societies to a degree undreamed of by fascism, making the third position ideologies seem archaic and obsolete by comparison. In a sense, liberalism is the origin of the other ideologies of modernity – both communism and fascism emerged as attempts to overcome liberalism, while mastering the forces liberated by modern industrial capitalism and technology. It has also outlived the adversaries it engendered.
Dugin Contra Nationalism
Why does Dugin reject nationalism? His negative view of nationalism differs to some extent from that of Evola, who saw it not only as destructive of the traditional European order, but also as leading towards modern collectivism (Dugin, on the contrary, sees collectivism as something positive). Does Dugin follow Heidegger in viewing nationalism as an “anthropologism” (cf. “Letter on Humanism”)? What Heidegger mean by this is that nationalism, like Marxism, places man, rather than Being, at the center of history. Nationalism is a “subjectivism,” in the sense that it views man as the subject of history. In this sense, nationalism is indeed a modern phenomenon, since modernity, for Heidegger, is essentially an epoch in the history of metaphysics that was initiated with Descartes’ cogito: with the rational subject as the secure foundation of philosophy and science. Descartes identifies the subject with reason (ratio). This became the metaphysical foundation for the Enlightenment and its anthropology.
However, Dugin does not, unlike Heidegger, reject subjectivism as such. On the contrary, the whole point of the fourth political theory is that it is the search for a new “political subject,” an alternative to the individual as a political subject.
Why does Dugin give Heidegger’s concept of “Dasein” the pivotal role in the “fourth political theory”? Heidegger elaborated his analysis of Dasein as an attempt to overcome the abstractions of the metaphysical concept of the subject. Hence, his “analytic of Dasein” offers the possibility of going beyond the modern political ideologies based on various interpretations of the subject. Dasein is beyond, or prior to, the subject-object split. Dasein is not the rational subject as the abstract basis of the concept of universal man. Dasein is the historical, spatio-temporal structure of concrete existence. The subject is outside of the world, relating to the world as a system of objects. Dasein is always already in the world, involved in it, struggling within it. The world, as Heidegger uses the term, is a totality of relations of meaning. Each thing refers to other things in a circuit of relations. Dasein’s relation to things is one of understanding and interpretation, not (primarily) one of objectification.
The subject is reason, that is, it is defined by its relation to an ultimate cause and foundation (Grund). Dasein is defined by its relation to finitude, death, and the abyss (Ab-grund). However, all this means that it is not clear how Dasein, which according to Heidegger is precisely not the subject, can be called “the subject” of the fourth political theory. Dasein is not a subject that arbitrarily imposes its will, creates itself from nothing or freely makes history. Instead, it is part of a cosmic process that transcends man and his agency. Man does not decide the history of Being. Heidegger is not interested in re-elaborating or modifying the concept of the subject, nor is he interested in returning man to “God and Tradition” in the sense of metaphysical foundations, but is trying to overcome metaphysics itself, that is, all thinking in terms of the Being of beings as a “foundation” (Grund). This also means that Heidegger is far from the metaphysical conceptions of Traditionalism.
If Dugin invokes Heidegger and the analytic of Dasein, we must assume that behind the critique of liberalism and the West, he is attempting a critique of modernity as such (identified with the West). Heidegger’s critique of modernity is linked to an attempt to overcome the philosophy of the subject. In Heidegger’s view, modernity, when the humanitarian masks of the Enlightenment fall off, is technological nihilism, and this nihilism is the fatal consequence of Western metaphysics. Western metaphysics, however, is the foundation of Western civilization as a whole.
Heidegger’s critique is not simply political. He is criticizing bolshevism, liberalism (which paved the way for bolshevism), and other modern ideologies for failing to understand not only their own essence, but the essence of modernity itself: technological nihilism. According to Heidegger, the emancipation of the subject (humanity interpreted as subject) is not the purpose of technological development. It is the other way around — the emancipation of the the subject is a means through which technology emancipates itself. Here, Heidegger’s interpretation of modern technology draws on Nietzsche’s concept of the Will to power. According to Nietzsche, the self is not the subject of the will to power, but is brought into being by the will to power. The last glimmers of transcendence are extinguished from the world so that technology can pursue, unobstructed and on a planetary scale, the endless, circular self-enhancement of its productive power, drawing everything into its vortex, with no ultimate goal or end other than power for its own sake. The West becomes “das Abendland,” the evening-land, the realm of the darkening of the divine, the withdrawal of the gods. Technology as “Ge-stell” is not mastered by man (the subject), but an impersonal destiny of Being itself. Man as a subject can never master technology, since the essence of technology as Gestell constitutes man as a subject. Technological development has no intrinsic, immanent limit, and no boundary can be arbitrarily set to it as long as thinking remains within the horizon of the philosophy of the subject (humanism) and of technological calculation (the final deviation of the Western logos). But as modern technology reaches the full actualization of its dominion, the subject that it once called into being enters into crisis, begins to “vanish.” It is liquidated in a system of purely functional relations without a center, without fixed norms or foundations. The essence of the subject reveals itself to be a kind of limit, which initially functioned as a necessary ground or condition, but now becomes only an obstacle to be overcome. For Heidegger, this crisis, this ultimate threshold of nihilism — brought about by technology itself — opens up the possibility of thinking the essence of man and Being in a much deeper dimension, beyond or before the subject. Instead of man as subject, Heidegger tries to think the historicity of Dasein. This is why the “inner truth” of National Socialism for him meant the confrontation between modern technology and historical man (that is, not man as subject).
For Heidegger, Western modernity and materialism are not, as traditionalists claim, the consequence of a fall from the normal, traditional society of medieval Europe. On the contrary, he views the transition from the Middle Ages to the modern age more as a development than as a radical break with the traditional past. For Heidegger, medieval scholasticism, with its misinterpretation of the Greek logos as “ratio” and its onto-theological synthesis of Greek philosophy with Christianity, prepared the way for Descartes’ rationalism. In a sense, Heidegger develops Nietzsche’s idea that nihilism is not so much a break with Christianity, but instead a revelation of the nihilistic essence of Christianity. As a Christian and a traditionalist, however, Dugin consistently avoids the anti-Christian aspect of Heidegger’s thought, without, however, being able to articulate a critique of it. For Heidegger, as for the majority of the conservative revolutionaries, the origin of modernity is Christian, or rather, it lies in the “onto-theological” synthesis of Christianity and Greek metaphysics. It is the Christian conception of the “sovereignty” of God with regard to the world as creation that is at the origin of the modern concept of the subject, just as the Christian notion of the free individual with a personal relation to God and the Christian concern with the salvation of the immortal soul of all individuals is the origin of modern mass individualism. It is God as the “highest being” — both causa sui and causa prima, the first cause, sovereign over all other beings and the “maker” of the world — that is at the origin of the sovereign subject whose relation to things is one of instrumental manipulation and objectification. Modern secular humanism is onto-theological: it has its origin not in Greek thought, but in the Christian interpretation of Greek thought.
We may add that the Evola of Revolt Against the Modern World also sees Christianity as a primary cause of the involution of the West. He does not view modernity as a fatality somehow inherent in the nature of the West. For Evola, the Western mode of spirituality, which is primarily an active rather than contemplative spirituality, was cut off from the dimension of transcendence by the Semitic, lunar, self-mortifying type of religiosity of Christianity, which ultimately lead to the Western drive to activity being deviated, finding an outlet only on a purely material and human plane.
In any case, whether from a Heideggerian or Traditionalist view, one may agree that race, insofar as it is conceived as a purely human, biological characteristic, is ultimately insufficient, or rather, that it is too narrowly anthropological, and must be integrated into a deeper conception. This is not the same as liquidating the concept of race. It does mean the rejection of certain narrow forms of racism, where the biological concept of race plays an analogous reductive role to the Marxist concept of a material base that determines the ideological superstructure (culture, mentality etc.) of a society.
Man is not the unconditioned, self-creating subject of modern metaphysics. Human existence is conditioned and finite — men are, as Jünger wrote, “sons of the earth.” Race is one of the earthly conditions of man’s existence. An historical world is not an unconditioned, arbitrary “construct.” There is, in Heidegger’s terms, an historical world is always founded through a struggle between world and earth — the world, an articulated, historical space of possibilities and decisions, and the conditions set by the un-objectified, elemental forces of the earth. Blood and soil are given the meaning of a destiny in an historical world (this is not at all the same as claiming that it is an arbitrary historical and social construct). For Heidegger, the limits set by the biological potentialities of human beings are not arbitrary historical creations — what is historical is the particular “figure” or constellation of relations that gives them meaning.
We can also note that the statistical concept of race referred to by race realists today is very different from National Socialist racial theories, which were based on the idea of racial purity. The modern concept of race is not on its own sufficient to non-reductively account for the specificity of our or other civilizations or cultures. The differences between the mentality of Americans of European descent, on the one hand, and the mentality of Europeans, on the other, underscores this clearly. However, it is more than obvious that race plays a role in shaping the general character of civilizations.
Editor’s Note
1. On the chaos star, see Wikipedia [4].
Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com
URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2014/09/dugin-on-the-subject-of-politics/
URLs in this post:
[1] Image: http://www.counter-currents.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Dugin-chaos-star-e1410484135489.jpg
[2] chaos: http://against-postmodern.org/dugin-necessity-metaphysics-chaos
[3] ethnocidal: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fdH6JgqNsPo
[4] Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symbol_of_Chaos
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Dugin Contra Liberalism
By Giuliano Adriano Malvicini
Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com
Editor’s Note:
This is a beginning of a series of more or less self-contained articles on Alexander Dugin drawn from a larger text, “Race, ‘Ethnos,’ and the Fourth Political Theory.”
Alexander Dugin has designated “liberalism” as the enemy of the “fourth political theory.” Or rather, since the enemy can only be an actually existing group of people and not an idea or ideology, he has designated as the enemy all those are in favor of the global hegemony of liberalism (the hegemony of “the West” and “atlanticism”): “If you are in favor of global liberal hegemony, you are the enemy.”
What does Dugin mean by “liberalism”? Is it the ideology of the people referred to as “liberals” in America? Calling someone a “liberal” in Europe means something quite different from calling someone a “liberal” in the United States. “Liberals” in the United States are on the left: they vote for the Democratic party and are in favor a welfare state and a regulated economy. In Europe, they would be considered social democrats. Ideologically, they are egalitarians and tend to be critical of laissez-faire capitalism. They oppose “racism,” “sexism” and “homophobia” from an egalitarian point of view. They view prison sentences as therapeutic and socializing rather than as forms of punishment. They believe in “social justice” rather than justice through retribution. They believe that human beings are basically good and can be redeemed through “social work.” They believe in social conditioning rather than personal responsibility. They tend to be in favor of a strict separation of church and state, while at the same time advocating an egalitarian world-view that is essentially a form of secularized Christianity.
In Europe, “liberals” are on the right: they are generally opposed to the welfare state, in favor of free markets, the privatization of the infrastructure and a largely unregulated economy. Traditionally, they also support various conservative social policies, placing an emphasis on individual responsibility as the correlative of the notion of individual rights. In other words, liberalism is a bourgeois ideology, favoring a capitalist economy, based on the enlightenment concept of individual human rights.
Today, however, the polarity between left and right is becoming much less sharp, and is gradually being replaced by a general consensus. The social policies of European liberal parties often coincide with those associated with the post-1968, libertarian left. Liberal, pro-capitalist parties oppose “racism,” “sexism,” and “homophobia” from the point of view of individualist libertarianism. Everyone is supposed to be treated as an individual, in an unprejudiced” way. Forms of collective identity — national, religious or racial – are declared passé. National borders and ethnic communities, insofar as they limit the freedom of the individual, are to be abolished. The freedom of the individual must be defended as long as it does not interfere with the rights of other individuals. This is the liberalism that Dugin has designated as the enemy: globalist capitalism founded on the ideology of human rights. The fourth political theory is anti-capitalist, against globalism, and against the ideology of human rights.
Today, the common foundations and origins of the social democratic, egalitarian left and the bourgeois, liberal right in the enlightenment ideology of human rights has become clearer, as “the left” and “the right” become increasingly hard to distinguish from one another. Both left and right-wing mainstream parties today tend to favor multiculturalism, immigration, gay rights, and the separation of church and state. They share fundamental views about gender equality and sometimes drug liberalization. These policies are legitimized by the “right” from the point of view of individual rights, and by the “left” from the point of view of egalitarianism. Moreover, the middle-class leftist “revolutionaries” of the late ’60s and early ’70s have often made a transition from the communist left to the libertarian right, realizing that their adherence to the left was based on an ideological self-misunderstanding. They were essentially bourgeois, left libertarians who briefly mistook themselves for communist revolutionaries.
In other words, the differences between the left and the right in Europe today are only differences of interpretation of a single legacy: the enlightenment. It would more correct to talk about “liberal-egalitarian hegemony” rather than simply “liberal hegemony.” Both liberalism and egalitarianism are based on the ideology of human rights, but emphasize different aspects. Right-wing liberals emphasize the individual aspect of human rights. Leftist egalitarians emphasize the universal aspect of human rights. Both conceptions of humanity — universal man and individual man — are abstractions, that is, defined only in negative terms. Both universal man and individual man are defined as not belonging to a particular group or category (ethnic or otherwise). Insofar as man is universal, “he” cannot belong to any particular ethnic group, gender or other category. The individual, on the other hand, cannot as such be subsumed under any category or defined as belonging to any collectivity (nationality ethnicity, gender, etc.) since this would violate his or her absolute singularity. “The individual,” then, is any and every human being and potentially corresponds to all of humanity. The individual is universal (as a representative of “humanity” as such) and all human beings are, as human beings, individuals. In other words, “universal man” can only be “individual man.” Egalitarianism and individualism ultimately boil down to the same abstract conception of man.
All established, mainstream political parties in Europe today gravitate towards this liberal-egalitarian center. This leaves all other groups marginalized. This center is the rational, humane, bourgeois individual, monopolizing the legacy of the enlightenment, with reason itself as the defining trait of humanity, it follows that those who deviate in some way from the center are non- or less-than-human (monsters), irrational and unenlightened. The marginalized are de-humanized and dismissed as irrational, “mentally ill” or “extremist.” They are denied a voice, the capacity to think and a right to participate in the political sphere: in other words, they are in various ways deprived of political subjectivity.
These groups include the various losers of liberal modernity, such as religious conservatives who oppose gay rights and the separation of church and state. Christian religious conservatives are not completely marginalized — they still have a presence within established political parties, albeit one that is steadily weakening. Communists, who oppose the idea of individual rights, free enterprise, and private property are not entirely marginalized, especially within academia and cultural institutions. When necessary, they post-communist parties in Europe are allowed to form parts of coalition governments. Leftist activists, in the form of “antifa” groups are tolerated insofar as they perform functions as the watchdogs of the system, when measures are required that lie outside of the limits of legality. They also share a common basis with the established political parties in the egalitarian, universalist aspects of their ideology, which has its roots in the enlightenment.
Much more marginalized and demonized are nationalists, who oppose, in varying degrees, universalism (to the extent that they value national identity), free trade (to the extent that they want to protect national economies), and individualism (to the extent that they view national and ethnic identity as in some cases having primacy over individual identity). Finally, the most marginalized and demonized group of all are racialists and racial nationalists, who oppose not only universalism, but also egalitarianism. However heterogeneous these groups are, they are sometimes placed in the same category – that of “totalitarian” or “anti-democratic” movements – by the liberal center.
It is on this basis that Alain de Benoist, Dugin, and Alain Soral have wanted to create an “alliance of the periphery against the center,” that is, of more or less marginalized groups against the dominant political establishment. In their case, this has so far meant not so much an alliance between the radical left and the radical right as an alliance between religious conservatives (to a large extent Muslims) and ex-communists. A good example of this in Western Europe is Alain Soral’s “Egalité et réconciliation” (“Equality and Reconciliation”), which rejects the repatriation of immigrants, instead embracing “communitarianism,” and attempts to build an alliance between Muslim immigrants and French “patriots.” The name of Soral’s movement already makes it clear that a critique of egalitarianism is not part of the agenda. Neither, of course, is racialism or racially-based nationalism.
It is noteworthy that Dugin, too, avoids any critique of egalitarianism. To the extent that opposition to egalitarianism is the essence of the true right, this means downplaying the real differences between left and right by focusing entirely on attacking “liberalism.” The concept of “liberalism” — intentionally left ambiguous, referring at times to capitalist economic individualism, at times to the moral individualism of gay rights activists and secularists — is meant to function as a central pole of opposition that will artificially unify into a single, cohesive front groups that are otherwise profoundly heterogeneous.
It is crucial to understand that Dugin, who calls for a “crusade against the West” is not opposed to liberalism because it is leading to the destruction of the white race. On the contrary, he frequently identifies “the West” with the white race (since he does not view Russians as white, as will be explained later). His primary stated goal is to destroy liberalism, even if that means destroying the white race (“European humanity”) along with it. As he puts it in The Fourth Political Theory:
. . . liberalism (and post-liberalism) may (and must – I believe this!) be repudiated. And if behind it, there stands the full might of the inertia of modernity, the spirit of Enlightenment and the logic of the political and economic history of European humanity of the last centuries, it must be repudiated together with modernity, the Enlightenment, and European humanity altogether. Moreover, only the acknowledgement of liberalism as fate, as a fundamental influence, comprising the march of Western European history, will allow us really to say ‘no’ to liberalism. (The Fourth Political Theory, p. 154)
He also defines the race of the subject of the “fourth political theory” as “non-White/European” [Ibid. p. 189]. He has predicted world-wide anti-white pogroms as retribution for the evil deeds of the white race, pogroms that Russians, however, will be exempt from, since they are not, according to him, fully white [2].
Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com
URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2014/09/dugin-contra-liberalism/
URLs in this post:
[1] Image: http://www.counter-currents.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Dugin4.jpg
[2] not, according to him, fully white: http://www.arcto.ru/article/1289
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00:05 Publié dans Evénement, Traditions | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : événement, brésil, sao paulo, amérique latine, amérique du sud, alexandre douguine, alain soral, julius evola, tradition, traditionalisme | | del.icio.us | | Digg | Facebook
Entretien avec Alexandre Douguine
Sur l'Union économique eurasienne, sur la nécessité d'une alliance UE/Russie, sur l'hégémonisme américain en Europe
Propos recueillis par Bernard Tomaschitz
Professeur Douguine, le 1 janvier 2015, l'Union Economique Eurasienne deviendra une réalité. Quel potentiel détient cette nouvelle organisation internationale?
AD: L'histoire nous enseigne que toute forme d'intégration économique précède une unification politique et surtout géopolitique. C'est là la thèse principale du théoricien de l'économie allemand, Friedrich List, impulseur du Zollverein (de l'Union douanière) allemand dans la première moitié du 19ème siècle. Le dépassement du "petit-étatisme" allemand et la création d'un espace économique unitaire, qui, plus tard, en vient à s'unifier, est toujours, aujourd'hui, un modèle efficace que cherchent à suivre bon nombre de pays. La création de l'Union Economique Eurasienne entraînera à son tour un processus de convergence politique. Si nous posons nos regards sur l'exemple allemand, nous pouvons dire que l'unification du pays a été un succès complet: l'Empire allemand s'est développé très rapidement et est devenu la principale puissance économique européenne. Si nous portons nos regards sur l'Union Economique Eurasienne, on peut s'attendre à un développement analogue. L'espace économique eurasien s'harmonisera et déploiera toute sa force. Les potentialités sont gigantesques.
Toutefois, après le putsch de Kiev, l'Ukraine n'y adhèrera pas. Que signifie cette non-adhésion pour l'Union Economique Eurasienne? Sera-t-elle dès lors incomplète?
AD: Sans l'Est et le Sud de l'Ukraine, cette union économique sera effectivement incomplète. Je suis d'accord avec vous.
Pourquoi l'Est et le Sud?
AD: Pour la constitution d'une Union Economique Eurasienne, les parties économiquement les plus importantes de l'Ukraine se situent effectivement dans l'Est et le Sud du pays. Il y a toutefois un fait dont il faut tenir compte: l'Ukraine, en tant qu'Etat, a cessé d'exister dans ses frontières anciennes.
Que voulez-vous dire?
AD: Nous avons aujourd'hui deux entités sur le territoire de l'Ukraine, dont les frontières passent exactement entre les grandes sphères d'influence géopolitique. L'Est et le Sud s'orientent vers la Russie, l'Ouest s'oriente nettement vers l'Europe. Ainsi, les choses sont dans l'ordre et personne ne conteste ces faits géopolitiques. Je pars personnellement du principe que nous n'attendrons pas longtemps, avant de voir ce Sud et cet Est ukrainiens, la "nouvelle Russie", faire définitivement sécession et s'intégrer dans l'espace économique eurasien. L'Ouest, lui, se tournera vers l'Union Européenne et s'intégrera au système de Bruxelles. L'Etat ukrainien, avec ses contradictions internes, cessera pratiquement d'exister. Dès ce moment, la situation politique s'apaisera.
Si, outre le Kazakhstan, d'autres Etats centrasiatiques adhèrent à l'Union Economique Eurasienne et que tous entretiennent de bonnes relations avec la Chine, un puissant bloc eurasien continental verra le jour: ce sera un défi géopolitique considérable pour les Etats-Unis, plus considérable encore que ne le fut jamais l'URSS…
AD: Non. Je ne crois pas que l'on puisse comparer les deux situations. Nous n'aurons plus affaire à deux blocs idéologiquement opposés comme dans l'après-guerre. L'idéologie ne joue aucun rôle dans la formation de cette Union Economique Eurasienne. Au contraire: pour l'Europe occidentale, cet immense espace économique sera un partenaire stratégique très attirant. L'Europe est en mesure d'offrir tout ce dont la Russie a besoin et, en échange, la Russie dispose de toutes les matières premières, dont l'Europe a besoin. Les deux partenaires se complètent parfaitement, profiteraient à merveille d'une alliance stratégique.
A Bruxelles, en revanche, on voit les choses de manière bien différente… On y voit Moscou et les efforts de convergence eurasiens comme une "menace". On utilise un vocabulaire qui rappelle furieusement la Guerre froide…
AD: Pour que l'alliance stratégique, que je viens d'esquisser, puisse fonctionner, l'Europe doit d'abord s'auto-libérer.
Se libérer de quoi?
AD: De la domination américaine. L'UE actuelle est bel et bien dominée par Washington. D'un point de vue historique, c'est intéressant: les Européens ont commencé par coloniser le continent américain et, aujourd'hui, par une sorte de retour de manivelle, les Américains colonisent l'Europe. Pour que l'Europe puisse récupérer ses marges de manœuvre, elle doit se libérer de l'hégémonisme américain. Le continent européen doit retrouver un sens de l'identité européenne, de manière à ce qu'il puisse agir en toute autonomie, en faveur de ses propres intérêts. Si les Européens se libèrent de la tutelle américaine, ils reconnaîtront bien vite que la Russie est leur partenaire stratégique naturel.
La crise ukrainienne et les sanctions contre la Russie, auxquelles participent aussi l'UE, révèlent combien l'Europe est sous l'influence de Washington. Pensez-vous vraiment que l'UE est capable de s'émanciper des Etats-Unis sur le plan de la défense et de la sécurité?
AD: Absolument. Aujourd'hui, l'Europe se comporte comme si elle était une entreprise américaine en franchise. Les sanctions contre la Russie ne correspondent en aucune façon aux intérêts économiques et stratégiques de l'Europe. Les sphères économiques européennes le savent bien car elles ne cessent de protester contre cette politique des sanctions. Cependant, une grande partie de l'élite politique européenne est absolument inféodée aux Etats-Unis. Pour elle, la voix de Washington est plus importante à écouter que les plaintes de ses propres ressortissants. Il est intéressant de noter aussi que la grande majorité des Européens, au contraire de l'élite politique, est critique à l'égard des Etats-Unis et est, dans le fond, pro-européenne au meilleur sens du terme. Une confrontation politique adviendra en Europe, c'est quasi préprogrammé. Ce sera une sorte de révolution. Il suffit d'attendre.
En mai, le traité sur les livraisons de gaz entre la Russie et la Chine a été conclu: ce traité prévoit que les factures seront établies en roubles ou en renminbi. Peut-on dès lors prévoir la fin de l'hégémonie du dollar, si cet exemple est suivi par d'autres?
AD: Par cet accord, la Russie et la Chine cherchent de concert à imposer un ordre mondial multipolaire. Ce sera une multipolarité en tous domaines: économique, stratégique, militaire, politique et idéologique. En Occident, on croit toujours à la pérennité d'un modèle unipolaire, dominé par les Etats-Unis. L'accord sino-russe de mai dernier marque cependant la fin de ce modèle prisé à l'Ouest. Quelle en sera la conséquence? Les Etats-Unis deviendront une puissance régionale et ne seront plus une puissance globale. Mais la Russie et la Chine, elles aussi, demeureront des puissances régionales, de même que l'Europe qui se sera libérée. Le monde multipolaire de demain sera un monde de puissances régionales. L'architecture du monde en sera changée.
(Entretien paru dans zur Zeit, Vienne, n°27-28/2014; http://www.zurzeit.at ).
00:08 Publié dans Actualité, Affaires européennes, Entretiens, Eurasisme, Géopolitique | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : alexandre douguine, entretien, eurasisme, géopolitique, politique internationale, russie, union européenne, europe, affaires européennes | | del.icio.us | | Digg | Facebook
Eurosibérie ou Eurasie ? Ou comment penser l’organisation du « Cœur de la Terre »…
par Georges FELTIN-TRACOL
Europe Maxima met en ligne la conférence de Georges Feltin-Tracol prononcée le 17 mai 2014 à Lyon dans le cadre du colloque « Réflexions à l’Est » à l’invitation de l’association Terre & Peuple.
Mesdames, Mesdemoiselles, Messieurs, Chers Amis,
Avec les développements inquiétants de la crise ukrainienne, la presse officielle de l’Hexagone insiste lourdement sur l’influence, réelle ou supposée, d’Alexandre Douguine, le théoricien russe du néo-eurasisme, sur les gouvernants russes. Ainsi, Bruno Tertrais l’évoque-t-il dans Le Figaro du 25 avril 2014. Puis c’est au tour du quotidien Libération du 28 avril d’y faire référence. Toujours dans Le Figaro, mais du 20 avril, c’est la philosophe catholique, libérale et néo-conservatrice Chantal Delsol de le citer… mal. Mieux, Le Nouvel Observateur du 1er mai lui consacre quatre pages sous la signature de Vincent Jauvert qui le qualifie de « Raspoutine de Poutine ». Même la livraison mensuelle de mai du Monde diplomatique en vient à traiter de l’eurasisme (1).
Cette notoriété médiatique tranche avec leur discrétion habituelle sur le sujet. Jusqu’à ces dernières semaines, et à part les périodiques de notre large mouvance rebelle, Alexandre Douguine était parfois évoqué par les correspondants permanents du journal Le Monde à Moscou (2). Certes, si ses œuvres complètes ne sont pas accessibles aux lecteurs francophones, ceux-ci disposent néanmoins de quelques ouvrages et textes essentiels traduits (3).
L’engouement des plumitifs du Système altantique-occidental pour le penseur polyglotte du néo-eurasisme témoigne en tout cas de l’intérêt qu’on porte à ses idées. Plus largement, la question de l’Eurasie suscite une réelle curiosité. Outre le n° 59 du magazine Terre et Peuple de ce printemps 2014, signalons que le dossier du nouveau trimestriel de géopolitique animé par Pascal Gauchon, Conflits, concerne « L’Eurasie. Le grand dessein de Poutine ».
Fins connaisseurs des thèses eurasistes, les rédacteurs du Terre et Peuple n° 59 préfèrent pour leur part se rallier à la thèse de l’Eurosibérie. De quoi s’agit-il donc ? C’est en 1998, soit plus d’une dizaine d’années après avoir quitté la métapolitique, que Guillaume Faye y revient avec un essai magistral, L’archéofuturisme. Cet ouvrage qui fit date dans nos milieux, bouscule maintes certitudes tenaces et balance quelques bombes idéologiques dont le fameux concept d’Eurosibérie. Guillaume Faye écrivait qu’« il faudra bien un jour intégrer la Russie et envisager l’avenir sous les traits de l’Eurosibérie. Les déboires actuels de la Russie ne sont que d’ordre transitoire et conjoncturel. Il s’agit simplement de contrer la (naturelle et explicable) volonté des États-Unis de contrôler l’Eurosibérie et de placer la Russie sous un protectorat et une assistance financière, prélude à sa vassalisation stratégique et économique (4) ».
Le concept d’Eurosibérie se réfère explicitement à la « Maison commune » du Soviétique Mikhaïl Gorbatchev exprimée en juillet 1989, et de la « Confédération européenne » esquissée le 31 décembre 1989 par François Mitterrand (5) avant que ces deux projets soient torpillés par les nouveaux agents de l’atlantisme en Europe centrale et orientale parmi lesquels le déplorable théâtreux tchèque Vaclav Havel.
L’Eurosibérie correspond à un espace géographique déterminé. « Notre frontière est sur l’Amour. Face à la Chine. Sur l’Atlantique et le Pacifique, face à la république impériale américaine, unique super-puissance mais dont le déclin géostratégique et culturel est déjà “ viralement ” programmé pour le premier quart du XXIe siècle – dixit Zbigniew Brzezinski, pourtant apologiste de la puissance américaine. Et, sur la Méditerranée et le Caucase, face au bloc musulman (moins divisé qu’on ne le pense) qui ne nous fera surtout jamais de cadeaux et peut constituer la première source de menaces mais aussi, si nous sommes forts, un excellent partenaire… (6) » Alors, éventuellement, « demain, poursuit Faye : de la rade de Brest à celle de Port-Arthur, de nos îles gelées de l’Arctique au soleil victorieux de la Crète, de la lande à la steppe et des fjords au maquis, cent nations libres et unies, regroupées en Empire, pourront peut-être s’octroyer ce que Tacite nommait le Règne de la Terre, Orbis Terræ Regnum (7) ».
En lisant L’archéofuturisme, on remarque que Guillaume Faye écarte la notion même d’Occident. Rappelons qu’il fut l’un des premiers en 1980 à dissocier et à opposer l’Occident – dominé par Washington -, de l’Europe dont nous sommes les paladins (8). Préoccupé par la montée démographique rapide des peuples du Sud, Faye imagine l’Eurosibérie intégrer une « solidarité globale – ethnique, fondamentalement – du Nord face à la menace du Sud. Quoi qu’il en soit, la notion d’Occident disparaît pour céder la place à celle du Monde du Nord, ou Septentrion (9) ». Après l’avoir combattu (10), il se rallie en fin de compte à l’avis de Jean Cau. Parce que « nous ne pouvons pas compter sur les États-Unis pour s’opposer à un mondialisme dont le monde-race blanc ferait seul les frais (11) », son célèbre Discours de la décadence n’excluait pas « ce qui me paraît essentiel pour notre salut : un nationalisme (et donc par là même un refus du mondialisme) qui, quelles que soient les rigueurs qu’il implique et les répugnances qu’il peut inspirer aux décadents que nous sommes (et qui ont lié les idées de liberté à la réalisation de ce mondialisme en lequel elles n’auront plus de contenu et de sens) est notre seul possible Destin (12) ». En effet, « par son action, continue Jean Cau, la Russie a plus le souci de défendre son empire que de “ libérer ” les peuples. C’est en vertu d’une vocation impériale, afin de rester intacte et non par idéalisme moralisant et mondialiste qu’elle agit (13) ». « Telle est, en ces années 70 – et bientôt 80 – ma “ vue de l’esprit ”, poursuit-il. Ô paradoxe n’est-ce pas, que de déclarer qu’une Russie nationale, de par sa résistance à l’Américanisme mondialiste, est peut-être la seule chance de nos nations et de notre monde-race blanc ? Paradoxe apparent, je le crains. Et vérité d’Histoire, je le crois (14). »
Dans Pourquoi nous combattons, publié en 2001, Guillaume Faye revient sur l’Eurosibérie qu’il définit comme un exemple d’« ethnosphère (15) ». Bloc continental à l’économie auto-centrée, c’« est l’espace destinal des peuples européens enfin regroupés, de l’Atlantique au Pacifique, scellant l’alliance historique de l’Europe péninsulaire, de l’Europe centrale et de la Russie (16) ». Il s’agit, dans son esprit, d’une « forteresse commune, la maison commune, l’extension maximale et l’expression naturelle de la notion d’« Empire européen ». Elle serait véritablement la “ Troisième Rome ”, ce que ne fut jamais la Russie (17) ».
Relevons en revanche l’absence dans ce manifeste du Septentrion. Est-ce parce qu’en 1989, on évoquait déjà une communauté euro-atlantique de Vancouver à Vladivostok ? Le 25 septembre 2001, Vladimir Poutine s’adressa en allemand au Bundestag. Il voyait alors la Russie comme un pays européen et occidental. C’était le temps où Moscou tentât d’adhérer à l’Alliance Atlantique. Aux États-Unis, certains cénacles de pensée stratégique proches des paléo-conservateurs, ces adversaires farouches du néo-conservatisme, approuvaient cette démarche destinée in fine à contrer l’ascension chinoise. L’auteur de thriller-fictions, Tom Clancy, en fit un roman, L’Ours et le Dragon (18). Une approche assez similaire se retrouve chez l’écrivain Maurice G. Dantec dans les trois volumes de son Journal métaphysique et polémique. Ainsi écrit-il dans Laboratoire de catastrophe générale que « l’O.T.A.N. doit donc non seulement intégrer au plus vite toutes les anciennes républiques populaires de l’Est européen, mais prévoir à moyen terme une organisation tripartite unifiant les trois grandes puissances boréales : Amérique du Nord, Europe Unie (quel que soit son état, malheureusement) et Russie, plus le Japon, au sein d’un nouveau traité Atlantique – Pacifique Nord, qui puisse faire contrepoids à l’abomination onuzie et aux menaces sino-wahhabites. […] La seule issue pour l’Occident est donc bien de définir un nouvel arc stratégique panocéanique, trinitaire, avec l’Amérique au centre, l’Europe du côté atlantique, et la Fédération de Russie, assistée du Japon, pour l’espace pacifique – sibérien (19) ».
Dénoncé par le national-républicain Régis Debray (20), l’option pan-occidentaliste a trouvé en Maurice G. Dantec son chantre décomplexé. Toutefois, à part l’implication du Japon, le cadre pan-occidental (ou Hyper-Occident) correspond déjà à l’O.C.D.E. (Organisation de coopération et de développement économique) et à l’O.S.C.E. (Organisation pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe). « Issue en 1994 de la transformation de la Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe d’Helsinki (1975), note Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, l’O.S.C.E. est une organisation régionale de sécurité juridiquement reliée à l’O.N.U. Ce forum regroupe les États d’Europe (Russie comprise), d’Asie centrale (les anciennes républiques musulmanes d’U.R.S.S.) et d’Amérique du Nord, soit 51 États membres. L’O.S.C.E. est tournée vers la maîtrise des armements et la diplomatie préventive (21). » Aujourd’hui, l’O.S.C.E. compte 57 membres ainsi que six partenaires méditerranéens pour la coopération (Algérie, Égypte, Israël, Jordanie, Maroc, Tunisie), et cinq partenaires asiatiques (Japon, Corée du Sud, Thaïlande, Afghanistan et Australie). Par ailleurs, l’orientation nord-hémisphérique que préfigure imparfaitement l’O.S.C.E., ne se confine pas au seul cénacle littéraire. « J’ai aussi été l’un des tout premiers, à l’époque de l’effondrement soviétique, à lancer l’idée de la construction politique d’un “ continent boréal ”, de Brest à Vladivostok, affirme Jean-Marie Le Pen (22). » En 2007, son programme présidentiel mentionnait de manière explicite une « sphère boréale » de Brest à Vladivostok.
Dans son dernier tome du Journal métaphysique et polémique, Maurice G. Dantec, converti, suite à ses lectures patristiques et philosophiques, au catholicisme traditionaliste, vomit l’Union européenne, l’O.N.U., le multiculturalisme, et en appelle à l’avènement d’« États continentaux – fédéraux, vagues souvenirs des empires d’autrefois (23) ». Exigeant une « Grande Politique » pour le pâle mécanisme européen qu’il surnomme « Zéropa-Land », il croit toutefois que « véritable fondation politique du continent, car seule capable historiquement de fonder quelque chose, l’O.T.A.N., ce vénérable Anneau de Pouvoir, est seule habilitée à le refondre. Elle va s’auto-organiser dans le développement tri-polaire de l’Occident futur : Russie/Europe de l’Est – Grande-Bretagne + Commonwealth – Amérique hémisphérique (24) ». Enthousiasmé par l’American way of life, l’auteur de Babylon Babies prétend que « les Américains, sous peu, auront encore plus besoin des Russes que ceux-ci des Américains; un peu comme avec la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, la Quatrième Guerre mondiale, qui est le régime international – pacifié de la guerre comme continuation du terrorisme par d’autres moyens, va fournir le décor pour un basculement d’alliance stratégique comme jamais il n’y eut dans l’histoire des hommes. Le dollar U.S. intronisé monnaie en Sibérie. Les ressources humaines et naturelles de la Russie, les ressources humaines et financières des États-Unis. À elles deux, ces deux nations l’ont montré, elles seraient capables de mettre en place un véritable condominium planétaire, basé sur les technologies de la conquête spatiale et un partage des responsabilités qui équivaudraient à une win-win situation, comme aiment le dire ces salauds de capitalistes yankees (25) ». Acquis à l’Occident génétiquement survitaminé, Dantec balaie sans aucune hésitation toute Eurosibérie possible. « Poutine devrait y réfléchir à deux fois avant de s’engager avec les Franco-boches, contre le Nouvel Occident, avertit Dantec. Malgré les délires de certains “ penseurs ” de la “ droite révolutionnaire ”, les Sibériens n’ont strictement rien à battre des pantins qui s’agitent à Strasbourg ou à Bruxelles, c’est-à-dire à leurs antipodes sur tous les plans. Quand je lis, de-ci de-là, de telles avanies sur une sorte de bloc euro-continental qui s’étendrait de Paris – Ville lumière jusqu’à Vladivostok, et sous le nom d’Europe, rien ne peut retenir mon rire d’éclater à la face de ces bidules prophétologiques dérisoires, et même pas vraiment criminels. Imaginent-ils donc qu’un marin russe qui pêche dans les eaux du Kamtchatka puisse se sentir en quelque façon “ européen ”, à quelques encablures du Japon? Anchorage sera toujours plus près d’Irkoutsk que n’importe laquelle des capitales de l’union franco-boche (26). »
Bien que réfractaire au concept eurosibérien, Dantec n’en demeure pas moins le défenseur d’un monde – race blanc, d’un Septentrion sous une forme déviante et identitairement inacceptable. D’autres font le même constat mais en lui donnant une formulation plus convaincante. Co-fondateur du site Europe Maxima, mon camarade et vieux complice Rodolphe Badinand promeut un Saint-Empire européen arctique. « La maîtrise du pôle Nord est une nécessité géopolitique et mythique, note-t-il. Outre qu’il est impératif que l’Empire s’assure du foyer originel de nos ancêtres hyperboréens, le contrôle du cercle polaire revêt une grande valeur stratégique. Si le réchauffement planétaire se poursuit et s’accentue, dans quelques centaines d’années, la banquise aura peut-être presque disparu, faisant de l’océan polaire, un domaine maritime de toute première importance. En s’étendant sur les littoraux des trois continents qui la bordent, le Saint-Empire européen arctique, dans sa superficie idéale qui comprendrait […] l’Eurosibérie et les territoires septentrionaux de l’Amérique du Nord (Alaska, Yukon, Territoire du Nord-Ouest, Nunavut, Québec, Labrador, Terre-Neuve, Acadie, Provinces maritimes de l’Atlantique), le Groenland et l’Islande, détiendrait un atout appréciable dans le jeu des puissances mondiales. C’est enfin la transposition tangible dans l’espace du symbole polaire. Comme l’Empereur est la référence de l’Empire, notre Empire redeviendra le pôle du monde, le référent des renaissances spirituelles et identitaires de tous les peuples, loin de tout universalisme et de tout mondialisme (27). »
Guillaume Faye, Jean Cau, Maurice G. Dantec, Rodolphe Badinand réfléchissent au fait politique à partir du critère géographique de grand espace. Ils poursuivent, consciemment ou non, les travaux du philosophe euro-américain Francis Parker Yockey (28), du géopoliticien allemand Karl Haushofer et du théoricien géopolitique belge Jean Thiriart (29). Dès la décennie 1960, ce dernier pense à un État-nation continental grand-européen qui s’étendrait de Brest à Vladivostok. Puis, au fil du temps et en fonction des soubresauts propres aux relations internationales, il en vient à soutenir dans les années 1980 un empire euro-soviétique. La fin de l’U.R.S.S. en 1991 ne l’empêche pas d’envisager une nouvelle orientation géopolitique paneuropéenne totale. Influencé, au soir de sa vie, par son compatriote Luc Michel, Jean Thiriart suggère « une République impériale allant de Dublin à Vladivostok dans les structures d’un État unitaire, centralisé (30) ». Le fondement juridique de cet État grand-européen reposerait sur l’« omnicitoyenneté ». « Né à Malaga, diplômé à Paris, médecin à Kiev, plus tard bourgmestre à Athènes le seul et même homme jouira de tous les droits politiques à n’importe quel endroit de la République unitaire (31). » Mais quelles frontières pour cet espace politique commun ? « Les limites territoriales vitales de l’Europe “ Grande Nation ”, écrit Thiriart, vont ou passent à l’Ouest de l’Islande jusqu’à Vladivostok, de Stockholm jusqu’au Sahara-Sud, des Canaries au Kamtchaka, de l’Écosse au Béloutchistan. […] L’Europe sans le contrôle des deux rives à Gibraltar et à Istanbul traduirait un concept aussi risible et dangereux que les États-Unis sans le contrôle de Panama et des Malouines. Il nous faut des rivages faciles à défendre : Océan glacial Arctique, Atlantique, Sahara (rivage terrestre), accès aux détroits indispensables, Gibraltar, Suez, Istanbul, Aden – Djibouti, Ormuz (32). » La Grande Europe selon Thiriart intègre non seulement l’Afrique du Nord, mais aussi la Turquie, le Proche-Orient et l’Asie Centrale, Pakistan inclus ! La capitale de cette Méga-Europe serait… Istanbul !
On doit reconnaître que les thèses exposées ici dépassent largement ce que François Thual et Aymeric Chauprade désignent comme des « panismes ». « On appelle panisme, ou pan-idée, une représentation géopolitique fondée sur une communauté d’ordre ethnique, religieuse, régionale ou continentale. Le “ ou ” ici n’étant pas exclusif. Le concept forgé dès les années 1930 par la géopolitique allemande de Karl Haushofer sous le vocable Pan-Idee, est repris et développé par François Thual dans les années 1990 (33). »
Nonobstant l’inclusion de l’Afrique du Nord dans l’aire politique grande-européenne, l’ultime vision de Jean Thiriart correspond imparfaitement à l’eurasisme dont Alexandre Douguine est l’une des figures les plus connues. Or la réflexion eurasiste ne se réduit pas à cette seule personnalité.
Pour faire simple et court, car il ne s’agit pas de retracer ici la généalogie et le développement tant historique qu’actuel de l’eurasisme (34), ce courant novateur résulte, d’une part, du panslavisme, et, d’autre part, du slavophilisme. Inventé à la Renaissance par un Croate, Vinko Pribojevitch, le panslavisme entend restaurer l’unité politique des peuples slaves à partir de leur héritage historique et linguistique commun retracé par des philologues et des poètes. Le panslavisme se politise vite. En 1823 – 1825 existe en Russie une Société des Slaves unis liée au mouvement libéral décabriste. Contrairement à ses prolongements ultérieurs, le premier panslavisme est plutôt libéral, voire révolutionnaire – l’anarchiste Michel Bakounine participe en 1848 au Ire Congrès panslave à Prague. Cette réunion internationale en plein « Printemps des Peuples » est un échec du fait de son éclatement en trois tendances antagonistes :
— un courant libéral et démocratique représenté par la Société démocratique polonaise, fondée en 1832, qui s’oppose surtout aux menées russes et veut rassembler les Slaves de l’Ouest catholiques romains ou réformés;
— une tendance plus attachée à la foi orthodoxe et donc plus alignée sur la Russie impériale, qui agite les Slaves du Sud (Monténégrins, Serbes, Macédoniens, Bulgares) vivant dans des Balkans soumis au joug ottoman et qui rêve d’une libération nationale grâce à l’intervention de Saint-Pétersbourg, le seul État slave-orthodoxe indépendant (c’est le « russo-slavisme »);
— une faction austro-slaviste prônée par des Tchèques, des Polonais de Galicie, des Slovaques et des Croates qui essaye de fédérer des Slaves de l’Ouest, des Balkans et de l’espace danubien sous l’autorité des Habsbourg.
La postérité du panslavisme dans la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle suit des prolongements inattendus. Le « russo-slavisme » vire en un « pan-orthodoxisme » impérialiste qui n’hésite pas à exclure Polonais et Tchèques jugés trop occidentaux et « romano-germains » quand il ne les russifie pas. Encouragé par de brillants publicistes dont le Russe Nicolas Danilevski, ces panslavistes pro-russes approuvent la guerre russo-turque de 1877 – 1878 dont la victoire militaire russe se solde au Congrès de Berlin en défaite diplomatique à l’initiative des puissances occidentales.
Opposé à la présence russe, les panslavistes polonais évoluent vers des positions nationalistes plus ou moins affirmées. La Démocratie nationale de Dmovski œuvre avant 1914 pour un royaume de Pologne en union personnelle avec le tsar tandis que le militant socialiste et futur maréchal polonais, Joseph Pilsudski, récuse toute collaboration avec la Russie. Ayant en tête l’âge d’or de l’Union de Pologne – Lituanie entre les XIVe et XVIIIe siècles, ce Polonais natif de la ville lituanienne de Vilnius envisage un glacis anti-russe de la Baltique à la Mer Noire, soit la Pologne, la Lituanie, la Biélorussie et l’Ukraine : la Fédération Intermarum ou Fédération Entre Mers. Cette aspiration fédéraliste demeurera le cœur nucléaire du prométhéisme de Pilsudski. Ce projet de Fédération Entre Mers (avec les États baltes) vient de réapparaître dans le programme électoral présidentiel du mouvement ultra-nationaliste ukrainien Pravyï Sektor (Secteur droit) de Dmytro Yaroch (35).
Le conservatisme de la Double-Monarchie déçoit l’austro-slavisme qui laisse bientôt la place à des panismes partiels (ou panslavismes régionaux). En 1914, la Serbie encourage l’irrédentisme des Serbes de Bosnie au nom du yougoslavisme. Mais ce yougoslavisme, orthodoxe et russophile, à forte tonalité panserbe, diffère tant du yougoslavisme de l’archevêque croate Joseph Strossmayer qui souhaite rassembler autour des Habsbourg les peuples slaves du Sud que du yougoslavisme libertaire et socialiste favorable à une large fédération balkanique, concrétisé en août 1903 par l’éphémère république socialiste macédonienne de Kroutchevo. On sait que l’archiduc François-Ferdinand, époux d’une aristocrate tchèque, préconisait une Triple-Monarchie avec un pilier slave, ce que ne voulaient pas les Hongrois d’où peut-être une connivence objective entre certains services serbes et quelques milieux républicains magyars…
Faut-il pour autant parler du naufrage du panslavisme ? Sûrement pas quand on examine la politique étrangère de l’excellent président du Bélarus, Alexandre Loukachenko. Depuis 1994, date de l’arrivée au pouvoir de cet authentique homme d’État dont l’action contraste avec la nullité des Cameron, Merkel, l’« Écouté de Neuilly » ou notre Flamby hexagonal !, le président bélarussien a à plusieurs reprises encouragé le renouveau panslaviste. Permettez-moi par conséquent de m’inscrire ici en faux avec l’affirmation d’Alain Cagnat qui qualifie le Bélarus de « musée du stalinisme. [… Cet État] n’a aucune existence internationale. Quant au pseudo-particularisme linguistique ou culturel biélorusse, cela tient au folklore. On peut logiquement penser que, une fois refermée la parenthèse Loukachenko, les Biélorussiens se hâteront de rejoindre le giron russe (36) ». Que le russe soit depuis 1995 la langue co-officielle du Bélarus à côté du bélarussien n’implique pas nécessairement une intégration future dans la Russie sinon les Irlandais, tous anglophones, demanderaient à rejoindre non pas la Grande-Bretagne (ils ont largement donné), mais plutôt les États-Unis, ou bien les Jurassiens suisses la République française. La présidence d’Alexandre Loukachenko a consolidé l’identité nationale bélarussienne qui s’enracine à la fois dans les traditions polythéistes slaves et l’héritage chrétien. Lors du solstice d’été, le Bélarus célèbre la fête de Yanka Koupali. Ce rite très ancien témoigne de l’attachement de la population à ses racines ainsi qu’à la nature. Il s’agit d’invoquer les éléments naturels pour que les récoltes soient bonnes. De nombreuses danses folkloriques sont alors exécutées par des jeunes femmes aux têtes couronnées de fleurs.
Par ailleurs, membre du Mouvement des non-alignés et allié du Venezuela de feu le Commandante Hugo Chavez, le Bélarus se trouve à l’avant-garde de la résistance au Nouveau désordre mondial propagé par l’Occident américanomorphe. Les projets d’union Russie – Bélarus sont pour l’heure gelés. Pour s’unir, il faut un consentement mutuel. Or le peuple bélarussien se sent autre par rapport à ses cousins russes. La revue en ligne, Le Courrier de la Russie, rapporte une certaine méfiance générale envers le grand voisin oriental. Une esthéticienne de Minsk déclare au journaliste russe : « Si la Russie et la Biélorussie se réunissent, ce sera du grand n’importe quoi. En Biélorussie, il y a de la discipline et de l’ordre, mais en Russie, il y a trop d’injustice, c’est le désordre (37). » Quelques peu dépités par les témoignages recueillis, les auteurs de l’article soulignent finalement que « pour les Biélorusses, la langue russe n’est pas associée directement avec la Russie », que « la Russie est perçue plutôt comme une force politique, du reste à l’esprit impérial assez désagréable » et quand « nous avons proposé à des étudiants de passer une sorte de test projectif – dessiner leur pays sur la carte du monde en s’orientant non sur les connaissances géographiques mais sur les associations personnelles, la majorité des Biélorusses ont fourni une image très semblable. Leur pays au centre et, autour, comme des pétales de marguerite et avec une importance équivalente, la Russie, la Pologne, la Lituanie, le Venezuela… (38) »
Sur la crise ukrainienne, le Président Loukachenko rejette toute fédéralisation du pays. Il a aussi reconnu et reçu le gouvernement provisoire de Kyiv et condamne les tentatives de sécession. Déjà en 2008, ce fidèle allié de Moscou n’a jamais reconnu l’indépendance de l’Abkhazie et de l’Ossétie du Sud. Mieux, il n’hésite pas à contrarier les intérêts russes. Le 26 août 2013, un proche de Poutine, Vladislav Baumgertner, directeur général d’Uralkali, une importante firme russe spécialisée dans la potasse, est arrêté à Minsk et incarcéré. « Quels que soient les sentiments qu’il inspire, le président biélorusse Alexandre Loukachenko entretient avec le Kremlin des relations qui sont plus d’égal à égal que celles des Grecs avec Merkel : imaginez ce qui se passerait si le patron d’une grosse entreprise allemande était arrêté en Grèce (39). » Minsk peut donc se montrer indocile envers Moscou qui respecte bien plus que les donneurs de leçons occidentaux la souveraineté étatique. En outre, contrairement encore à l’État-continent, le Bélarus n’appartient pas à l’O.M.C. et applique encore la peine de mort.
À la fin des années 1830 apparaissent en Russie les slavophiles (Alexis Khomiakov, Constantin Léontiev, Ivan Kireïevski, Constantin Aksakov, Fiodor Dostoïevski, etc.) dont la dénomination était à l’origine un sobriquet donné par leurs adversaires. Si ces romantiques particuliers ne sont pas toujours panslavistes, ils s’accordent volontiers sur l’exaltation des idiosyncrasies de leur civilisation, en particulier sa foi orthodoxe, sa paysannerie et son autocratie. Hostiles aux occidentalistes qui célèbrent un monde occidental romano-germanique hérétique en constante modification, les slavophiles s’associent trop au pouvoir tsariste et s’étiolent à l’orée de la Grande Guerre.
On a pu dire que leur dernier représentant fut Alexandre Soljénitsyne. Quand sombre l’Union Soviétique, l’ancien dissident envisage une « Union des peuples slaves » avec la Russie, l’Ukraine, le Bélarus et les marches septentrionales du Kazakhstan fortement russophones. Cependant, Soljénitsyne ne nie pas la réalité des langues, cultures et identités bélarussienne et ukrainienne. Il les admet et veut même les valoriser ! Il prévient néanmoins que « si le peuple ukrainien désirait effectivement se détacher de nous, nul n’aurait le droit de le retenir de force. Mais divers sont ces vastes espaces et seule la population locale peut déterminer le destin de son petit pays, le sort de sa région (40) ».
La Première Guerre mondiale, les révolutions russes de 1917, le renversement du tsarisme et la guerre civile jusqu’en 1921 bouleversent les héritiers du slavophilisme. C’est au sein de l’émigration russe blanche qu’émerge alors l’eurasisme. Exilés à Prague et à Paris, les premiers eurasistes, Nicolas Troubetskoï, Pierre Savitsky, Georges Vernadsky, Pierre Suvchinskiy, redécouvrent le caractère asiatique de leur histoire et réhabilitent les deux cent cinquante ans d’occupation tataro-mongole. Saluant l’œuvre des khan de Karakorum, ils conçoivent l’espace russe comme un troisième monde particulier. S’ils proclament le caractère eurasien des régions actuellement ukrainiennes de la Galicie, de la Volhynie et de la Podolie, ils se désintéressent superbement des Balkans, du Caucase et de la Crimée. Parfois précurseurs d’une troisième voie, certains d’entre-eux approuvent le renouveau soviétique sous la férule de Staline si bien que quelques-uns retournent en U.R.S.S. pour se retrouver envoyés au Goulag ou exécutés.
Pensée « géographiste », voire géopolitiste, parce qu’elle prend en compte l’espace steppique, l’eurasisme ne dure qu’une dizaine d’années et semble disparu en 1945. Remarquons que le numéro-culte d’Éléments consacré à la Russie en 1986 ignore l’eurasisme pourtant présent en filigrane dans certains milieux restreints du P.C.U.S. (41). Cependant, la transmission entre le premier eurasisme et l’eurasisme actuel revient à Lev Goumilev qui sut élaborer un nouvel eurasisme à portée ethno-biologico-naturaliste. Le néo-eurasisme resurgit dans les années 1990 et prend rapidement un ascendant certain au sein du gouvernement. Dès 1996, un eurasiste connu, l’arabophone Evgueni Primakov, devient ministre des Affaires étrangères avant d’être nommé président du gouvernement russe entre 1998 et 1999.
Aujourd’hui, le néo-eurasisme russe se structure autour de trois principaux pôles. Activiste métapolitique de grand talent, Alexandre Douguine ajoute aux travaux des précurseurs et de Goumilev divers apports d’origine ouest-européenne comme l’école de la Tradition primordiale (Guénon et Evola), de la « Révolution conservatrice » allemande, des « Nouvelles Droites » françaises, thioises et italiennes, et des approches marxistes hétérodoxes d’ultra-gauche (42). Un autre « courant, autour de la revue Evrazija (Eurasie) d’Édouard Bagramov, est plus culturel et folkloriste, explique Marlène Laruelle. Son thème central est la mixité, l’alliance slavo-turcique, qu’il illustre par la réhabilitation de l’Empire mongol et des minorités turco-musulmanes dans l’histoire russe, par une comparaison entre religiosité orthodoxe et mysticisme soufi : la fidélité à la Russie serait ainsi le meilleur mode de protection de l’identité nationale des petits peuples eurasiens. Sur le plan politique, Evrazija appelle à la reconstitution d’une unité politique et économique de l’espace post-soviétique autour du projet du président Nazarbaev, qui finance en partie la revue. Le troisième et dernier grand courant eurasiste, celui d’Alexandre Panarine et de Boris Erassov, est le plus théorique puisqu’il tente de réhabiliter la notion d’« empire » : l’empire ne serait ni un nationalisme étroit ni un impérialisme agressif mais une nouvelle forme de citoyenneté, d’« étaticité » reposant sur des valeurs et des principes et non sur le culte d’une nation. Il incarnerait sur le plan politique la diversité nationale de l’Eurasie et annoncerait au plan international l’arrivée d’un monde dit “ post-moderne ” où les valeurs conservatrices, religieuses et ascétiques gagneraient sur les idéaux de progrès de l’Occident (43) ». Treize ans plus tard, en dépit du décès de Goumilev et de Panarine, cette répartition théorique persiste avec l’apparition d’« un courant néo-eurasiste sinophile, incarné par Mikhaïl Titarenko, le directeur de l’Institut d’Extrême-Orient de l’Académie des Sciences (44) ». Quoique balbutiante, cette orientation tend à s’affirmer progressivement. « Les cinq cents ans de domination de l’Occident sur le monde sont en train de s’achever, assurait en 2007 Anatoli Outkine, historien à l’Institut des États-Unis et du Canada de l’Académie des Sciences, et, in extremis, la Russie a réussi à prendre le train des nouveaux pays qui montent, aux côtés de la Chine, de l’Inde et du Brésil. […] L’Europe aurait pu être le centre du monde si seulement la Russie avait été acceptée dans l’O.T.A.N. et l’Union européenne. […] En 2025, c’est Shanghai qui sera le centre du monde, et la Russie sera dans le camp de l’Orient. Aujourd’hui, nous n’attendons plus rien de l’Occident (45). » « L’Extrême-Orient est systématiquement valorisé dans les discours officiels russes comme une région d’avenir, signale Marlène Laruelle. Son évocation participe en effet de l’idée que la Russie est une puissance asiatique ayant un accès direct à la région la plus dynamique du monde, l’Asie – Pacifique dont elle est partie intégrante. Si tel est le cas sur le plan géographique – bien que l’Asie du Nord soit marginale, économiquement, comparée à l’Asie du Sud, qui concentre le dynamisme actuel -, il n’en est rien au niveau économique. Le commerce transfrontalier avec la Chine est bel et bien en pleine expansion, et des projets de zone de libre-échange entre la Russie, la Chine et la Corée du Sud sont à l’ordre du jour. Mais, globalement, l’économie russe est encore peu tournée vers l’Asie et peu intégrée à ses mécanismes régionaux (46). »
L’eurasisme n’est pas propre à la Russie. Le Kazakhstan de Nursultan Nazarbaïev assume, lui aussi, cette idéologie. Inquiet des revendications territoriales de Soljénitsyne, il a transféré la capitale d’Almaty à une ville créée ex-nihilo, Astana, dont l’université d’État s’appelle officiellement Lev-Goumilev… Dans le n° 1 de Conflits, Tancrède Josserand traite avec brio de l’eurasisme turc (47). L’eurasisme est aussi présent en Hongrie via le pantouranisme dont le Jobbik se veut le continuateur. Mais, dans ce dernier cas, l’idéocratie eurasiste exprimée en Mitteleuropa apparaît surtout comme un cheval de Troie pro-turc. Le Jobbik souhaiterait que l’Union européenne s’ouvre à Ankara. Avec lucidité, Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier estime que « lorsque ce type de production n’est pas destiné à promouvoir la candidature turque à l’Union européenne, l’« eurasisme » européen accorde une place centrale à l’alliance russe, la mission historique de la “ Troisième Rome ” consistant faire de l’Asie du Nord le prolongement géopolitique de l’Europe. Aussi serait-il plus adéquat de parler d’« Eurosibérie » (48) ».
Existe-t-il en Chine une pensée eurasiste ? Impossible en l’état de répondre à cette question. Ces derniers jours, les médiats ont rapporté que Pékin aimerait construire une ligne à grande vitesse de 13 000 km qui relierait le Nord-Ouest de la Chine aux États-Unis en deux jours par un train roulant à 350 km/h. Cette hypothétique L.G.V. traverserait la Sibérie, l’Alaska et le Canada et franchirait le détroit de Béring par un tunnel de 200 km (49). En revanche existe au Japon jusqu’en 1941 une mouvance eurasiste. Entre 1905 et 1940, les milieux cultivés de l’archipel débattent avec vigueur de deux orientations géopolitiques contradictoires : le Nanshin-ron ou « Doctrine d’expansion vers le Sud » (l’Asie du Sud-Est et les îles du Pacifique, ce qui implique d’affronter les puissances européennes et étasunienne) et le Hokushin-ron ou « Doctrine d’expansion vers le Nord » (à savoir combattre l’U.R.S.S. – Russie afin de s’emparer de la partie Nord de Sakhaline, de la Mongolie, de Vladivostok, du lac Baïkal et de la Sibérie centrale). Adversaire de la Faction du contrôle (Toseiha) de Tojo, le Kodoha (ou Faction de la voie impériale) du général Sadao Araki a en partie défendu l’Hokushin-ron. La synthèse revient à Tokutomi Sohô qui se prononce en faveur d’une invasion simultanée du Nord et du Sud, d’où l’affirmation dans un second temps d’une visée pan-asiatique. On sait cependant que la poussée vers le Nord est brisée lors de la défaite nippone de Khalkin-Gol en 1939 (50). Cette digression extrême-orientale n’est pas superflue. Robert Steuckers rappelle que le Kontinentalblock de Karl Haushofer a été « très probablement repris des hommes d’État japonais du début du XXe siècle, tels le prince Ito, le comte Goto et le Premier ministre Katsura, avocats d’une alliance grande-continentale germano-russo-japonaise (51) ».
Éclectique au Japon, en Turquie, en Hongrie, l’eurasisme l’est aussi en Russie. « L’idéologie néo-eurasiste, précise Marlène Laruelle, peut ainsi se présenter comme une science naturelle (Goumilev), une géopolitique et un spiritisme (Douguine), une intégration économique (Nazarbaev, organes de la C.E.I.), un mode de gestion des problèmes internes de la Fédération (eurasisme turcique), une philosophie de l’histoire (Panarine), une “ culturologie ” (Bagramov), un nouveau terrain scientifique (Vestnik Evrazii) (52) », d’où une multiplicité de contentieux internes : Panarine et Bagramov ont par exemple critiqué les approches biologisantes, ethnicisantes et métapolitiques de Goumilev et de Douguine.
L’eurasisme reste un pragmatisme géopolitique qui, à rebours de l’idée eurosibérienne, prend en compte la diversité ethno-spirituelle des peuples autochtones de Sibérie. Quid en effet dans l’Eurosibérie ethnosphérique de leur existence ? Le territoire sibérien n’est pas un désert humain. Y vivent des peuples minoritaires autochtones tels les Samoyèdes, les Bouriates, les Yakoutes, etc. Il ne faut pas avoir à ce sujet une volonté assimilatrice comme l’appliquèrent les Russes tsaristes et les Soviétiques. La nature de la Russie est d’être multinationale. Entre ici les notions complémentaires d’ethnopolitique et de psychologie des peuples. « Il convient d’attacher la plus grande importance à l’étude de ces unités secondaires qu’en France on appelle régions et pays, déclare Abel Miroglio […]. Une bonne psychologie nationale ne peut se dispenser de s’appuyer sur la connaissance des diverses régions; bien sûr, elle la domine, elle ne s’y réduit pas; et pareillement la psychologie de la région exige, pour être bien conduite, l’étude de ses divers terroirs (53). » Par conséquent, si la société russe adopte une solution nationaliste telle que la défendent des « nationaux-démocrates » anti-Poutine à la mode Alexeï Navalny, elle perdra inévitablement les territoires sibériens. Or ce vaste espace participe pleinement à la civilisation russe. « La civilisation est un ensemble plus large qui peut contenir plusieurs cultures, juge Gaston Bouthoul. Car la civilisation est un complexe très général dont les dominantes sont les connaissances scientifiques et techniques et les principales doctrines philosophiques. Les cultures, tout en participant de la civilisation à laquelle elles appartiennent, présentent surtout des différences de traditions esthétiques, historiques et mythiques (54). » La civilisation russe est polyculturaliste qui est l’exact contraire radical du multiculturalisme marchand.
Voilà pourquoi Douguine assigne à l’Orthodoxie, au judaïsme, à l’islam et au chamanisme – animisme le rang de religions traditionnelles, ce que n’ont pas le catholicisme et les protestantismes représentés dans l’étranger proche par une multitude de sectes évangéliques d’origine étatsunienne. C’est ainsi qu’il faut comprendre son fameux propos : « Le rejet du chauvinisme, du racisme et de la xénophobie procède d’abord chez moi d’une fidélité à la philosophie des premiers Eurasistes, qui soulignaient de façon positive le mélange de races et d’ethnies dans la formation et le développement de l’identité russe et surtout grand-russe. Il est par ailleurs une conséquence logique des principes de la géopolitique, selon lesquels le territoire détermine en quelque sorte le destin de ceux qui y vivent (le Boden vaut plus que le Blut) (55) ». Rien de surprenant de la part d’Alexandre Douguine, traditionaliste de confession orthodoxe vieux-croyants. Il ajoute même que, pour lui, « le traditionalisme est la source de l’inspiration, le point de départ. Mais il faut le développer plus avant, le vivre, le penser et repenser (56) ».
Alexandre Douguine, en lecteur attentif de Carl Schmitt, systématise l’opposition entre la Terre et la Mer (57), entre les puissances telluriques et les puissances thalassocratiques. Alors que triomphe une « vie liquide » décrite par Zygmunt Bauman (58), sa démarche nettement tellurocratique est cohérente puisqu’elle s’appuie sur le Sol et non sur le Sang dont la nature constitue, en dernière analyse, un liquide. Et puis, en authentique homme de Tradition, Douguine insiste sur le fait, primordial à ses yeux, qu’ « un Eurasiste n’est donc nullement un “ habitant du continent eurasiatique ”. Il est bien plutôt l’homme qui assume volontairement la position d’une lutte existentielle, idéologique et métaphysique, contre l’américanisme, la globalisation et l’impérialisme des valeurs occidentales (la “ société ouverte ”, les “ droits de l’homme ”, la société de marché). Vous pouvez donc très bien être eurasiste en vivant en Amérique latine, au Canada, en Australie ou en Afrique (59) ». Marlène Laruelle considère néanmoins que « si l’eurasisme est bien un nationalisme, il se différencie des courants ethnonationalistes plus classiques par sa mise en valeur de l’État et non de l’ethnie, par son assimilation entre Russie et Eurasie, entre nation et Empire, et emprunte beaucoup au discours soviétique (60) ». Il est évident que les eurasistes pensent en terme d’empire et non en nation pourvue de « frontières naturelles » établies et reconnues. Guère suspect de cosmopolitisme, l’écrivain Vladimir Volkoff fait dire dans son roman uchronique, Alexandra, à Ivan Barsoff, l’un des personnages principaux qui emprunte pas mal des traits de l’auteur, qui est le Premier ministre de cette tsarine, que son empire russe « n’a pas de limites naturelles (à moins que ce soient les océans Arctique et Indien, Pacifique et Atlantique), il n’a pas d’unité linguistique, ni raciale, ni même religieuse : il est tissu autour d’une triple colonne torsadée constituée par l’orthodoxie, la monarchie et l’idéalisme du peuple russe servant de noyau aux autres (61) ».
Par-delà les écrits de Guillaume Faye, de Jean Thiriart, de Maurice G. Dantec, des eurasistes ou des officiers nippons, tous veulent maîtriser le Heartland, ce « Cœur de la Terre ». Correspondant à l’ensemble Oural – Sibérie occidentale, cette notion revient au Britannique Halford Mackinder qui l’écrit en 1904 dans « Le pivot géographique de l’Histoire ». Pour Mackinder, le Heartland est un espace inaccessible à la navigation depuis l’Océan. Pour Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, « le concept de Heartland et celui d’Eurasie […] se recoupent partiellement (62) ». Il entérine ce qu’avance Zbignew Brzezinski à propos de cette zone-pivot : « Passant de l’échelle régionale à l’approche planétaire, la géopolitique postule que la prééminence sur le continent eurasien sert de point d’ancrage à la domination globale (63) ». Le grand géopolitologue étatsunien se réfère implicitement à la thèse de Mackinder pour qui contrôler le Heartland revient à dominer l’Île mondiale formée de l’Europe, de l’Asie et de l’Afrique, et donc à maîtriser le monde entier. Cette célèbre formulation ne lui appartient pas. L’historien François Bluche rapporte qu’en novembre 1626, le chevalier de Razilly adresse à Richelieu un mémoire dans lequel est affirmé que « “ Quiconque est maître de la mer, a un grand pouvoir sur terre ”. [Cette trouvaille] poursuivra le Cardinal, l’obsédera, inspirera directement le Testament politique (64) ». « L’Eurasie demeure, en conséquence, l’échiquier sur lequel se déroule le combat pour la primauté globale (65). » Il faut toutefois se garder des leurres propres au « géopolitisme ». Ce dernier « est venu combler le vide provoqué par les basses pressions idéologiques. Il ne s’agit pas de recourir à la géographie fondamentale – comme savoir scientifique et méthode d’analyse – pour démêler l’écheveau des conflits et tenter d’apporter des réponses aux défis des temps présents, mais d’une vision idéologique qui se limite à quelques pauvres axiomes : la Russie est située au cœur du Heartland et elle est appelée à dominer (66) ».
Attention cependant à ne pas verser dans le manichéisme géopolitique ! Toute véritable puissance doit d’abord se penser amphibie, car, à la Terre et à la Mer, une stratégie complète s’assure maintenant de la projection des forces tout en couvrant les dimensions aérienne, sous-marine, spatiale ainsi que le cyberespace et la guerre de l’information. C’est ainsi qu’il faut saisir qu’à la suite de Robert Steuckers, « l’eurasisme, dans notre optique, relève bien plutôt d’un concept géographique et stratégique (67) ».
De nouvelles études sur les écrits de Mackinder démontrent en fait qu’il attachait une importance cruciale au Centreland, la « Terre centrale arabe », qui coïncide avec le Moyen-Orient. Et puis, que se soit l’Eurosibérie ou l’Eurasie, l’autorité organisatrice de l’espace politique ainsi créé doit se préoccuper de la gestion des immenses frontières terrestres et maritimes. Actuellement, les États-Unis ont beau avoir fortifié leur mur en face du Mexique, ils n’arrivent pas à contenir les flux migratoires clandestins des Latinos. L’Union pseudo-européenne est incapable de ralentir la submersion migratoire à travers la Méditerranée. Même si toutes les frontières eurosibériennes étaient sous surveillance électronique permanente et si était appliquée une préférence européenne, à la rigueur nationale, voire ethno-régionale, il est probable que cela freinerait l’immigration, mais ne l’arrêterait pas, à moins d’accepter la décroissance pour soi, une économie de puissance pour la communauté géopolitique et la fin de la libre circulation pour tous en assignant à chacun un territoire de vie précis.
Vu leur superficie, l’Eurosibérie ou l’Eurasie n’incarnent-elles pas de véritables démesures géopolitiques ? Si oui, elles portent en leur sein des germes inévitables de schisme civilisationnel comme l’a bien vu en poète-visionnaire le romancier Jean-Claude Albert-Weill. Dans Sibéria, le troisième et dernier volume de L’Altermonde, magnifique fresque uchronique qui dépeint une Eurosibérie fière d’elle-même et rare roman vraiment néo-droitiste de langue française (68), on perçoit les premières divergences entre une vieille Europe, adepte du Chat, et une nouvelle, installée en Sibérie, qui vénère le Rat.
Le risque d’éclatement demeure sous-jacent en Russie, particulièrement en Sibérie. Dès les années 1860 se manifestait un mouvement indépendantiste sibérien de Grigori Potanine, chantre de « La Sibérie aux Sibériens ! ». Libéral nationalitaire, ce mouvement fomenta vers 1865 une insurrection qui aurait bénéficié de l’appui de citoyens américains et d’exilés polonais. Quelques années plus tôt, vers 1856 – 1857, des entreprises étatsuniennes se proposaient de financer l’entière réalisation de voies ferrées entre Irkoutsk et Tchita. La Russie déclina bien sûr la proposition. Pendant la guerre civile russe, Potanine présida un gouvernement provisoire sibérien hostile à la fois aux « Rouges » et aux « Blancs ». Ce séparatisme continue encore. En octobre 1993, en pleine crise politique, Sverdlovsk adopta une constitution pour la « République ouralienne ». Plus récemment, en 2010, le F.S.B. s’inquiéta de l’activisme du groupuscule Solution nationale pour la Sibérie qui célèbre Potanine… Il est à parier que des officines occidentales couvent d’un grand intérêt d’éventuelles séditions sibériennes qui, si elles réussissaient, briseraient définitivement tout projet d’eurasisme ou d’Eurosibérie.
L’Eurosibérie « est un “ paradigme ”, c’est-à-dire un idéal, un modèle, un objectif qui comporte la dimension d’un mythe concret, agissant et mobilisateur, annonce Guillaume Faye (69) ». Il s’agit d’un mythe au sens sorélien du terme qui comporte le risque de remettre à plus tard l’action décisive. Pour y remédier, faisons nôtre le slogan du penseur écologiste Bernard Charbonneau : « Penser global, agir local ». Si le global est ici l’idéal eurosibérien, voire eurasiste, l’action locale suppose en amont un lent et patient travail fractionnaire d’édification d’une contre-société identitaire en sécession croissante de la présente société multiculturaliste marchande avariée. Par la constitution informelle mais tangibles de B.A.D. (bases autonomes durables), « il faut, en lisière du Système, construire un espace où incuber d’autres structures sociales et mentales. À l’intérieur de cet espace autonomisé, il sera possible de reconstituer les structures de l’enracinement (70) ».
Les zélotes du métissage planétaire se trompent. L’enracinement n’est ni l’enfermement ou le repli sur soi. Soutenir un enracinement multiple ou plus exactement un enracinement multiscalaire – à plusieurs échelles d’espace différencié – paraît le meilleur moyen de concilier l’amour de sa petite patrie, la fidélité envers sa patrie historique et l’ardent désir d’œuvrer en faveur de sa grande patrie continentale quelque que soit sa désignation, car « l’enracinement est peut-être le besoin le plus important et le plus méconnu de l’âme humaine. C’est un des plus difficiles à définir. Un être humain a une racine par sa participation réelle, active et naturelle à l’existence d’une collectivité qui conserve vivants certains trésors du passé et certains pressentiments d’avenir. Participation naturelle, c’est-à-dire amenée automatiquement par le lieu, la naissance, la profession, l’entourage. Chaque être humain a besoin d’avoir de multiples racines. Il a besoin de recevoir la presque totalité de sa vie morale, intellectuelle, spirituelle, par l’intermédiaire des milieux dont il fait naturellement partie (71) ». N’oublions jamais qu’au-delà des enjeux géopolitiques, notre combat essentiel demeure la persistance de notre intégrité d’Albo-Européen.
Je vous remercie.
Georges Feltin-Tracol
Notes
1 : Cf. la tribune délirante, summum de politiquement correct, de Thimothy Snyder, « La Russie contre Maïdan », in Le Monde, 23 et 24 février 2014; « Poutine doit écraser le virus de Maïdan… Entretien avec Lilia Chevtsova par Vincent Jauvert », in Le Nouvel Observateur, 27 février 2014; Bruno Tertrais, « La rupture ukrainienne », in Le Figaro, 25 avril 2014; Chantal Delsol, « Occident – Russie : modernité contre tradition ? », in Le Figaro, 30 avril 2014; Jean-Marie Chauvier, « Eurasie, le “ choc des civilisations ” version russe », in Le Monde diplomatique, mai 2014; Vincent Jauvert, « Le Raspoutine de Poutine », in Le Nouvel Observateur, 1er mai 2014; Isabelle Lasserre, « Grande serbie, Grande Russie, une idéologie commune », in Le Figaro, 6 mai 2014, etc.
2 : Ainsi, dans Le Monde du 18 janvier 2001, Marie Jégo évoquait-elle le projet poutinien de restauration d’un ensemble néo-soviétique en se référant aux Fondements de géopolitique (non traduit) de Douguine.
3 : Sur les œuvres de Douguine disponibles en français, se reporter à Georges Feltin-Tracol, « Rencontre avec Alexandre Douguine », in Réflexions à l’Est, Alexipharmaque, coll. « Les Réflexives », Billère, 2012, note 5 p. 220. On rajoutera depuis la parution de cet ouvrage : Alexandre Douguine, L’appel de l’Eurasie. Conversation avec Alain de Benoist, Avatar, coll. « Heartland », Étampes, 2013; Alexandre Douguine, La Quatrième théorie politique. La Russie et les idées politiques du XXIe siècle, Ars Magna Éditions, Nantes, 2012; Alexandre Douguine, Pour une théorie du monde multipolaire, Ars Magna Éditions, Nantes, 2013.
4 : Guillaume Faye, L’archéofuturisme, L’Æncre, Paris, 1998, p. 192.
5 : Sur ce projet mitterrandien méconnu, cf. Roland Dumas, « Un projet mort-né : la Confédération européenne », in Politique étrangère, volume 66, n° 3, 2001, pp. 687 – 703.
6 : Guillaume Faye, L’archéofuturisme, op. cit., p. 192.
7 : Idem, p. 194.
8 : cf. Guillaume Faye, « Pour en finir avec la civilisation occidentale », in Éléments, n° 34, avril – mai 1980, pp. 5 – 11.
9 : Guillaume Faye, L’archéofuturisme, op. cit., p. 75, souligné par l’auteur.
10 : cf. Guillaume Faye, « Il n’y a pas de “ monde blanc ” », in Éléments, n° 34, avril – mai 1980, p. 6.
11 : Jean Cau, Discours de la décadence, Copernic, coll. « Cartouche », Paris, 1978 pp. 164 – 165.
12 : Idem, p. 175, souligné par l’auteur.
13 : Id., p. 182, souligné par l’auteur.
14 : Id., p. 183, souligné par l’auteur.
15 : Guillaume Faye, Pourquoi nous combattons. Manifeste de la résistance européenne, L’Æncre, Paris, 2001, p. 119.
16 : Id., p. 123, souligné par l’auteur.
17 : Id., p. 124.
18 : Tom Clancy, L’Ours et le Dragon, Albin Michel, Paris, 2001 (1re édition originale en 2000), deux tomes.
19 : Maurice G. Dantec, Le théâtre des opérations 2000 – 2001. Laboratoire de catastrophe générale, Gallimard, Paris, 2001, pp. 594 – 595.
20 : L’Édit de Caracalla ou Plaidoyer pour des États-Unis d’Occident, par Xavier de C***, traduit de l’anglais (américain), et suivi d’une épitaphe par Régis Debray, Fayard, Paris, 2002.
21 : Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, Dictionnaire géopolitique de la défense européenne. Du traité de Bruxelles à la Constitution européenne, Éditions Unicomm, coll. « Abécédaire Société – Défense européenne », Paris, 2005, p. 235.
22 : « Contre le communisme ou l’islamisation, je me suis toujours battu pour préserver notre identité. Entretien avec Jean-Marie Le Pen », in Minute, 28 décembre 2011, p. 5.
23 : Maurice G. Dantec, American Black Box. Le théâtre des opérations 2002 – 2006, Albin Michel, Paris, 2007, p. 174.
24 : Idem, p. 119.
25 : Id., p. 66.
26 : Id., p. 122.
27 : Rodolphe Badinand, Requiem pour la Contre-Révolution. Et autres essais impérieux, Alexipharmaque, coll. « Les Réflexives », Billère, 2009, pp. 123 – 124.
28 : Cf. Francis Parker Yockey, Le prophète de l’Imperium, Avatar, coll. « Heartland », Paris - Dun Carraig, 2004; Francis Parker Yockey, Imperium. La philosophie de l’histoire et de la politique, Avatar, coll. « Heartland », Paris - Dun Carraig, 2008 (1re édition originale en 1948); Francis Parker Yockey, L’Ennemi de l’Europe, Ars Magna Éditions, Nantes, 2011 (1re édition originale en 1956).
29 : cf. Jean Thiriart, Un Empire de quatre cents millions d’hommes, l’Europe. La naissance d’une nation, au départ d’un parti historique, Avatar, coll. « Heartland », Paris - Dublin, 2007 (1re édition originale en 1964).
30 : Jean Thiriart, « Europe : l’État-nation politique », in Nationalisme et République, n° 8, 1er juin 1992, p. 3.
31 : Jean Thiriart, art. cit., p. 5.
32 : Idem, p. 6, souligné par l’auteur.
33 : Aymeric Chauprade, Géopolitique. Constantes et changements dans l’histoire, Ellipses, Paris, 2003, p. 475.
34 : Sur l’histoire et les principales lignes de force de l’eurasisme, on consultera avec un très grand profit de Marlène Laruelle, L’idéologie eurasiste russe. Ou comment penser l’empire, L’Harmattan, coll. « Essais historiques », Paris, 1999; Mythe aryen et rêve impérial dans la Russie du XXIe siècle, C.N.R.S. – Éditions, coll. « Mondes russes. États, sociétés, nations », Paris, 2005; La quête d’une identité impériale. Le néo-eurasisme dans la Russie contemporaine, Petra Éditions, 2007; Le nouveau nationalisme russe. Des repères pour comprendre, L’Œuvre Éditions, Paris, 2010; de Lorraine de Meaux, La Russie et la tentation de l’Orient, Fayard, Paris, 2010; de Georges Nivat, Vers la fin du mythe russe. Essais sur la culture russe de Gogol à nos jours, L’Âge d’Homme, coll. « Slavica », Lausanne, 1982, en particulier « Du “ panmongolisme ” au “ mouvement eurasien ” », pp. 138 – 155; Vivre en russe, L’Âge d’Homme, coll. « Slavica », Lausanne, 2007, en particulier « Les paradoxes de l’« affirmation eurasienne » », pp. 81 – 102.
35 : Cf. sur le blogue de Lionel Baland, « Secteur droit entre en politique », mis en ligne le 6 mars 2014.
36 : Alain Cagnat, « Europe, Eurasie, Eurosibérie, l’éclairage géopolitique », in Terre et Peuple, n° 59, Équinoxe de Printemps 2014, p. 18.
37 : « La Russie vue par les Biélorusses », mis en ligne sur Le Courrier de la Russie, le 13 décembre 2013, cf. http://www.lecourrierderussie.com/2013/12/la-russie-vue-par-les-bielorusses/
38 : « La Russie vue par les Biélorusses. En coulisses… », mis en ligne sur Le Courrier de la Russie, le 13 décembre 2013, cf. http://www.lecourrierderussie.com/2013/12/la-russie-vue-par-les-bielorusses/2/
39 : Alexandre Baounov, « Entre Kiev et Moscou », in La Russie d’aujourd’hui, supplément du Figaro, le 18 décembre 2013.
40 : Alexandre Soljénitsyne, Comment réaménager notre Russie ? Réflexions dans la mesure de mes forces, Fayard, Paris, 1990, traduit par Geneviève et José Johannet, p. 23, souligné par l’auteur.
41 : cf. Éléments, « La Russie : le dernier empire ? », n° 57 – 58, printemps 1986, pp. 19 – 41.
42 : cf. Alexandre Douguine, « Evola entre la droite et la gauche », collectif, Evola envers et contre tous !, Avatar, coll. «Orientation», Étampes - Dun Carraig, 2010.
43 : Marlène Laruelle, « Le renouveau des courants eurasistes en Russie : socle idéologique commun et diversité d’approches », in Slavica occitania, n° 11, 2000, p. 156.
44 : Marlène Laruelle, « De l’eurasisme au néo-eurasisme : à la recherche du Troisième Continent », in sous la direction de Hervé Coutau-Bégarie et Martin Motte, Approches de la géopolitique. De l’Antiquité au XXIe siècle, Économica, coll. « Bibliothèque Stratégique », Paris, 2013, p. 664.
45 : in Libération, 15 août 2007.
46 : Marlène Laruelle, « L’Extrême-Orient russe : la carte asiatique », in Questions Internationales, n° 57, septembre – octobre 2012, pp. 67 – 68.
47 : Tancrède Josserand, « L’eurasisme turc. La steppe comme ligne d’horizon », in Conflits, n° 1, avril – mai 2014, pp. 62 – 64.
48 : Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, Dictionnaire géopolitique de la défense européenne, op. cit., pp. 135 – 136.
49 : cf. Cécile de La Guérivière, « La Chine veut faire rouler un T.G.V. jusqu’aux États-Unis », in Le Figaro, 10 et 11 mai 2014.
50 : Jacques Sapir, La Mandchourie oubliée. Grandeur et démesure de l’art de la guerre soviétique, Éditions du Rocher, coll. « L’art de la guerre », Monaco, 1996.
51 : Robert Steuckers, La Révolution conservatrice allemande. Biographies de ses principaux acteurs et textes choisis, Les Éditions du Lore, Chevaigné, 2014, p. 131.
52 : Marlène Laruelle, « Le renouveau des courants eurasistes en Russie », art. cit., p. 159.
53 : Abel Miroglio, La psychologie des peuples, P.U.F., coll. « Que sais-je ? », n° 798, Paris, 1971, p. 7, souligné par l’auteur.
54 : Gaston Bouthoul, Les mentalités, P.U.F., coll. « Que sais-je ? », n° 545, Paris, 1952, p. 76, souligné par l’auteur.
55 : « Qu’est-ce que l’eurasisme ? Une conversation avec Alexandre Douguine », in Krisis, n° 32, juin 2009, p. 153.
56 : « La quatrième théorie politique d’Alexandre Douguine. Entretien », in Rébellion, n° 15, mars – avril 2012, p. 16.
57 : cf. Carl Schmitt, Terre et Mer. Un point de vue sur l’histoire mondiale, Le Labyrinthe, coll. « Les cahiers de la nouvelle droite », 1985, introduction et postface de Julien Freund, traduit par Jean-Louis Pesteil.
58 : cf. Zygmunt Bauman, La vie liquide, Éditions du Rouergue / Chambon, coll. « Les incorrects », Arles, 2006.
59 : « Qu’est-ce que l’eurasisme ? », art. cit., p. 127.
60 : Marlène Laruelle, « De l’eurasisme au néo-eurasisme : à la recherche du Troisième Continent », op. cit., p. 681.
61 : Jacqueline Dauxois et Vladimir Volkoff, Alexandra, Albin Michel, Paris, 1994, p. 444.
62 : Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, La Russie menace-t-elle l’Occident ?, Choiseul, Paris, 2009, p. 100.
63 : Zbignew Brzezinski, Le grand échiquier. L’Amérique et le reste du monde, Fayard, coll. « Pluriel », Paris, 2010 (1re édition originale en 1997), traduction de Michel Bessière et Michelle Herpe-Voslinsky, pp. 66 – 67.
64 : François Bluche, Richelieu, Perrin, Paris, 2003, p. 136.
65 : Zbignew Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 59 et 61.
66 : Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, La Russie menace-t-elle l’Occident ?, op. cit., pp. 97 – 98.
67 : Robert Steuckers, « Eurasisme et atlantisme : quelques réflexions intemporelles et impertinentes », mis en ligne sur Euro-Synergies, le 20 mars 2009.
68 : Jean-Claude Albert-Weill, L’Altermonde, Éditions Gills Club La Panfoulia, Paris, 2004.
69 : Guillaume Faye, Pourquoi nous combattons, op. cit., p. 124, souligné par l’auteur.
70 : Serge Ayoub, Michel Drac, Marion Thibaud, G5G. Une déclaration de guerre, Les Éditions du Pont d’Arcole, Paris, 2012, p. 18.
71 : Simone Weil, L’enracinement, Gallimard, coll. « Folio – Essais », Paris, 1949, p. 61.
Article printed from Europe Maxima: http://www.europemaxima.com
URL to article: http://www.europemaxima.com/?p=3805
00:05 Publié dans Actualité, Affaires européennes, Eurasisme, Géopolitique, Nouvelle Droite | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : georges feltin-tracol, nouvelle droite, eurasisme, eurasie, politique internationale, alexandre douguine, eurosibérie, russie, histoire | | del.icio.us | | Digg | Facebook
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The world of my youth was a world with only personal, friendly relationships never determined by contracts, only by pure genuine human and manly confidence, based on the given word you never withdraw. Books were important in this world, as Willy de Grunne had, among other tasks as a diplomat, to read books for Queen Elizabeth Wittelsbach, a Bavarian Duchess, who became Queen of the Belgians in 1909. Willy de Grunne was Grand Master of her House in the Thirties. Queen Elizabeth was, just as her whole Bavarian family in Munich, an excellent sponsor of arts, music and museums. We owe her the Egyptology Museum in Brussels and among many other things the world famous “Concours Reine Elizabeth”, promoting young talented musicians from all over the world. Many young Russian musicians participated in this prestigious competition. Besides, Queen Elizabeth has been (and still is) criticized for being of German origin and for having refused to boycott the USSR and China during the Cold war. She ended her life in the Fifties and the early Sixties by acquiring the then sulphurous reputation of a “Bolshevik Queen”. She died in 1965.
Jean Varenne, a benevolent and charming university teacher, whose relevant studies were financially supported by the UNESCO, left the movement without a single word in order to stress the deep contempt he felt. Third, Gilbert Sincyr, who replaced Cariou for a while, left the movement in order to prepare a hypothetical rebirth of it. Fourth, Faye left the movement, with the help of his now eternal chum Yann-Ber Tillenon, at the very beginning of 1987, writing to the members of GRECE a too gentle open letter, simply stating that the movement had reached its apex and that times had come to start something new. The second period in the history of the French New Right ended actually in a messy sewer in which Benoist revelled himself.
Rauti had volunteered in Mussolini’s Social Republican Army, was taken prisoner in Northern Italy after the German-Italian collapse in Spring 1945, almost escaped being shot by communist partisans when British paratroopers evacuated the Fascist prisoners, sent them subsequently to camps in French Northern Africa in order to select a good deal of them who could be eventually sent to Australia to be settled in the Western half desertified regions around the present-day town of Perth. Once liberated, Rauti and two friends, who didn’t want to settle in the hottest, driest and snakes infected regions of British Australia, reached Rome where they sang too loudly some patriotic songs in the streets, songs of the RSI that had of course be banned by the new government. They were sent for a couple of weeks to the Maria Coeli jail, where they found books of Julius Evola: the three fresh liberated RSI-Army comrades were immediately fascinated by the philosopher’s ideas and decided on the spot to pay a visit to him, once they would leave the Maria Coeli clink. When they rang the bell at Evola’s door along the Corso Vittorio Emmanuele, the Austrian servant told them that her master was still being cured in a hospital in Bologna, after a wall crumbled down and broke his spine during the siege of the Imperial City of Vienna by Soviet troops, making a cripple of the gallant former officer, alpinist and diplomat. They immediately rushed to Bologna and when they arrived, Evola had been sent back to his home in Rome. Finally they decided to resume political and metapolitical activities, a decision that lead, at least for Rauti to the foundation of the movement “Ordine Nuovo” in the Fifties (which was banned and sued by the Italian State) and later the weekly paper “Linea”. We received copies of “Linea” in Brussels and I could, as a very young man, observe that the cultural pages of the paper were indeed of the highest possible quality.
Tarchi belonged obviously to the Rauti’s branch of the so-called “Italian Social Movement” and decided first to develop more genuinely the satirical press of the movement and the metapolitical activities within its frames. By publishing the really “politically incorrect” satirical magazine “La Voce della fogna” (“The Sewer’s Voice”), Tarchi attracted the more radical activists. It was the “Sewer’s Voice” simply because the French artist and activist Jack Marchal created the famous comic figures of the
“Black Rats”, dwelling in sewers, after having imitated the Belgian anti-fascist cartoonist Raymond Macherot who created bad guys characters in the shape of angry rats, also dwelling in underground drains. Marchal’s “Black Rats” became a craze among “radical right” groups in the late Seventies and Tarchi adopted them and introduced these characters in his “Voce della fogna”, so that almost every staunch right-wing activist identified with the sinister and giggling “Black Rats” (a Swiss equivalent of “La Voce della fogna” was also published in Geneva under the title “Le Rat Noir”). But by starting his highly learned magazine for book reviews and philosophical comments, “Diorama letterario”, he attracted also the best intellectuals. “Diorama letterario” as well as “Trasgressioni” (with deep-thought essays) are still published in Italy nowadays. If there is a person incarnating “New Right” in its best form in Europe, it is undoubtedly Tarchi, as he is a genuine political scientist of high level, duly acknowledged by academic caucuses, whose studies are penetrating and extensive. More, Tarchi’s printed productions are the only ones in the New Right realm to appear regularly, just like Venner’s “Nouvelle revue d’histoire”. The Italian New Right, under the supervision of Tarchi, is a well-oiled machine: if the trains arrived on time in Mussolini’s Fascist State, publications are similarly issued in time in Tarchi’s own “New Right” preserve. The exact contrary of Prig Benoist’s and Vlanparterre’s erratic publishing policy in Paris.
Therefore, in the paranoid crazy logic of the sectarian Benoist’s fan club, I had to be punished: I won’t receive review copies of “Diorama letterario” and “Trasgressioni” anymore and my articles as well as all the ones that I translated from German or from Dutch wouldn’t be translated into Italian anymore; and I was also forbidden to translate Tarchi’s or Campi’s articles. Obeying like a good drilled mutt, the prick-and-boobs trash creams seller from Antwerp, about whom I’m going to talk next, did exactly the same but without writing a letter… The old Flemish dumbbellified wacko knew pretty well that I could have translated and published it with the best polished sarcastic comments. Campi and Tarchi were in fact shooting in their own feet: no one in the Benoist’s silly small club was ever able to translate their own texts and their Italian readers were from then on definitively bereft of articles from Germany or elsewhere and subsequently fed up like fattened up geese, whose fat liver is a real “délicatesse” (with onion jam!), with Benoist’s and Champetier’s abstruse productions, which are of course inedible. Of the considerable amount of reviews, articles and essays of Tarchi, only one short interview of him was taken over and printed in an issue of Benoist’s “Eléments” and that single poor miserable translation was made in a period of more than twenty years! That’s what happens when you recruit tinkers, umbrellas’ repairers, parrots’ breeders, Parisian slappers who wipe the stinking shit off their babies’ bottom at the back of the conference room while Benoist and Champetier are explaining their sophisticated strategies in front of the assembled members!
crush patriots or to forbid or limit the celebration of European festivals like Christmas or Carnival because this could offend people having one day come from all possible alien continents. Simultaneously the same politicians spend huge amount of the taxpayers’ money to stimulate the celebration of the most strange and weird festivals of foreign folks or to sponsor new ridiculous festivities among which you can include the well-known “Gay Prides” that Serbians and Russians loath in the name of Orthodox decency. Among all those who were active in the frame of the old New Right of the Eighties, Esparza didn’t become an “oikophobic” traitor like many others. Esparza wrote also books to criticize the domination of television in the Western way of life (“Informe sobre la televisión – El invento del Maligno”, Criterio Libros, Madrid, 2001). He participated also to collective initiatives aiming at destroying the persistent myths of the Spanish and international Left, that were born during the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939 and are still conveyed by the present-day left, which they now call the “Zapaterismo”. In this respect, Esparza was the editor of “El libro negro de la izquierda española” (Chronica, Madrid, 2011; “The Black Book of the Spanish Left”). As a brilliant hispanist, you should take all those ideas and books into consideration if you want to develop an original Russian New Right. Esparza’s life is the true story of a metapolitical success.
I supposed that Benoist, who hated deeply all the people invited by Dugin and Prokhanov in September 1992, started to tell Dugin the worst possible things about myself and the others. In his paranoid eyes, the combined invitation was the evidence that a “Schneiderite-Steuckersite” plot was about to succeed with the sardonic blessing of Thiriart, whom Benoist loathed particularly, because the Belgian animator of the former “Young Europe” movement based in Brussels and his fellow-travelers like Bernard Garcet couldn’t stop mocking the “would-be intellectual and narcissistic Frenchie”, who has “frail, puny and unmuscular arms coming out of his shabby sleeves” and “who was permanently smoking like a chimney”. Thiriart unfortunately died some weeks after his visit to Moscow. But since then, probably due to Benoist’s gossip, I could meet Dugin only once, in 2005, when he came to Brussels and Antwerp to address two different meetings. Just after the Brussels’ meeting, held in the famous Coloma Castle, Dugin took a very light meal (as it was Lent time) and jumped on the train to Paris, as he had an appointment with Benoist. I’ve never heard of him anymore since then. Alain de Benoist surely pursued his usual dissolving job of chitchatting and splitting the movement, by setting the people of our own spiritual-intellectual community at loggerheads, as if he was duly paid to do so by some mysterious sponsors...
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"United by Hatred"
Interview with Alexander Dugin
by Manuel Ochsenreiter
Ex: http://manuelochsenreiter.com
Prof. Dugin, the Western mainstream media and established politicians describe the recent situation in Ukraine as a conflict between pro-European, democratic and liberal oppositional alliance on the one side and an authoritarian regime with a dictator as president on the other side. Do you agree?
Dugin: I know those stories and I consider this type of analysis totally wrong. We cannot divide the world today in the Cold War style. There is no “democratic world” which stands against an “antidemocratic world”, as many Western media report.
Your country, Russia, is one of the cores of this so called “antidemocratic world” when we believe our mainstream media. And Russia with president Vladimir Putin tries to intervene in Ukrainian domestic politics, we read...
Dugin: That´s completely wrong. Russia is a liberal democracy. Take a look at the Russian constitution: We have a democratic electoral system, a functioning parliament, a free market system. The constitution is based on Western pattern. Our president Vladimir Putin rules the country in a democratic way. We are a not a monarchy, we are not a dictatorship, we are not a soviet communist regime.
Our politicians in Germany call Putin a “dictator”!
Dugin: (laughs) On what basis?
Because of his LGBT-laws, his support for Syria, the law suits against Michail Chodorchowski and “Pussy Riot”...
Dugin: So they call him “dictator” because they don´t like the Russian mentality. Every point you mentioned is completely democratically legitimate. There is not just one single “authoritarian” element. So we shouldn´t mix that: Even if you don´t like Russia´s politics you can´t deny that Russia is a liberal democracy. President Vladimir Putin accepts the democratic rules of our system and respects them. He never violated one single law. So Russia is part of the liberal democratic camp and the Cold War pattern doesn´t work to explain the Ukrainian crisis.
So how can we describe this violent and bloody conflict?
Dugin: We need a very clear geopolitical and civilizational analysis. And we have to accept historical facts, even if they are in these days not en vogue!
What do you mean?
Dugin: Todays Ukraine is a state which never existed in history. It is a newly created entity. This entity has at least two completely different parts. These two parts have a different identity and culture. There is Western Ukraine which is united in its Eastern European identity. The vast majority of the people living in Western Ukraine consider themselves as Eastern Europeans. And this identity is based on the complete rejection of any pan-Slavic idea together with Russia. Russians are regarded as existential enemies. We can say it like that: They hate Russians, Russian culture and of course Russian politics. This makes an important part of their identity.
You are not upset about this as a Russian?
Dugin: (laughs) Not at all! It is a part of identity. It doesn´t necessarily mean they want to go on war against us, but they don´t like us. We should respect this. Look, the Americans are hated by much more people and they accept it also. So when the Western Ukrainians hate us, it is neither bad nor good – it is a fact. Let´s simply accept this. Not everybody has to love us!
But the Eastern Ukrainians like you Russians more!
Dugin: Not so fast! The majority of people living in the Eastern part of Ukraine share a common identity with Russian people – historical, civilizational, and geopolitical. Eastern Ukraine is an absolute Russian and Eurasian country. So there are two Ukraines. We see this very clear at the elections. The population is split in any important political question. And especially when it comes to the relations with Russia, we witness how dramatic this problem becomes: One part is absolute anti-Russian, the other Part absolute pro-Russian. Two different societies, two different countries and two different national, historical identities live in one entity.
So the question is which society dominates the other?
Dugin: That´s an important part of Ukrainian politics. We have the two parts and we have the capital Kiev. But in Kiev we have both identities. It is neither the capital of Western Ukraine nor Eastern Ukraine. The capital of the Western part is Lviv, the capital of the Eastern part is Kharkiv. Kiev is the capital of an artificial entity. These are all important facts to understand this conflict.
Western Media as well as Ukrainian “nationalists” would strongly disagree with the term “artificial” for the Ukrainian state.
Dugin: The facts are clear. The creation of the state of Ukraine within the borders of today wasn´t the result of a historical development. It was a bureaucratic and administrative decision by the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was one of the 15 constituent republics of the Soviet Union from its inception in 1922 to its end in 1991. Throughout this 72-year history, the republic's borders changed many times, with a significant part of what is now Western Ukraine being annexed by the Red Army in 1939 and the addition of formerly Russian Crimea in 1954.
Some politicians and analysts say that the easiest solution would be the partition of Ukraine to an Eastern and a Western state.
Dugin: It is not as easy as it might sound because we would get problems with national minorities. In the Western part of Ukraine many people who consider themselves as Russians live today. In the Eastern part lives a part of the population that considers itself as Western Ukrainian. You see: A simple partition of the state wouldn´t really solve the problem but even create a new one. We can imagine the Crimean separation, because that part of Ukraine is purely Russian populated territory.
Why does it seem that the European Union is so much interested in “importing” all those problems to its sphere?
Dugin: It is not in the interest of any European alliance, it is in the interest of USA. It is a political campaign which is led against Russia. The invitation of Brussels to Ukraine to join the West brought immediately the conflict with Moscow and the inner conflict of Ukraine. This is not surprising at all of anybody who knows about the Ukrainian society and history.
Some German politicians said that they were surprised by the civil war scenes in Kiev...
Dugin: This says more about the standards of political and historical education of your politicians than about the crisis in Ukraine...
But the Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych refused the invitation of the West.
Dugin: Of course he did. He was elected by the pro-Russian East and not by the West. Yanukovych can´t act against the interest and the will of his personal electoral base. If he would accept the Western-EU-invitation he would be immediately a traitor in the eyes of his voters. Yanukovych´s supporters want integration with Russia. To say it clearly: Yanukovych simply did what was very logical for him to do. No surprise, no miracle. Simply logical politics.
There is now a very pluralistic and political colorful oppositional alliance against Yanukovych: This alliance includes typical liberals, anarchists, communists, gay right groups and also nationalist and even neo-Nazi groups and hooligans. What keeps these different groups and ideologies together?
Dugin: They are united by their pure hatred against Russia. Yanukovych is in their eyes the proxy of Russia, the friend of Putin, the man of the East. They hate everything what has to do with Russia. This hate keeps them together; this is a block of hatred. To say it clearly: Hate is their political ideology. They don´t love the EU or Brussels.
What are the main groups? Who is dominating the oppositional actions?
Dugin: These are clearly the most violent neo-Nazi groups on the so called Euro-Maidan. They push for violence and provoke a civil war situation in Kiev.
Western Mainstream media claims that the role of those extremist groups is dramatized by the pro-Russian media to defame the whole oppositional alliance.
Dugin: Of course they do. How do they want to justify that the EU and the European governments support extremist, racist, neo-Nazis outside the EU-borders while they do inside the EU melodramatic and expensive actions even against the most moderate right wing groups?
But how can for example the gay right groups and the left wing liberal groups fight alongside the neo-Nazis who are well known to be not really very gay friendly?
Dugin: First of all, all these groups hate Russia and the Russian president. This hate makes them comrades. And the left wing liberal groups are not less extremist than the neo-Nazi groups. We tend to think that they are liberal, but this is horribly wrong. We find especially in Eastern Europe and Russia very often that the Homosexual-Lobby and the ultranationalist and neo-Nazi groups are allies. Also the Homosexual lobby has very extremist ideas about how to deform, re-educate and influence the society. We shouldn´t forget this. The gay and lesbian lobby is not less dangerous for any society than neo-Nazis.
We know such an alliance also from Moscow. The liberal blogger and candidate for the mayoral position in Moscow Alexej Nawalny was supported by such an alliance of gay rights organizations and neo-Nazi groups.
Dugin: Exactly. And this Nawalny-coalition was also supported by the West. The point is, it is not at all about the ideological content of those groups. This is not interesting for the West.
What do you mean?
Dugin: What would happen if a neo-Nazi organization supported Putin in Russia or Yanukovych in Ukraine?
The EU would start a political campaign; all huge western mainstream media would cover this and scandalize that.
Dugin: Exactly that´s the case. So it is only about on which side such a group stands. If the group is against Putin, against Yanukovych, against Russia, the ideology of that group is not a problem. If that group supports Putin, Russia or Yanukovych, the ideology immediately becomes a huge problem. It is all about the geopolitical side the group takes. It is nothing but geopolitics. It is a very good lesson what is going on in Ukraine. The lesson tells us: Geopolitics is dominating those conflicts and nothing else. We witness this also with other conflicts for example in Syria, Libya, Egypt, in Caucasian region, Iraq, Iran...
Any group taking side in favor of the West is a “good” group with no respect if it is extremist?
Dugin: Yes and any group taking side against the West – even if this group is secular and moderate – will be called “extremist” by the Western propaganda. This approach exactly dominates the geopolitical battlefields today. You can be the most radical and brutal Salafi fighter, you can hate Jews and eat human organs in front of a camera, as long as you fight for the Western interest against the Syrian government you are a respected and supported ally of the West. When you defend a multi-religious, secular and moderate society, all ideals of the West by the way, but you take position against the Western interest like the Syrian government, you are the enemy. Nobody is interested in what you believe in, it is only about the geopolitical side you chose if you are right or wrong in the eyes of the Western hegemon.
Prof. Dugin, especially Ukrainian opposition groups calling themselves “nationalists” would strongly disagree with you. They claim: “We are against Russia and against the EU, we take a third position!” The same thing ironically also the salafi fighter in Syria would say: “We hate Americans as much as the Syrian government!” Is there something like a possible third position in this geopolitical war of today?
Dugin: The idea to take a third and independent position between the two dominating blocks is very common. I had some interesting interviews and talks with a leading figure of the Chechen separatist guerilla. He confessed to me that he really believed in the possibility of an independent and free Islamic Chechnya. But later he understood that there is no “third position”, no possibility of that. He understood that he fights against Russia on the side of the West. He was a geopolitical instrument of the West, a NATO proxy on the Caucasian battlefield. The same ugly truth hits the Ukrainian “nationalist” and the Arab salafi fighter: They are Western proxies. It is hard to accept for them because nobody likes the idea to be the useful idiot of Washington.
To say it clearly: The “third position” is absolutely impossible?
Dugin: No way for that today. There is land power and sea power in geopolitics. Land power is represented today by Russia, sea power by Washington. During World War II Germany tried to impose a third position. This attempt was based precisely on those political errors we talk about right now. Germany went on war against the sea power represented by the British Empire, and against the land power represented by Russia. Berlin fought against the main global forces and lost that war. The end was the complete destruction of Germany. So when even the strong and powerful Germany of that time wasn´t strong enough to impose the third position how the much smaller and weaker groups want to do this today? It is impossible, it is a ridiculous illusion.
Anybody who claims today to fight for an independent “third position” is in reality a proxy of the West?
Dugin: In most of the cases, yes.
Moscow seems to be very passive. Russia doesn´t support any proxies for example in the EU countries. Why?
Dugin: Russia doesn´t have an imperialist agenda. Moscow respects sovereignty and wouldn´t interfere in the domestic politics of any other country. And it is an honest and good politics. We witness this even in Ukraine. We see much more EU-politicians and even US-politicians and diplomats travelling to Kiev to support the opposition than we see Russian politicians supporting Yanukovych in Ukraine. We shouldn´t forget that Russia doesn´t have any hegemonial interests in Europe, but the Americans have. Frankly speaking, the European Union is not a genuine European entity – it is an imperialist transatlantic project. It doesn´t serve the interests of the Europeans but the interests of the Washington administration. The “European Union” is in reality anti-European. And the “Euro-Maidan” is in reality “anti-Euro-Maidan”. The violent neo-Nazis in Ukraine are neither “nationalist” nor “patriotic” nor “European” - they are purely American proxies. The same for the homosexual rights groups and organizations like FEMEN or left wing liberal protest groups.
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Algeriepatriotique : Quelle analyse faites-vous de la dégradation de la situation sécuritaire en Russie après les deux actes terroristes perpétrés à Volgograd ?
Alexandre Douguine : Je ne crois pas qu'il s’agisse de dégradation de la situation sécuritaire en Russie. Certains actes terroristes sont presque incontrôlables quand il est question des régions ayant des populations plus ou moins homogènes qui soutiennent, dans une certaine mesure, des groupes terroristes comme c'est le cas au Caucase du Nord, en Russie. Le fait que l'activité des terroristes s’accentue ces derniers temps montre que les forces qui veulent déstabiliser la Russie se focalisent sur les Jeux olympiques de Sotchi. Les Etats-Unis et les pays de l'Otan veulent montrer Poutine, qui s’oppose radicalement au libéralisme et à l’hégémonie américaine, comme un «dictateur» en comparant Sotchi à Munich à l'époque d’Hitler. C'est la guerre médiatique. Dans cette situation, les forces qui soutiennent la politique hégémonique américaine, avant tout les réseaux sub-impérialistes locaux – comme les wahhabites soutenus par l’Arabie Saoudite –, cherchent à confirmer cette image en faisant de la Russie un pays où il n’y a pas le minimum de sécurité et qui est prêt à installer la dictature en réponse aux actes terroristes qui visent essentiellement les Jeux olympiques de Sotchi chers à Poutine. On sait que le chef des renseignements saoudiens, Bandar Bin Sultan, a proposé à Poutine de garantir la sécurité en Russie en échange de l'arrêt de l'appui russe à Damas. Poutine a piqué une colère et refusé cela d'une manière explicite, en accusant les Saoudiens d'être des terroristes, ce qu'ils sont en vérité, pire que ceux qui servent les intérêts des Etats-Unis. Donc, les groupes wahhabites qui activent en Russie, téléguidés par les Saoudiens et à travers eux par leurs maîtres de Washington, ont accompli la menace de Bandar Bin Sultan. En fin de compte, ce sont les Etats-Unis qui attaquent la Russie de Poutine, afin de le châtier pour sa politique indépendante et insoumise à la dictature hégémonique américaine et libérale.
Qui en est à l'origine ?
Je crois que je l'ai expliqué dans ma réponse à la question précédente. Quant aux organisateurs concrets de cet acte terroriste, je n'en sais pas plus que les autres. Il semble que ce sont des réseaux wahhabites du Caucase du Nord et les femmes de terroristes liquidés par les services spéciaux russes. Je crois qu’elles sont ignoblement utilisées par les chefs cyniques, consciemment ou inconsciemment, qui travaillent pour les intérêts des Américains.
D'aucuns estiment que ces attentats terroristes sont la conséquence du soutien indéfectible de la Russie à la Syrie et à l'Ukraine. Etes-vous du même avis ?
C'est absolument correct. Il s'agit du «châtiment américain» accompli par les complices des Américains par le biais des Saoudiens.
Quelles vont être les mesures que prendra le Kremlin pour parer à une escalade de la violence dans le pays ?
Je crois que la montée de la violence durant la période des Jeux olympiques de Sotchi est inévitable. J'espère qu’à Sotchi on réussira quand même à contrôler la situation, mais c'est théoriquement impossible de le faire dans les régions qui l'entourent et qui sont organiquement liées à certains groupes de population du Caucase du Nord où se trouvent les bases principales des terroristes. Cette fois, ce n'est pas la Tchétchénie qui est au centre du dispositif du terrorisme, mais plutôt le Daguestan et la République de Kabardino-Balkarie. On essayera de faire pour le mieux, mais il ne faut pas oublier qu’on a affaire à une grande puissance mondiale, celle des Etats-Unis, qui nous attaque. C'est un défi sérieux qui demande une réponse symétrique. Donc, on verra...
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Milestones of Eurasism
By Alexander Dugin
Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com
Eurasism is an ideological and social-political current born within the environment of the first wave of Russian emigration, united by the concept of Russian culture as a non-European phenomenon, presenting–among the varied world cultures–an original combination of western and eastern features; as a consequence, the Russian culture belongs to both East and West, and at the same time cannot be reduced either to the former or to the latter.
The founders of eurasism:
Eurasism’s main value consisted in ideas born out of the depth of the tradition of Russian history and statehood. Eurasism looked at the Russian culture not as to a simple component of the European civilization, as to an original civilization, summarizing the experience not only of the West as also–to the same extent–of the East. The Russian people, in this perspective, must not be placed neither among the European nor among the Asian peoples; it belongs to a fully original Eurasian ethnic community. Such originality of the Russian culture and statehood (showing at the same time European and Asian features) also defines the peculiar historical path of Russia, her national-state program, not coinciding with the Western-European tradition.
Foundations
Civilization concept
The Roman-German civilization has worked out its own system of principles and values, and promoted it to the rank of universal system. This Roman-German system has been imposed on the other peoples and cultures by force and ruse. The Western spiritual and material colonization of the rest of mankind is a negative phenomenon. Each people and culture has its own intrinsic right to evolve according to its own logic. Russia is an original civilization. She is called not only to counter the West, fully safeguarding its own road, but also to stand at the vanguard of the other peoples and countries on Earth defending their own freedom as civilizations.
Criticism of the Roman-German civilization
The Western civilization built its own system on the basis of the secularisation of Western Christianity (Catholicism and Protestantism), bringing to the fore such values like individualism, egoism, competition, technical progress, consumption, economic exploitation. The Roman-German civilization founds its right to globality not upon spiritual greatness, as upon rough material force. Even the spirituality and strength of the other peoples are evaluated only on the basis of its own image of the supremacy of rationalism and technical progress.
The space factor
There are no universal patterns of development. The plurality of landscapes on Earth produces a plurality of cultures, each one having its own cycles, internal criteria and logics. Geographical space has a huge (sometimes decisive) influence on peoples’ culture and national history. Every people, as long as it develops within some given geographical environment, elaborates its own national, ethical, juridical, linguistic, ritual, economic and political forms. The “place” where any people or state “development” happens predetermines to a great extent the path and sense of this “development”–up to the point when the two elements became one. It is impossible to separate history from spatial conditions, and the analysis of civilizations must proceed not only along the temporal axis (“before,” “after,” “development” or “non-development,” and so on) as also along the spatial axis (“east,” “west,” “steppe,” “mountains,” and so on). No single state or region has the right to pretend to be the standard for all the rest. Every people has its own pattern of development, its own “times,” its own “rationality,” and deserves to be understood and evaluated according to its own internal criteria.
The climate of Europe, the small extension of its spaces, the influence of its landscapes generated the peculiarity of the European civilization, where the influences of the wood (northern Europe) and of the coast (Mediterraneum) prevail. Different landscapes generated different kinds of civilizations: the boundless steppes generated the nomad empires (from the Scythians to the Turks), the loess lands the Chinese one, the mountain islands the Japanese one, the union of steppe and woods the Russian-Eurasian one. The mark of landscape lives in the whole history of each one of these civilizations, and cannot be either separated form them or suppressed.
State and nation
The first Russian slavophiles in the 19th century (Khomyakov, Aksakov, Kirevsky) insisted upon the uniqueness and originality of the Russian (Slav, Orthodox) civilization. This must be defended, preserved and strengthened against the West, on the one hand, and against liberal modernism (which also proceeds from the West), on the other. The slavophiles proclaimed the value of tradition, the greatness of the ancient times, the love for the Russian past, and warned against the inevitable dangers of progress and about the extraneousness of Russia to many aspects of the Western pattern.
From this school the eurasists inherited the positions of the latest slavophiles and further developed their theses in the sense of a positive evaluation of the Eastern influences.
The Muscovite Empire represents the highest development of the Russian statehood. The national idea achieves a new status; after Moscow’s refusal to recognize the Florentine Unia (arrest and proscription of the metropolitan Isidore) and the rapid decay, the Tsargrad Rus’ inherits the flag of the Orthodox empire.
Political platform
Wealth and prosperity, a strong state and an efficient economy, a powerful army and the development of production must be the instruments for the achievement of high ideals. The sense of the state and of the nation can be conferred only through the existence of a “leading idea.” That political regime, which supposes the establishment of a “leading idea” as a supreme value, was called by the eurasists as “ideocracy”–from the Greek “idea” and “kratos,” power. Russia is always thought of as the Sacred Rus’, as a power [derzhava] fulfilling its own peculiar historical mission. The eurasist world-view must also be the national idea of the forthcoming Russia, its “leading idea.”
The eurasist choice
Russia-Eurasia, being the expression of a steppe and woods empire of continental dimensions, requires her own pattern of leadership. This means, first of all, the ethics of collective responsibility, disinterest, reciprocal help, ascetism, will and tenaciousness. Only such qualities can allow keeping under control the wide and scarcely populated lands of the steppe-woodland Eurasian zone. The ruling class of Eurasia was formed on the basis of collectivism, asceticism, warlike virtue and rigid hierarchy.
Western democracy was formed in the particular conditions of ancient Athens and through the centuries-old history of insular England. Such democracy mirrors the peculiar features of the “local European development.” Such democracy does not represent a universal standard. Imitating the rules of the European “liberal-democracy” is senseless, impossible and dangerous for Russia-Eurasia. The participation of the Russian people to the political rule must be defined by a different term: “demotia,” from the Greek “demos,” people. Such participation does not reject hierarchy and must not be formalized into party-parliamentary structures. “Demotia” supposes a system of land council, district governments or national governments (in the case of peoples of small dimensions). It is developed on the basis of social self-government, of the “peasant” world. An example of “demotia” is the elective nature of church hierarchies on behalf of the parishioners in the Muscovite Rus’.
The work of L. N. Gumilev as a development of the eurasist thinking
Lev Nikolaevic Gumilev (1912–1992), son of the Russian poet N. Gumilev and of the poetess A. Akhmatova, was an ethnographer, historian and philosopher. He was profoundly influenced by the book of the Kalmuck eurasist E. Khara-Vadan “Gengis-Khan as an army leader” and by the works of Savitsky. In its own works Gumilev developed the fundamental eurasist theses. Towards the end of his life he used to call himself “the last of the eurasists.”
Basic elements of Gumilev’s theory
An ethnos is in general any set of individuals, any “collective”: people, population, nation, tribe, family clan, based on a common historical destiny. “Our Great-Russian ancestors–wrote Gumilev–in the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries easily and rather quickly mixed with the Volga, Don and Obi Tatars and with the Buriates, who assimilated the Russian culture. The same Great-Russian easily mixed with the Yakuts, absorbing their identity and gradually coming into friendly contact with Kazakhs and Kalmucks. Through marriage links they pacifically coexisted with the Mongols in Central Asia, as the Mongols themselves and the Turks between the 14th and 16th centuries were fused with the Russians in Central Russia.” Therefore the history of the Muscovite Rus’ cannot be understood without the framework of the ethnic contacts between Russians and Tatars and the history of the Eurasian continent.
The advent of neo-eurasism: historical and social context
The crisis of the Soviet paradigm
In the mid-1980s the Soviet society began to lose its connection and ability to adequately reflect upon the external environment and itself. The Soviet models of self-understanding were showing their cracks. The society had lost its sense of orientation. Everybody felt the need for change, yet this was but a confused feeling, as no-one could tell the way the change would come from. In that time a rather unconvincing divide began to form: “forces of progress” and “forces of reaction,” “reformers” and “conservators of the past,” “partisans of reforms” and “enemies of reforms.”
Infatuation for the western models
In that situation the term “reform” became in itself a synonym of “liberal-democracy.” A hasty conclusion was inferred, from the objective fact of the crisis of the Soviet system, about the superiority of the western model and the necessity to copy it. At the theoretical level this was all but self-evident, since the “ideological map” offers a sharply more diversified system of choices than the primitive dualism: socialism vs. capitalism, Warsaw Pact vs. NATO. Yet it was just that primitive logic that prevailed: the “partisans of reform” became the unconditional apologists of the West, whose structure and logic they were ready to assimilate, while the “enemies of reform” proved to be the inertial preservers of the late Soviet system, whose structure and logic they grasped less and less. In such condition of lack of balance, the reformers/pro-westerners had on their side a potential of energy, novelty, expectations of change, creative drive, perspectives, while the “reactionaries” had nothing left but inertness, immobilism, the appeal to the customary and already-known. In just this psychological and aesthetic garb, liberal-democratic policy prevailed in the Russia of the 1990s, although nobody had been allowed to make a clear and conscious choice.
The collapse of the state unity
The result of “reforms” was the collapse of the Soviet state unity and the beginning of the fall of Russia as the heir of the USSR. The destruction of the Soviet system and “rationality” was not accompanied by the creation of a new system and a new rationality in conformity to national and historical conditions. There gradually prevailed a peculiar attitude toward Russia and her national history: the past, present and future of Russia began to be seen from the point of view of the West, to be evaluated as something stranger, transcending, alien (“this country” was the “reformers’” typical expression). That was not the Russian view of the West, as the Western view of Russia. No wonder that in such condition the adoption of the western schemes even in the “reformers’” theory was invoked not in order to create and strengthen the structure of the national state unity, but in order to destroy its remains. The destruction of the state was not a casual outcome of the “reforms”; as a matter of fact, it was among their strategic aims.
The birth of an anti-western (anti-liberal) opposition in the post-Soviet environment
In the course of the “reforms” and their “deepening,” the inadequacy of the simple reaction began to be clear to everyone. In that period (1989–90) began the formation of a “national-patriotic opposition,” in which there was the confluence of part of the “Soviet conservatives” (ready to a minimal level of reflection), groups of “reformers” disappointed with “reforms” or “having become conscious of their anti-state direction,” and groups of representatives of the patriotic movements, which had already formed during the perestroika and tried to shape the sentiment of “state power” [derzhava] in a non-communist (orthodox-monarchic, nationalist, etc.) context. With a severe delay, and despite the complete absence of external strategic, intellectual and material support, the conceptual model of post-Soviet patriotism began to vaguely take shape.
Neo-eurasism
Neo-eurasism arose in this framework as an ideological and political phenomenon, gradually turning into one of the main directions of the post-Soviet Russian patriotic self-consciousness.
Stages of development of the neo-eurasist ideology
1st stage (1985–90)
In these years eurasism shows “right-wing conservative” features, close to historical traditionalism, with orthodox-monarchic, “ethnic-pochevennik” [i.e., linked to the ideas of soil and land] elements, sharply critical of “Left-wing” ideologies.
2nd stage (1991–93)
3rd stage (1994–98): theoretical development of the neo-eurasist orthodoxy
4th stage (1998–2001)
5th stage (2001–2002)
Basic philosophical positions of neo-eurasism
At the theoretical level neo-eurasism consists of the revival of the classic principles of the movement in a qualitatively new historical phase, and of the transformation of such principles into the foundations of an ideological and political program and a world-view. The heritage of the classic eurasists was accepted as the fundamental world-view for the ideal (political) struggle in the post-Soviet period, as the spiritual-political platform of “total patriotism.”
The neo-eurasists took over the basic positions of classical eurasism, chose them as a platform, as starting points, as the main theoretical bases and foundations for the future development and practical use. In the theoretical field, neo-eurasists consciously developed the main principles of classical eurasism taking into account the wide philosophical, cultural and political framework of the ideas of the 20th century.
Each one of the main positions of the classical eurasists (see the chapter on the “Foundations of classical eurasism”) revived its own conceptual development.
Civilization concept
Criticism of the western bourgeois society from “Left-wing” (social) positions was superimposed to the criticism of the same society from “Right-wing” (civilizational) positions. The eurasist idea about “rejecting the West” is reinforced by the rich weaponry of the “criticism of the West” by the same representatives of the West who disagree with the logic of its development (at least in the last centuries). The eurasist came only gradually, since the end of the 1980s to the mid-1990s, to this idea of the fusion of the most different (and often politically contradictory) concepts denying the “normative” character of the Western civilization.
The “criticism of the Roman-German civilization” was thoroughly stressed, being based on the prioritary analysis of the Anglo-Saxon world, of the US. According to the spirit of the German Conservative Revolution and of the European “New Right,” the “Western world” was differentiated into an Atlantic component (the US and England) and into a continental European component (properly speaking, a Roman-German component). Continental Europe is seen here as a neutral phenomenon, liable to be integrated–on some given conditions–in the eurasist project.
The spatial factor
Neo-eurasism is moved by the idea of the complete revision of the history of philosophy according to spatial positions. Here we find its trait-d’union in the most varied models of the cyclical vision of history, from Danilevsky to Spengler, from Toynbee to Gumilev.
Such a principle finds its most pregnant expression in traditionalist philosophy, which denies the ideas of evolution and progress and founds this denial upon detailed metaphysical calculations. Hence the traditional theory of “cosmic cycles,” of the “multiple states of Being,” of “sacred geography,” and so on. The basic principles of the theory of cycles are illustrated in detail by the works of Guénon (and his followers G. Georgel, T. Burckhardt, M. Eliade, H. Corbin). A full rehabilitation has been given to the concept of “traditional society,” either knowing no history at all, or realizing it according to the rites and myths of the “eternal return.” The history of Russia is seen not simply as one of the many local developments, but as the vanguard of the spatial system (East) opposed to the “temporal” one (West).
State and nation
Dialectics of national history
It is led up to its final, “dogmatical” formulation, including the historiosophic paradigm of “national-bolshevism” (N. Ustryalov) and its interpretation (M. Agursky). The pattern is as follows:
Political platform
Neo-eurasism owns the methodology of Vilfrido Pareto’s school, moves within the logic of the rehabilitation of “organic hierarchy,” gathers some Nietzschean motives, develops the doctrine of the “ontology of power,” of the Christian Orthodox concept of power as “kat’echon.” The idea of “elite” completes the constructions of the European traditionalists, authors of researches about the system of castes in the ancient society and of their ontology and sociology (R. Guénon, J. Evola, G. Dumézil, L. Dumont). Gumilev’s theory of “passionarity” lies at the roots of the concept of “new eurasist elite.”
The thesis of “demotia” is the continuation of the political theories of the “organic democracy” from J.-J. Rousseau to C. Schmitt, J. Freund, A. de Benoist and A. Mueller van der Bruck. Definition of the eurasist concept of “democracy” (“demotia”) as the “participation of the people to its own destiny.”
The thesis of “ideocracy” gives a foundation to the call to the ideas of “conservative revolution” and “third way,” in the light of the experience of Soviet, Israeli and Islamic ideocracies, analyses the reason of their historical failure. The critical reflection upon the qualitative content of the 20th century ideocracy brings to the consequent criticism of the Soviet period (supremacy of quantitative concepts and secular theories, disproportionate weight of the classist conception).
The following elements contribute to the development of the ideas of the classical eurasists:
The philosophy of traditionalism (Guénon, Evola, Burckhardt, Corbin), the idea of the radical decay of the “modern world,” profound teaching of the Tradition. The global concept of “modern world” (negative category) as the antithesis of the “world of Tradition” (positive category) gives the criticism of the Western civilization a basic metaphysic character, defining the eschatological, critical, fatal content of the fundamental (intellectual, technological, political and economic) processes having their origin in the West. The intuitions of the Russian conservatives, from the slavophiles to the classical eurasists, are completed by a fundamental theoretical base. (see A. Dugin, Absoljutnaja Rodina [The Absolute Homeland], Moscow 1999; Konets Sveta [The End of the World], Moscow 1997; Julius Evola et le conservatisme russe, Rome 1997).
The investigation on the origins of sacredness (M. Eliade, C. G. Jung, C. Levi-Strauss), the representations of the archaic consciousness as the paradigmatic complex manifestation laying at the roots of culture. The reduction of the many-sided human thinking, of culture, to ancient psychic layers, where fragments of archaic initiatic rites, myths, originary sacral complexes are concentrated. Interpretation of the content of rational culture through the system of the ancient, pre-rational beliefs (A. Dugin, “The evolution of the paradigmatic foundations of science” [Evoljutsija paradigmal’nyh osnovanij nauki], Moscow 2002).
The search for the symbolic paradigms of the space-time matrix, which lays at the roots of rites, languages and symbols (H. Wirth, paleo-epigraphic investigations). This attempt to give a foundation to the linguistic (Svityc-Illic), epigraphic (runology), mythological, folkloric, ritual and different monuments allows to rebuild an original map of the “sacred concept of the world” common to all the ancient Eurasian peoples, the existence of common roots (see A. Dugin Giperborejskaja Teorija [Hyperborean Theory], Moscow 1993.
A reassessment of the development of geopolitical ideas in the West (Mackinder, Haushofer, Lohhausen, Spykman, Brzeszinski, Thiriart and others). Since Mackinder’s epoch, geopolitical science has sharply evolved. The role of geopolitical constants in 20th century history appeared so clear as to make geopolitics an autonomous discipline. Within the geopolitical framework, the concept itself of “eurasism” and “Eurasia” acquired a new, wider meaning.
From some time onwards, eurasism, in a geopolitical sense, began to indicate the continental configuration of a strategic (existing or potential) bloc, created around Russia or its enlarged base, and as an antagonist (either actively or passively) to the strategic initiatives of the opposed geopolitical pole–“Atlantism,” at the head of which at the mid-20th century the US came to replace England.
The philosophy and the political idea of the Russian classics of eurasism in this situation have been considered as the most consequent and powerful expression (fulfilment) of eurasism in its strategic and geopolitical meaning. Thanks to the development of geopolitical investigations (A. Dugin, Osnovye geopolitiki [Foundations of geopolitics], Moscow 1997) neo-eurasism becomes a methodologically evolved phenomenon. Especially remarkable is the meaning of the Land – Sea pair (according to Carl Schmitt), the projection of this pair upon a plurality of phenomena – from the history of religions to economics.
The search for a global alternative to globalism, as an ultra-modern phenomenon, summarizing everything that is evaluated by eurasism (and neo-eurasism) as negative. Eurasism in a wider meaning becomes the conceptual platform of anti-globalism, or of the alternative globalism. “Eurasism” gathers all contemporary trends denying globalism any objective (let alone positive) content; it offers the anti-globalist intuition a new character of doctrinal generalization.
The assimilation of the social criticism of the “New Left” into a “conservative right-wing interpretation” (reflection upon the heritage of M. Foucault, G. Deleuze, A. Artaud, G. Debord). Assimilation of the critical thinking of the opponents of the bourgeois western system from the positions of anarchism, neo-marxism and so on. This conceptual pole represents a new stage of development of the “Left-wing” (national-bolshevik) tendencies existing also among the first eurasists (Suvchinskij, Karsavin, Efron), and also a method for the mutual understanding with the “left” wing of anti-globalism.
“Third way” economics, “autarchy of the great spaces.” Application of heterodox economic models to the post-Soviet Russian reality. Application of F. List’s theory of the “custom unions.” Actualization of the theories of S. Gesell. F. Schumpeter, F. Leroux, new eurasist reading of Keynes.
Source: Ab Aeterno, no. 3, June 2010.
Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com
URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/12/milestones-of-eurasism/
09:07 Publié dans Définitions, Eurasisme, Géopolitique, Nouvelle Droite | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : alexandre douguine, géopolitique, nouvelle droite, eurasisme, théorie politique, sciences politiques, politologie, lev gumilev | | del.icio.us | | Digg | Facebook
TWO STUDIES ON NEO-EURASIANISM
by Martin A. Schwarz
Ex: http://www.eurasia-rivista.org
Marlene Laruelle: Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Press/Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008, 288 p.
Alexander Höllwerth: Das sakrale eurasische Imperium des Aleksandr Dugin. Eine Diskursanalyse zum postsowjetischen Rechtsextremismus. Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society, Vol. 59. Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag 2007. 735 p.
Different strands of Russian Eurasianism (Laruelle, part 1)
Marlene Laruelle, a young but prolific French-American scholar, who has already published books about the classic Eurasianism and about its precursor in the 19th century, has now written “Russian Eurasianism. An ideology of Empire”, one of the first comprehensive academic studies of Neo-Eurasianism, or at least in the West. In difference to other works of this kind, the author sticks to her principles of impartiality, which does not mean that she does not present her own theories about history and function of Eurasianism as an “ideology of Empire”, but, in her own words “this book analyzes Neo-Eurasianism without judging it, for two reasons. First, I do not think one may, either methodologically or ethically, judge and analyze at the same time. Knowledge is a prerequisite of argument, but the former must precede the latter. Second, as Pierre-André Taguieff has remarked, ‘There is no need to put words into an author’s mouth or demonize him in order to critically examine theses that one believes must be opposed.’” (Laruelle, p. 13)
After a brief introduction in which she points to the relevance of the subject, her different approach (as mentioned), and the specific weight of the personalities she choose for presentation, the first chapter is devoted to the original Eurasianism from 1920-1930. This is a rather brief outline, as she has already written a book on the subject (L’Idéologie eurasiste russe ou comment penser l’empire, Paris 1999) , and brings not many new or original informations about a movement, which was the “conservative revolution” á la Russe, borrowing from Fascism and Bolshevism, but denouncing their short-comings and “Western” features. Two things though seem to be central for Laruelle’s understanding of the Eurasianists: the notion of a “geographic identity” for Russians, instead of the Western self-understanding of a “historic” and therefore progressive understanding of the identity of nations (which of course was transferred as “historical materialism” to Russia, and also was promoted by liberals and – inverted – by nostalgic monarchists). Therefore the geographic orientation of Eurasianism lies at the core of the movement, but was paradoxically developed in the Western exile: “The Eurasianist doctrine must be grasped in its fundamentally provocative character. It was born of the malaise of young nationalists who were reluctant to integrate into the host culture and who refused to resign themselves to the thought that links with homeland were definitely broken. Their rejection of Europe can only be understood if we remember that it was elaborated in the West by those Russians who, culturally speaking, were the most Europeanized.” (p. 25) While it is undeniable true, that Eurasianism as self-affirmation could only become self-knowledge in the encounter and subsequently (at least partial) rejection of Western ideologies, Laruelle shows a tendency to psychologize the phenomenon: “(Eurasianism) attempts to theorize what is above all an experience and a feeling: the experience of young men in exile who feel humiliated by the defeat of the Whites and try to understand the reality of the motherland and stay in touch with it.” (p. 47)
Another paradox or ambiguity can be found in the Eurasianist re-evaluation of the Far Eastern part of Russian history and culture, the Mongolic and Islamic one. „(…) before Eurasianism in the 1920s, no Russian intellectual movement displayed a real openness to the Turko-Mongol world. Asia was only ever highlighted under the aspects of Aryanism; it was a mere detour to reinforced claims of Europeaness.“ (p. 4) While this heritage was now used by the Eurasianists as an argument for the distinction of Russia not only to Western Europe but also to Pan-Slavism, the religions and cultures of Buddhism and Islam as such were denigrated in favor of a militant Orthodox Christianity. As the final parts of this book are dedicated to the relation between (neo-)Eurasianism and Islam, this question has not to be answered at this point.
After this brief, not very differentiated presentation of the original Eurasianists, Laruelle looks more in detail in the thinking of the three most influential neo-Eurasianists. These are, in her words “the theories of ethnogenesis elaborated by the Orientalist Lev N. Gumilëv (1912-92); the fascistic geopolitics of the fashionable theorist Aleksandr Dugin (1962-); the philosopher Aleksandr Panarin’s (1940-2003) defense of a multipolar world.” (p. 2)
Lev Gumilëv, the missing link – or rather: not missing link – between “old” and “new” Eurasianism enjoys nearly universal popularity in Russia. His theories of Ethnogenesis are generally excepted and taught in schools and universities, often without reference to the Eurasianist Weltanschauung, although they are deeply connected with their organic understanding of peoples and societies. While Gumilëv shares with the Eurasianists the idea that the individual draws the meaning from the totality, Gumilëv’s theory of ethnos is definitively on the more biologistic and deterministic side of possible variations of this idea. One that, as I must say, does not fit well with the ideas of an supra-natural origin of culture, which is the normal religious concept, and also especially stressed by the representatives of integral traditionalism (René Guénon, Julius Evola, and others), whose ideas were introduced to neo-Eurasianism by Aleksandr Dugin and Geidar Dzhemal. As Laruelle writes, “he [Gumilëv] takes up the original Eurasianists’ organicism and radicalizes it, using numerous biological or even genetic metaphors with far-reaching political implications”, although “he does not, strictly speaking, develop a political theory; and […| he cannot be considered a partisan of conservative revolution.” (p. 82) Instead he stressed (as must remembered: in the time of Soviet stagnation of the Brezhnev era) very social conservative norms: endogamy, family life, respect for the elderly, the nation, and rejection of any challenge to the powers that be, all necessary for the survival of the ethnos. Laruelle considers him – understandably – “the least intellectually relevant and the least original (Neo-)Eurasianist.” (p. 82) As Gumilëv was neither in touch with Western intellectuals nor in tune with Soviet science , “his thought, the product of intellectual solitude, was fundamentally autistic” (p. 82), This result, if true, is by the way in striking contradiction to his notion of the supremacy of the collective ethnos as a sovereign whole, and also a total contrast to the very mercurial and alert ideologue of Neo-Eurasianism, Aleksandr Dugin, well-known in the West and very present in Russian media.
Before devoting space to Dugin, Laruelle discusses Aleksandr Panarin, whom she clearly favors. She calls him intellectually superior to Dugin and Gumilëv, or to be exact: she writes that “many”, but unnamed “Russian scholars” (p. 86) did consider him to be. Be this at it may, Panarin was in the Yeltsin era a promoter of “people’s capitalism” (p. 87) and in the Putin era an advocate of “the restoration of both Orthodox spirituality and Stalinist statehood.” (p. 88) Maybe he could be considered as flexible or opportunist as Dugin? Nevertheless he presented a “civilized Eurasianism”, “civilized” here being the indicator of “the exact opposite to Dugin’s variety.” (p. 88) Nevertheless Panarin became a member of the Central Council of Dugin’s Eurasian Party in 2002, and planned to write a foreword to a book by Dugin, but as Laruelle writes, “death put an end to this unlikely cooperation.” (p. 89) Panarin’s work was marked by the search for a third way, “between the West’s egalitarian universalism and the ethnic particularism of the non-European world.” (p. 93) Panarin’s model for an Eurasian Empire in his words, as quoted by Laruelle: “The principle of cultural pluralism, as well as attention and tolerance for different ethnocultural experiences are combined with a monist political authority that tolerates no opposition.” (p. 97) One of the intriguing but also problematic ideas of Panarin was the need for a combination of the Eurasian religions into something, what he calls the “Great Tradition” (p. 98), especially a fusion between Orthodox Christianity and Islam. In his quoted words: “We need a new, powerful world-saving idea that would ensure a consensus between Orthodox and Muslim culture for the benefit of a common higher goal.” (p. 99) Later he seemed to have abandoned this attempt in favor of an Orthodox supremacism and a renewed pan-Slavism, according to Laruelle in reaction to the NATO bombardment of Serbia. (p. 100)
The chapter on Aleksandr Dugin in titled “Aleksandr Dugin: A Russian Version of the European Radical Right?“ and was published before as a study by the Woodrow Wilson Institute in Washington, DC. While the title indicates the direction and the somewhat limited approach to the multi-faceted Dugin, it can be said that this attempt to analyze the influences of the New Right and the „Traditionalist school“ on Dugin’s theories is of much superior quality than the ramblings of the ubiquous Andreas Umland and his school of Dugin bashing. Like the New Right in Western Europe Dugin has attempted to adopt the teachings of Carl Schmitt, Karl Haushofer, Ernst Niekisch and Moeller van den Bruck, the so-called “Conservative Revolution” in Germany’s Weimar period, to the present situation of Russia, which largely means the attempted forced Westernization through Globalization and the counter-measures of the re-establishment of state power. This “conservative revolution” intellectual heritage is accompanied by two more currents, the New Right or rather: Nouvelle Droite, and the „integral Tradition“, both not so much of German but French and Italian origins, although the thinking of Alain de Benoist not only has a strong „Conservative Revolutionary“ foundation, but was also influenced by Armin Mohler, the personal link between Ernst Jünger and Carl Schmitt, and Alain de Benoist. Additionally and largely unrelated to Benoist was the Belgian European activist Jean Thirirat, whose model of an „European nation“ has preformed Dugin’s „Eurasian nation“ as much as the French Nouvelle Droite’s think tank GRECE and their meta-political approach did for the somehow fluctuating style of Dugin’s intellectual enterprises. Therefore Laruelle is not mislead, when she writes: “Dugin distinguishes himself from other figures in the Russian nationalist movements precisely through his militant Europeanism, his exaltation of the Western Middle Ages, and his admiration for Germany. All these ideological features contrast strongly with the ethnocentrism of his competitors.“ (p. 128)
Even more on the point is her acknowledgment of the influence of René Guénon and Julius Evola, and their minor intellectual allies and successors, on Dugin. She calls „Traditionalism“ the „foundation of Dugin’s thoughts“. While it can correctly be said, that the notion of a primordial Tradition as the common origin of all the religious-cultural traditions of Eurasia, can not be found in the writings of the „founding fathers“ of Eurasianism and was directly alien to some of their ideas – the rambling against the „Roman-Germanic civilization“ - , nevertheless Dugin could find only here the organic and integral solution to some of the most urgent problems of Russia’s Eurasian (com)position between Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism and other more minor elements: the transcendent – esoteric - unity of the exoteric different heirs of one primordial Tradition. Which is why – in our not Laruelle’s view – and without considering possible personal idiosyncrasy and political opportunism, his brand of neo-Eurasianism must be considered superior to those of his „competitors“, take for example the ill-fated attempt of Panarin’s Islam/Orthodoxy „melting pot“. Dugin’s claim of post-Guénonism because of his attempt to „Russify“ Guénon and to criticize the lack of references to Orthodox Christianity (p. 123), should be seen rather as a complementary effort. Similar is his attempt to reconcile Evolian „paganism“ (p. 123), or rather Aryanism, with Russian Christianity, with its strong national element. And not only of theoretically value is the distinction between Traditional Islam – as represented in the Sufi traditions and in Shiite Iran – and the Western-allied Wahhabite branch. In this context Laruelle makes reference to the important symposium “Islamic Threat or Threat against Islam?” (p. 118) which intended to establish a Russian-Muslim strategic partnership.
A „discourse analysis“ of Aleksandr Dugin (Höllwerth)
Alexander Höllwerth’s doctor thesis in Salzburg (Austria) on the „sacred Eurasian empire of Alexander Dugin“ impresses by it sheer quantity of more than 700 pages. The reader expects to gain access to fundamental texts of Russian neo-Eurasianism, otherwise only available in Russian. This expectation is fulfilled only partially because the author does give way to much space to his own objections, considerations and assumptions. A part called „contextualisations“, which brings nothing new, but gives an oversight of the historical Eurasianist movement, follows the book’s methodological reflections (reaching from Foucault’s discourse notion to Buruma’s occidentalism model).
Höllwerth then summarizes the literature from Stephen Shenfield („Russian Fascism“) to Andreas Umland (who is the editor of this volume and wrote its preface) on the biography of Aleksandr Dugin. He gives his estimation of the relationship between the subject of the book and the current Russian regime. Höllwerth states that Dugin is one of the few prominent intellectuals in Russia whom it is allowed to criticize the Kremlin without being banned from public discourse into the small niches of opposition media (which are rather the domain of Dugin’s enemies, the Western orientated liberals). Dugin has written in 2005 that the “acting of Putin can be evaluated as an artificially masked continuation of the pro-American, liberal, pro-oligarch strategy of Yeltsin, as a camouflage of the decline of Russia and its geopolitical spheres of influence.” (Höllwerth, p. 182) But this harsh assessment was followed by a phase of “reconciliation”. One could consider this as an evaluation of differing politics by a principled intellectual, the changes being on the side of the Kremlin and not on the side of the commentator. Höllwerth tends to mystify this point of view, but with the help of Dugin himself or rather his edition of Jean Parvulesco’s book “Putin and the Eurasian Empire” which differentiates between “Putin-1”, the real Putin, and “Putin-2”, the metaphysical Putin, the “mysterious builder of the Great Eurasian Empire of the End” (p. 184), the agent or tool of the great Eurasian conspiracy, a vulgarized or at least popularized variation of the initiation as described by René Guénon, but assuming in the sketch of Parvulesco rather counter-initiative features.
But what is the real and not “metaphysical” influence of Aleksandr Dugin, according to Höllwerth? “The attempt to estimate the ‘real political influence’ of Dugin is confronted with the difficulty to separate the plane of staging from the plane of factuality. This difficulty, with which the external scholar is confronted, seems to be part of a conscious strategy: the meaning of Dugin’s staging does, metaphorically put, not be to let the viewer look behind the scenery of the staging, but to focus his attention on the staging itself. (…) ‘Behind the scenery’ activities in connection with the Dugin phenomenon (secret services, political string-pullers, etc.) can not be excluded, are even probable, but should not lead to ambitious speculations based on few evidences.” (p. 194 f.) By the way, a sensationalist piece of work, based on such “ambitious speculations based on few evidences” was published by the same publishing house, which did not dare to include it in their scientific series and did flank it with cautious remarks. (Vladimir Ivanov: Alexander Dugin und die rechtsextremen Netzwerke. Fakten und Hypothesen zu den internationalen Verflechtungen der russischen Neuen Rechten. Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag, 2007) And of course also with a preface by the inevitable Andreas Umland. A work to be put on the same shelve with Jean Parvulesco’s political fiction, but one has to admit that it has better entertainment value than Höllwerth’s rather sour work.
With page 197 starts the real discourse-theoretical body of the book, being also the real achievement of Höllwerth: „Dugin’s construction of world and reality“. Which is itself parted into three: Space, Order, Time, or also: Geopolitics, State, and History. But through these 500 pages goes one leitmotif: Höllwerth tries to reduce the complexity of Dugin’s system of synthesis and distinction to simple dualisms; we and the other, Eurasia (=Russia) against the West, Empire against democracy, etc., which are in return recognized as redundant repetitions of one and only mantra of power. After Dugin’s philosophy and policy has passed through Höllwerth’s mechanism of discourse analysis we arrive at exactly the same result, a more temporizing genius like Andreas Umland did achieve with one piece of paper and only two quotes of Dugin out of context: the exposure of a dangerous enemy of freedom and democracy. Vade retro, Dugin! But with Höllwerth’s help the Western reader can uplift himself by dining from a broad protruding self-affirmation of Western values with a more than saturating scientific apparatus.
The most compelling aspect of Höllwerth’s de- and reconstruction of Dugin’s discourse is its stringent structure. Also the obvious inclusion of the most important Western and Eastern authors must be noted. The confrontation with the matadors of Western liberalism (Jürgen Habermas, Sir Karl Popper, Bassam Tibi, Jean-François Lyotard) could be seen as helpful. But the extensive reproduced arguments of Dugin’s counter-parts are put on the same level of discourse with Dugin, even where Höllwerth notes the metaphysical character of Dugin’s traditionalists argument. The resulting impossibility of a dialogue between equals is construed by Höllwerth as a deficit of Dugin’s discourse.
Another example of Höllwerth’s inadequate approach: Höllwerth did indeed – and this is rather remark- and laudable - read the French metaphysician René Guénon. But only to point out the deviations of Dugin from the Guénon traditionalist “standard”, which is rather pointless, because Höllwerth himself has already classified Dugin correctly as Russian Evolianist (p. 355 ff.) and most of Höllwerth’s arguments seemingly advocating Guénon could also been directed against Julius Evola, and on this subject a large intra-traditionalist discussion could be cited. More than once Höllwerth argues that Dugin postulates a metaphysical dichotomy of East and West, while Guénon did stress the common original unity and only accepted a difference East-West since the decline of the West beginning with the modern era. But the West is the Occident, the sphere of sunset, by definition, and essential before the temporal decline began. So Dugin and Guénon are both correct, if they are read correctly!
Not unrelated is another important objection, which may indeed be problematic if true. This is the dependency of Dugin not only from Western authors in general, but also in his understanding of Eastern, meaning mainly Russian-Orthodox authors. Höllwerth tries to argue this in detail in some examples (for example: p. 664 ff.), this unfortunately cannot be assessed by me, due to my lack of knowledge of the Russian sources. But one thing is clear, this argument of Western influence can cut in two directions. Höllwerth points out that in one of Dugin’s best known texts “The metaphysics of national-bolshevism” Dugin does refer to Sir Karl Popper’s view of Platon, (p. 320 ff.) but everything the ideologue of the “open society” does characterize negatively is affirmed by Dugin, therefore he arrives at the holistic, total state of the philosophical rulers and the caste of watchers, this not through an adequate study of Platon, but as the reverse of an one-sided caricature made by Popper. If we see the Western history of philosophy not as a footnote to Platon, as was famously said, but as the decline from Platon to Popper, which really was the case, we can still see a partial truth in Höllwerth’s criticism of Western dependency by Dugin, but we have also to recast it into a much greater blame against the West, not to have remained true to its origin.
The adherence of Dugin to a kind – and which kind - of nationalism or a nation-transcending form of Eurasianism would be another question which would need a deeper consideration than Höllwerth provides. The question of nation can in the East not be separated from the confession. From the point of view of metaphysics and tradition (in the sense of René Guénon) most of the values attributed to the Russian nation should be rather connected with the Russian-Orthodox church. The formulation of the “angels of peoples” by the great Russian philosophers and theologians are thought from the premise of the identity nation=religion and correct for all authentic traditions but certainly not for nations in the modern Western sense, where Evola’s and Guénon’s critique of nationalism is totally applicable. Höllwerth’s attempt to find a contradiction between Dugin and the different strands of thought which convene in his own – traditionalist, conservative revolutionary, Orthodox and Russian – can therefore not be followed so easy.
Russia’s Eurasian mission, which lies in the simple fact to be Eurasia in the excellent sense (there is a incomplete Eurasia possible without China or India or Western Europe, but without Russia it makes to sense to speak from Eurasia), is not necessarily a chauvinism of thinking of itself as the hub of the world, but a fact of geopolitics, which can be confirmed by a look at the world map. If the space called Russia would be not be populated by Russians, there would be another people populating this space, and it would have to adopt to the stated property of large space, and would become exactly “Russian” in this way. Thus it becomes clear, why Höllwerth can quote Dugin’s definition of the being (Wesen) of the Russians as space (extension) (p. 401). All this is to keep in mind, when Höllwerth agitates himself on Dugin’s corresponding affirmation, that Russia is the whole (of Eurasia).
The difference between land (Eurasia) and sea (Anglo-America), coincident with rise and decline, Orient and Occident (in the afore mentioned sense of temporal difference by same origin in the metaphysical North, p. 212 ff.) would demand another thorough study. Höllwerth makes a lot out of the seemingly different use of the term “Nomos of the earth” (Nomos der Erde) by Carl Schmitt and Aleksandr Dugin. While Schmitt did mean the search for a new principle of international law for the whole globe, Dugin exclusively uses the phrase as synonym with “Nomos of the land” as contrasted with “Nomos of the sea” (p. 249). This dichotomy of laws according to the different Nomos is not the only problem of mediation, the intra-Eurasian and therefore more urgent is the juristic mediation of the different tradition, when according to Dugin the law is not universal but traditional (for each tradition) (p. 475 ff.). The “integral traditionalism” is exactly the only possible foundation to preserve the differences of the traditions while acknowledging their common and in this sense universal origin (the primordial Tradition). The “universalism” of traditionalism allows to stress the discerned internally and the common ground externally. Especially Hindu tradition and Islam have traditionally absolutely no problems in recognizing the other traditions as varieties of the one Tradition. (But Dugin may not evaluate these two as much as would be desirable, especially in their function of beginning and closing the cycle of mankind.) Finally it becomes absurd when Höllwerth in his “discourse analysis” regards the universalism of all traditions as structurally equivalent to the arrogant “universalism” of Western liberalism. On the one hand, favored by Dugin, the land-bound traditions take all part in the whole of Tradition (analogue to the classic model of idea by Platon), on the other hand, the Western universalism, championed by Höllwerth, is nothing more than a particular, very late development deviation from one specific tradition, the rejection of Western Christianity in its own boundary, and its violent expansion on the way of the world’s seas, postulating itself as the only valuable, and this exactly because it is anti-traditional (“enlightened”)!
Coping with Dugin’s philosophical and geopolitical notion of sacredness, Höllwerth seems to misled by a point of view, which he seems to have adopted from Mircea Eliade, a founder of the modern science of comparative religion (p. 209, p. 529 f.). A partial truth, the difference of profane and sacred, is been used as absolute segregation. There exist sacred places (and times), and on this the sacred geography (and sacred history) is founded, whose importance for Dugin’s geopolitics Höllwerth does carve out – much to his credit, as this level of argument is overlooked to often as pure rhetoric. But are there also in a strict sense profane things? “Come in, here do dwell Gods, too”, Heraclitus did say. Or, speaking with Guénon: there exists no profane thing, but only a profane point of view. Dugin seems to look at all questions also – certainly not only – in a metaphysical perspective, and in general he is able to explain why a certain political action is seen as necessary in this metaphysical perspective by him. This opens here the possibility of misuse through the sacralization of the profane, as on the other hand the profanization of the sacred in the West. The Western man is the one who takes the utilitarism as the measure for all things. The pure action – of which Julius Evola speaks - , which principle of not-clinging to the fruits of action has been affirmed by Dugin, the exact opposite of utilitarism, can only be seen as measure for the validity of Dugin’s decisions. To say, that he may not always be in the right in his metaphysical decisions is a different thing than saying he is guided by profane utility, as the sacred point of view does not make a saint. Höllwerth´s grasp of this problems is flawed because of his attempt to arrange the perceived oppositions into mirrored congruencies, instead of acknowledgment their structurally inequality, which would lead to the necessarily conclusion of the metaphysical superiority of the Eurasian tradition over its Western descent and rival.
Eurasianism and Islam (Laruelle, continuation)
In the last two chapters of her book Marlene Laruelle gives attention to the Muslim Eurasianists, first between the Muslim minorities of the Russian federation and then outside. This topic, though well-known by specialists, did not grasp the attention of a broader public as much as for example Dugin’s role in relation to the Kremlin. Therefore Laruelle’s retelling of the sometime short-lived organizational and personal development is very helpful, but can obviously not been retold in this review. In general there are two kinds of involvement of the Muslim minorities, one in specific Islamic Eurasianist parties, and the other the involvement of Islamic representatives in the general Eurasianist movement. There are two rival organizations representing the Muslim citizens of the Russian Federation, who were headed by two personal rivals, Mufti Talgat Tadzhuddin, who died shortly ago, and Mufti Ravil Gainutdin. The first was a member of Dugin’s party, close to the Kremlin, and a friend of the Russian patriarch Alexis II (p. 156), who coincidentally also died shortly ago. Gainutdin on the other hand keeps more distant to the Orthodox Church and the Kremlin (p. 158), and supports one of the more important Eurasianists rival of Aleksandr Dugin, Abdul-Vakhed V. Niizaov and his Eurasianist Party of Russia. (p. 161) The author summarizes the differences of the Muftis, which also reflect the differences of Dugin and Niizaov: “Tadzhuddin and Gainutdin embody two poles of traditional Russian Eurasianism: on the one hand, Russian nationalism and Orthodox messianism; and on the other hand, a more secular patriotism, which combines great-power ambitions with an acknowledgment of Russia’s multiethnic and multireligious character. Thus Eurasianism has become one of the crystallization points between the various Islamic representative bodies (…)” (p. 161 f.) Alongside these two mainstream bodies of Islam in Russia, there exist many smaller groups. One deserves special mention, the Islamic Commitee of Russia, lead by a former ally of Aleksandr Dugin, who broke with him on several issues, Geidar Dzhemal. The philosopher Dzhemal is an Azeri Shiite (Shiism being the dominant branch of Islam in Azerbaijan), with a close relation to the Islamic Republic of Iran, what separates Dzhemal from the other mentioned Muslim representatives. Strangely this fact is not mentioned by Laruelle. What she stresses, is the importance Dzhemal gives to Islam for securing Russia’s future: “Dzhemal […] states: ‘Russia’s only chance to avoid geopolitical disappearance is to become a Islamic state.’ Thus the movement remained on the borderline of Eurasianism, because it talked of conversion rather than cultural symbiosis ” (p. 147) Dugin’s apparently strong opposition to any conversions on the other hand is self-contradictory given his heavy reliance of his “Traditionalist” foundation on the teaching of René Guénon, also known as Sheikh Abd al-Wâhid Yahya. But it cannot neglected that the Orthodox-Islamic tension in the Eurasianist movement is as much ethnic as religious. The Turkic people can claim to represent “Eurasia” even more than Russians do. “In this view, the Russian people are European and party alien to Eurasia, as opposed to the Turkic people, who are considered to better illustrate the great meeting between Europe and Asia. Russia is no longer understood as a great power but as the most backward part of Europe, by contrast with the dynamism of the Far East and China.” (p. 169) A certain ambiguity in this question goes back to the classic Eurasianist movement of the Twenties of the last century, as Laruelle earlier in a different context has already stated: “Eurasianism’s place within the Russian nationalist spectrum has remained paradoxical due to the fact that it can be interpreted in either a ‘Russocentric’ or a ‘Turkocentric’ way. However, the paradox is not simply in the eye of the outside beholder; it has also divided the Neo-Eurasianists, who have accused each other of advocating the supremacy of one people over another.” (p. 5)
Naturally there is no question on which side the Eurasianist interpretation leans in the cases of Turkish Eurasianism outside of Russia, which is the final topic of this manifold book. In Kazakhstan one can state a “Eurasianism in Power” (p. 171), but a pragmatic Eurasianism this is, without any of the eschatological or traditionalist features of Dugin’s world-view. But Kazhakh Eurasianism as a whole is a multifaceted movement: “’Eurasianist’ Kazakh nationalism has several embodiments: a literary tradition introduced by Olzhas Suleimenov; a highly pragmatic variety used by the presidential administration; and a type of Eurasianist rhetoric that merely masks a much more traditional view of the nation and its right to exist, and mentions Russia only in the negative.” (p. 172) Suleimenov being a friend and ally of Lev Gumilëv (p. 175) and an apologist of “multiethnicity, tolerance, and diversity”, as characteristics of Eurasia. (p. 175) Also present in this intellectual Eurasianism seems to be a religious syncretism, “embracing all the religions that have ever (co)existed in the steppe. For example, the Kazakh Eurasianists make a great deal of archaeological traces of Nestorian Christianity, Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, and Shamanism, trying to go beyond the classic Orthodox-Islamic dualism.” (p. 176) President Nazarbaev proposed a “Union of Eurasian States” already in 1994 (p. 177) and embodies a mainly “economically based Eurasianism, whose integrationists ideas are popular among those who have suffered from the breakdown of links between the former Soviet republics.” (p. 177) But Nazarbaev is nothing less than an ideology-free technocrat, he has written even a book “In the stream of history”, in which he claims the Aryan and sedentary origin of Kazakhstan, predating the Mongol nomadic arrival. (p. 186) Additionally, the country’s Muslim character of the country is stressed, and Nazarbaev is proud of the global Islamic relevance Muslim scholars of Kazhakh origin like Al-Farabi and Al-Buruni.
Finally the only example of Eurasianism beyond the border of the former Soviet Union, studied by Laruelle, is the case of Turkey. Here the Eurasianist claim of the Turkish people goes along with the implication, “that Russia and Turkey are no longer competing for the mythical territory of Inner Asia – which both Eurasianists and pan-Turkists claim as their people’s ancestral homeland – but are Eurasian allies.” (p. 171) Laruelle starts by postulating common ideological roots of Eurasianism and Turkism, the “official Turkish state discourse on the nation’s identity” (p. 193), in romanticism and “Pan-“Ideologies (p. 188), but this seems to be rather a feature of Pan-Slavism than of Eurasianism with its re-evaluation of the non-Russian strands of the Empire. A similar development in the development from Turkism to Avrasyanism seems to be lacking. Rather it can be seen as a turning the back to the West, to which Mustafa Kemal, the so-called Atatürk (Father of the Turks), wanted to direct the aspirations of the Turks. The author states the original competition between the Turkish Avrasyian tendency and the Russian Eurasianist movements, similar to the natural antagonistic relation of nationalisms. But the interesting developments are the recently “attempts (…) to turn the two ‘Eurasias’ into allies rather than competitors” and parallel “a Dugin-style ideologization of the term in response to American adcendancy.” (p. 198) The few pages Laruelle dedicates to these developments are rather brief, and she has in the mean time published a more extensive study (Russo-Turkish Rapprochement through the Idea of Eurasia: Alexander Dugin’s Networks in Turkey, Jamestown Foundation, Occasional Paper, 2008), which itself has been overtaken by the dismantling of large parts of these „networks“ through the Ergenekon affair, but which is definitively outside the scope of this review.
The different manifestations of Eurasianism in this book leave the author and the reader with the question of the unity of Eurasianists idea. Laruelle states that Eurasianism is “a classic example of a flexible ideology. This explains its success, its diversity, and its breadth of coverage.” (p. 221) Without arguing about sheer words the author cannot be followed in her strict subsumption of Eurasianism under the term nationalism. At least a more nuanced view of nation in a more traditional sense, common to both Orthodox and Islamic thinking, in difference to the Western concept of nation-state (as I discussed in the part on Höllwerth) would have to be considerated instead of stating that the Eurasianists “concept of ‘civilization’ is only a euphemism for ‘nation’ and ‘empire.’” (p. 221).
Article printed from eurasia-rivista.org: http://www.eurasia-rivista.org
URL to article: http://www.eurasia-rivista.org/two-studies-on-neo-eurasianism/19891/
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Ex: http://paginatransversal.wordpress.com
[Aecio] Excelente entrevista que realiza la revista lituana Radikaliai a Alexander Dugin, donde con un toque más personal se habla del posible colapso del mundo occidental, la Cuarta Teoría Política y sus fundamentos, la situación actual del Eurasianismo de la mano de Rusia y la visión del mundo post-moderno que nos depara.
Mindaugas Peleckis: Estimado profesor ¿podríamos iniciar la conversación con su muy interesante biografía? Antes que nada ¿es cierto lo que está escrito en Wikipedia y otras fuentes oficiales? ¿Qué es verdad y qué no lo es? Padre que trabajaba en la GRU; nazi del círculo dirigido por E. Golovin; muchas perturbaciones políticas; un buen amigo del Sr. Putin…
Alexander Dugin: Todo es pura mentira. Ni Putin, ni nazi, ni padre en el GRU y así sucesivamente. Mi biografía es mi bibliografía (cf. J.Evola). No cambio nada en Wikipedia por dos razones:
1) Hay un grupo de administradores Wiki liberales que restablecerán de inmediato todas las mentiras para conservar la imagen peyorativa de mi persona (la guerra cibernética – es sólo una democracia, no es nada personal, pero la democracia es siempre una mentira).
2) El individuo (Yo mismo) no importa. Para mí, sólo importa la misión.
Hasta ahora no me siento inclinado a hablar de mi persona. Lea mis libros, forme su opinión personal acerca de mis ideas (primero) y la personalidad del autor (segundo – es opcional).
M. P.: De todas maneras lo principal a discutir en esta entrevista son sus ideas, las cuales considero bastante interesantes y de importancia global a medida que el mundo occidental parece estar colapsando. ¿Lo es? El fin de la civilización occidental se predijo bastante tiempo atrás. ¿Cuánto tiempo tenemos que esperar? ¿Hay algo que tiene que suceder? ¿La Tercera Guerra Mundial? ¿Revolución mundial? ¿Nada (significando el colapso como un proceso natural)?
A. D.: Yo más bien creo que no pasará nada, nada en absoluto. Eso es algo que es realmente terrible. La eternidad es el momento perpetuo del aburrimiento. Heidegger estudió en su obra “Die Grundbegriffen der Metaphysik” el fenómeno del aburrimiento profundo. Como la función existencial del Dasein moderno. El gnóstico Basílides describió al mundo después del fin como completamente equilibrado, el mundo sin ningún acontecimiento. Eso no quiere decir que no haya más eventos, significa más bien que no vivimos los acontecimientos como eventos. El colapso duradero es bien analizado por el escritor inglés Alex Kurtagić.
El verdadero problema viene cuando nadie percibe que es un problema. Así que estamos aquí. El Occidente es el centro del aburrimiento. No explota, más bien implosiona cada vez más y más profundo.
Tienen razón en que durará para siempre. El fin del mundo es la imposibilidad del mundo a acabarse. El mundo sin fin ya no es más el mundo, es la suma de los fragmentos sin sentido del todo inexistente. Estamos viviendo en las hipótesis 6-9 de “Parménides” de Platón – hay multitudes (πολλά), pero no hay ninguna unidad (ἓν). Tal mundo no puede existir (según los neoplatónicos). Estoy bastante de acuerdo con ellos, no con los medios de comunicación y la cultura prêt a porter o con los intelectuales hegemónicos.
M. P.: Usted publicó muchos libros – ni siquiera puedo contarlos ¿usted podría?. Recuerdo el primero que leí – era sorprendente- en 1999, sobre conspirología. ¿Usted cree en una conspiración global seria como Bilderberg/Masones/ Illuminati o cualquier otro que esté realmente pasando en este momento? Si es así, por favor explique cómo funciona y qué debemos esperar más adelante.
A. D.: No recuerdo la cantidad de mis libros, recuerdo su calidad. La calidad es muy diferente, ya que los libros fueron escritos para públicos diversos. La conspirología es descrita por mí como una especie de sociología primitiva. Para la sociología, hay un punto muy importante: lo que la sociedad piensa sobre lo que está sucediendo a su alrededor es importante, no menos de lo que sucede realmente o lo que los expertos científicos piensan. Así que estudiando las teorías de conspiración estudiamos la mente de la gente, los mitos, la cultura, los miedos, las estructuras gnoseológicas y cognitivas. La gente cree en conspiraciones. Eso significa que “existen” o ” subsisten ” (de acuerdo a la ontología diferenciada de Alexius Meinong).
M. P.: Se le considera como el padre del Eurasianismo y de la Cuarta Teoría Política. ¿Podría explicar los fundamentos de sus ideas?
A. D.: El Eurasianismo no ve a Rusia como país, sino como una civilización. Por lo tanto, debe compararse no con países europeos o asiáticos, si no con Europa o el islam o las civilizaciones hindúes. Rusia-Eurasia consiste en elementos modernos y pre-modernos, de culturas y etnias europeas y orientales. Esta identidad particular debe ser reconocida y reafirmada en el marco de un nuevo proyecto de integración. El eurasianismo niega la universalidad de la civilización occidental y la unidimensionalidad del proceso histórico (dirigida hacia el liberalismo, la democracia, los derechos humanos, la economía de marcado y así sucesivamente).
Hay diferentes culturas con diferentes antropologías, ontologías, valores, tiempos y espacios. El Occidente no es otra cosa que el mundo hipertrofiado e insolente con megalomanía. Es el caso más abyecto del hybris. La humanidad debe luchar contra Occidente con el fin de poner sus pretensiones en los límites legítimos. El mundo debe convertirse en lo que es -la provincia, el caso aislado histórico, la elección – no el destino universal y normativo o el objetivo común.
La Cuarta Teoría Política es la teoría que afirma:
1) Las tres principales ideologías políticas modernas (liberalismo, comunismo/socialismo, fascismo /nacionalsocialismo) ya no son adecuadas – así que tenemos que descartarlas todas, lo que significa no más liberalismo, socialismo, fascismo (chequee lo del fascismo y compare con lo que dicen de mí);
2) Necesitamos construir la Cuarta Teoría Política más allá, descartando las tres, y esta debe ser no-moderna (puede ser post-moderna, puede ser pre-moderna);
3) El sujeto de la Cuarta Teoría Política es el Dasein que Heidegger ha descrito en sus obras (no el individuo como en el liberalismo, ni la de clase como en el marxismo, ni la raza/estado como en el nacionalsocialismo/fascismo) – El Dasein debe ser liberado del modo inauténtico de la existencia;
4) El Dasein es plural y depende de la cultura, por lo que el mundo debe ser multipolar (cada cultura, etnia o religión tiene su propio Dasein – no son necesariamente contradictorios pero sí son diferentes)
5) Hacemos un llamado a la revolución mundial existencial de los Daseins – Daseins de las sociedades humanas unidas por la lucha contra hegemónica – en contra de la globalización occidental y el universalismo liberal, así como en contra de la dominación de Estados Unidos.
M. P.: La Unión Euroasiática se estableció hace varios años. Ahora parece que está en el limbo, aunque se puede ver que la parte oriental del mundo (China, Irán, etc.) es cada vez más fuerte mientras la occidental se debilita. ¿Sucede así? ¿Cuál es la situación actual con la Unión Euroasiática y cual que es su predicción para el futuro?
A. D.: La Unión Euroasiática es nuestra idea tomada por los burócratas de Putin. Creo que es la única manera de asegurar el futuro de Rusia y una condición indispensable para la multipolaridad. Rusia debe estar en el lado de las potencias no occidentales. Hay muchos problemas con la Unión Euroasiática, objetiva y subjetivamente. La hegemonía de Estados Unidos y la quinta columna en Rusia la sabotean activamente, y la ineficacia de la burocracia rusa empeora la situación. No obstante, se llevará a cabo, porque debe hacerse.
M. P.: Guerras y revoluciones suceden en todas partes actualmente… Malí, Siria, Palestina, Túnez… ¿Qué piensa acerca de la situación en el Magreb/Oriente Medio? ¿Terminará en un baño de sangre y con otros diez años de guerra?
A. D.: No, nunca va a terminar. Es el proyecto caótico patrocinado por el Occidente que está perdiendo su poder para controlar las sociedades no occidentales por otros medios. La sangre será derramada más y más. Sólo cuando todos los musulmanes apunten sus armas contra los occidentales y se unan a la batalla eurasianista final contra la hegemonía esta se detendrá. El Imperio sigue dividiendo, pero ya no puede controlar todo efectivamente. Así que empieza a dividir y eso es todo. No puede gobernar, sólo matar. Así que tenemos que devolver el golpe.
M. P.: ¿Cuál es su opinión sobre el Islam e Irán?
A. D.: Admiro Irán y admiro el Chiísmo y el Sufismo. Es una tradición espiritual que lucha en contra de la modernidad apuntando a su centro. Hay muchos tipos de Islam. Me gustar el Islam tradicional y tengo algunas dudas sobre la versión wahabista. Es una versión modernista y universalista del Islam, además que parece funcionar acorde a los intereses de Estados Unidos como una especie de unidad sub-imperialista. Así que apoyo el tradicionalismo en todas las religiones. Sin embargo, amo con mi corazón a Irán y a la tradición chií.
M. P.: ¿Qué mundo futuro (cercano y lejano) te gustaría ver? ¿Cuál es su visión?
A. D.: En la situación actual estamos desprovistos de futuro. Entiendo el futuro existencialmente como el horizonte de la auténtica existencia del Dasein, como Ereignis (acontecimiento/ser parte de), la llegada del último Dios (letzte Gott). Pero este futuro es incompatible con el Logos en descomposición de la historia occidental. El Occidente actual (Estados Unidos y parte de Europa) debe ser aniquilado y la humanidad debe ser reconstruida en un terreno diferente – en frente de la cara de la Muerte y el Abismo.
Debe haber un nuevo comienzo de la filosofía o… nada de nada. La misma nada como ahora, no se percibe más como tal. Así que el futuro no vendrá por sí mismo. Tenemos que hacerlo. Pero antes hay que destruir lo que es o parece ser.
M. P.: Como veo en Facebook y páginas de Internet, hay un montón de gente dispuesta a algún cambio revolucionario de paradigma en su mente, e incluso quizás a revoluciones físicas. ¿Son cambios reales que vienen a nuestro mundo? ¿Podría predecir cuándo y cómo?
A. D.: El cambio de paradigma es absolutamente necesario. No veo suficientes hombres y mujeres dispuestos a cambiarse a sí mismos y el mundo que los rodea. Pero veo algo. Es demasiado pequeño para la esperanza, pero demasiado grande para la desesperación. Me gustaría ver medidas más decididas y concretas. Es bueno que algunos comiencen a despertar. Obviamente el odio a Occidente, a la globalización, al consumismo, a los medios de comunicación, a las mentiras democráticas, a la basura de los derechos humanos, a la dictadura del capitalismo, a la llamada “sociedad civil” y a la dominación estadounidense es cada vez mayor. Así que debemos ir más allá. La vigilia significa la revolución y la guerra. Es poco probable que comience ahora. Pero deberían comenzar ahora mismo, porque mañana será demasiado tarde.
M. P.: Deseándole todo lo mejor y dándole las gracias por las respuestas, la última pregunta por ahora: ¿cuáles son las principales ideas en las que está trabajando actualmente?
A. D.: Algunos proyectos actuales son:
-El manual de Relaciones Internacionales para las universidades rusas.
-La teoría de mundo multipolar (publicada, pero aún en desarrollo).
-El desarrollo de la Cuarta Teoría Política.
-Estudios de Heidegger en el campo de la filosofía (He escrito dos libros sobre Heidegger ya y seguiré trabajando sobre el mismo tema).
-El tradicionalismo (Henri Corbin, el círculo Eranos – Recientemente he comprado todos los números de la Eranos Jahrbuch en Suiza).
-La sociología de la imaginación (en el estilo de G.Durand – Hice hace dos años el doctorado sobre el tema).
-Nuevos libros de geopolítica (geopolítica histórica de Rusia, las regiones del mundo, y así sucesivamente).
-Platonismo y neoplatonismo, eurasianismo (por supuesto).
-La teología ortodoxa.
-Antropología Social y etnosociología.
-Economía (vías alternativas).
-Estudios conservadores.
También:
-La enseñanza en la Universidad Estatal de Moscú (siendo jefe del departamento de Sociología de Relaciones Internacionales) – Relaciones Internacionales, Geopolítica, Etnosociología, Sociología.
-Conferencias (en todo el mundo)
-Asesorar al Gobierno ruso y el Parlamento (siendo miembro oficial del consejo de asesores del jefe del Estado del Parlamento, S. Narishkin).
-Dirigir el Movimiento Eurasiático Internacional
M. P.: Gracias.
A. D.: De nada
Fuente: The Four Political Theory
00:05 Publié dans Actualité, Entretiens, Nouvelle Droite | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : occident, politique internationale, russie, géopolitique, occidentisme, alexandre douguine, nouvelle droite, entretien | | del.icio.us | | Digg | Facebook
von David Beetschen
Ex: http://www.blauenarzisse.de
Alexander Dugins „Vierte politische Theorie“ sorgte für kontroverse Debatten. Um den Kern seiner propagierten authentischen Existenz zu erfassen, muss man sich mit Heideggers Seinsfrage auseinandersetzen.
Treffend hat Markus Willinger in seinem Artikel über „Dugins Alternative“ erwähnt, dass der Kern der Theorie nicht klar herausgeschält wird. Insbesondere umschreibt er nicht genau die Basis, auf der das Subjekt der vierten politischen Theorie gründet.
Die vierte politische Theorie ist als Sammelbecken konzipiert für alle Menschen, die sich gegen Globalisierung und Amerikanismus wenden, der als Leitkultur fungiert. Um dies zu verwirklichen, versucht diese Theorie die Kräfte zu bündeln, also die Menschen, die sich für die zweite und dritte politische Theorie einsetzen, wie auch für alle anderen antiliberalen Strömungen.
Dies bedeutet aber nicht, dass die vierte politische Theorie ein Synkretismus der ersten drei darstellt, oder lediglich eine gegenaufklärerische Bewegung. Die vierte politische Theorie darf nicht mit einer der anderen verwechselt werden, insbesondere nicht mit der zweiten oder dritten.
Die Theorie schält die positiven Aspekte der anderen drei Theorien heraus: beim Liberalismus die „Freiheit“, dahingehend, dass man keine Tyrannei will. Bei der zweiten den Aspekt der Solidarität und bei der dritten die von Rassismus, Chauvinismus und Xenophobie befreite Idee des Ethnos. Ein wichtiger Punkt ist, dass Dugin selbst dazu aufruft, antifaschistische und antikommunistische Ressentiments beiseite zu legen, da diese nichts anderes seien als Instrumente in den Händen der Liberalen.
Die vierte politische Theorie hat als neues politisches Subjekt nach dem Individuum, der Klasse, der Rasse und dem Staat eine Heideggersche Kategorie erhalten. Hierzu soll der Terminus „Dasein“ genutzt werden, der von Heidegger in seiner Fundamentalontologie anstelle von „Mensch“ gebraucht wird, um sich von der traditionellen Philosophie und ihren Vorurteilen abzugrenzen.
So soll „Dasein“ der Philosophie die Möglichkeit bieten, an die unmittelbaren Lebenserfahrungen des Einzelnen anzuknüpfen. Um sich insbesondere von Kants Erkenntnistheorie abzugrenzen, ging Heidegger nicht von einem „erkennenden Subjekt“ aus, sondern von einem „verstehenden Dasein“.
Nach der Definition von „Dasein“ soll hier nun nicht die ganze Fundamentalontologie Heideggers ausgebreitet, sondern direkt das aufgegriffen werden, was für die vierte politische Theorie wichtig ist und dies ist Heideggers „Man“. Dieses „Man“ bildet den Lebenshintergrund des Daseins, in allen kulturellen, gesellschaftlichen und geschichtlichen Aspekten, in die das „Dasein“ durch die „Geworfenheit“ eingebettet ist.
Dieser Lebenshintergrund in Form der Kultur gibt dem Menschen gewisse Möglichkeiten, die er ohne sie nicht hätte. Jedoch kann die Kultur das Denken und Handeln des Daseins vorbestimmen, ohne dass ihm dies wirklich bewusst wird, wodurch es bestimmten Verhaltensmustern und Weltanschauungen ausgesetzt ist. Heidegger nannte diese Situation des Ausgeliefertseins „uneigentliche Existenz“.
Diesen Zustand konstatiert Heidegger als Ausgangspunkt, in welchen der durchschnittliche Mensch hineingeboren wird. Die Vorherbestimmung der kulturellen und gesellschaftlichen Verhaltensangebote nimmt dem „Dasein“ sein „eigentliches Sein“ weg. Wer ihm das wegnimmt, sind „die Anderen“, wobei hier keine spezifische Person gemeint ist, sondern das „Dasein“ in seiner Alltäglichkeit als „Man“.
Folgender Satz soll die Idee dahinter vergegenwärtigen: „Wir genießen und vergnügen uns, wie man genießt; wir lesen, sehen und urteilen über Literatur und Kunst, wie man urteilt; wir ziehen uns aber auch vom ‚großen Haufen‘ zurück, wie man sich zurückzieht.“ Diese Überlegungen brachten Heidegger dazu, folgenden radikalen Schluss zu ziehen: „Jeder ist der Andere und Keiner er selbst.“
Als Gegenkonzept zur Fremdbestimmung des Daseins führt Heidegger das „eigentliche Selbstsein“ ins Feld, das eine „existenzielle“ Modifikation des „Man“ sei. Hierfür stellt er dem „Man“ die „Jemeinigkeit“ (dies ist jenseits von ich und wir) entgegen, wobei er nach einem möglichen Weg für ein authentisches Leben sucht, dem Weg vom „eigentlichen Selbst-sein-können“.
Um diesen Weg zu finden, macht Heidegger eine Analyse des Verhaltens des Daseins in Bezug auf seine Existenzialien. Diese umriss er bei einer phänomenologischen Analyse des Daseins, um dessen Struktur und Verhalten geistig zu begegnen. So sind nach ihm die Existenzialien des Daseins:
Durch die Verbindung dieser drei Punkte in einer Einheit erkennt Heidegger das „Sein von Dasein“ und definiert es als „Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in-(der-Welt) als Sein-bei (innerweltlich begegnendem Seienden)“. Nun definiert Heidegger, daraus ableitend, die Possibilitäten, die sich als eigentliche Existenz erweisen und kommt dabei auf zwei verschiedene Lösungen, die in Bezug auf seine Zeitlehre stehen. Hierfür ist ein anderer Terminus sehr wichtig, die „Sorge“, was die Heideggersche Abkürzung für das „Sein des Daseins“ ist.
Diese Sorge hat jedoch weder mit der Besorgnis etwas zu tun, noch mit der Sorglosigkeit, sondern ist eine Seinsweise des Menschen, die primär im praktischen Umgang mit seiner Umwelt liegt, worauf er auch eine theoretische Erfassung derselben vornehmen kann, aber nicht bloß im erkennenden Anschauen derselben endet.
Heidegger versucht nun, die Bestimmung des Daseins als ein „Sein zum Tode“ hin genauer zu betrachten. Er kommt dabei zum Schluss, dass die Zeitlichkeit des Daseins ihm erst die Möglichkeit biete, sich auf den Tod hin einzustellen, wobei er schlussendlich subsumiert: „Zeitlichkeit ist der Sinn der Sorge.“ Diesen Sinn findet er in drei Ekstasen, die er in Bezug auf die „Sorge“ ordnet:
Hiermit wurde nun die Basis gelegt, um das „eigentliche Selbst-sein-können“ zu finden und auf die beiden Lösungen zu stoßen, die Heidegger so darstellte:
An diesem Punkte setzt die vierte politische Theorie ein, die genau darum besorgt ist, dass dem Menschen die Möglichkeit bleibt, das „eigentliche Selbst-sein-können“ zu entfalten, indem der Mensch die Taten der gewesenen „Helden“ wiederholen kann. Um die Worte Dugins zu benutzen, steht die vierte politische Theorie für „Dasein“ ein, um ihm die Chance auf eine authentische Existenz zu gewähren, um die letzten Überbleibsel zu retten, „which makes man an existential being.“
Aus diesen Betrachtungen leitet sich ab, dass die Welt multipolar werden muss und die unipolare Hegemonie des Amerikanismus abschütteln sollte. Ja, sie muss die Kultur der „Fremdbestimmung des Daseins“ überwinden, wenn sie die „connection to the roots of …being“ wiederfinden will. Hier erscheint auch wieder die Vision Eurasien, wenn die Forderung nach dem Schmittschen „Großraum“ auftaucht. In diesen Großräumen könnten sich die Kulturen souverän selbständig organisieren, verteilt auf die Kontinente, fern aber von jedem Imperialismus.
Auch die Religionen, insbesondere in Form der Schule der Integralen Tradition, spielen eine essentielle Rolle für die Theorie, da auf der Grundlage der „inneren Einheit der Religionen“ eine Basis für ein inner– und außereurasisches Verständnis für die anderen Glaubensgemeinschaften gelegt wird. Es gibt keine Feindschaft mit Juden oder Moslems, sondern der Liberalismus wird als gemeinsamer Gegenspieler aufgefasst, der die Kulturen bedroht. Dies ist sicher ein wesentlicher Unterschied zu den identitären Blöcken, die gerne offen gegen den Islam auftreten.
Die vierte politische Theorie ist nicht als Dogma aufzufassen, sondern als eine Einladung Dugins an die oben genannten Gruppen, sich in der Bewegung einzufinden und konstruktive Kritik daran zu üben. So ist Dugins Buch The Fourth Political Theory nicht die Konzeption eines abgeschlossenen Systems, sondern ein Stein des Anstoßes, eine Frage, die Dugin gekonnt in den Raum stellt.
Anm. d. Red.: Alexander Geljewitsch Dugin wurde am 7. Januar 1962 in Moskau als Sohn eines sowjetischen Drei-Sterne-Generals und einer Ärztin geboren. Er spricht neun Sprachen, besitzt einen Doktortitel in Geschichts– und einen in Politikwissenschaft, ist verheiratet, hat zwei Kinder und gehört den Altorthodoxen an. Als Professor besitzt er einen Lehrstuhl für die Soziologie der internationalen Beziehungen an der Moskauer Staatsuniversität und fungiert seit längerer Zeit als Berater Putins in geopolitischen Fragen.
Beispiele bestehender Gruppierungen, die sich auf Dugins Theorie beziehen: Global Revolutionary Alliance, New Resistance, Eurasian Youth Union, International Eurasian Movement, Journal of Eurasian affairs, Eurasian Artists Association.
00:04 Publié dans Nouvelle Droite, Philosophie | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : alexandre douguine, nouvelle droite, nouvelle droite russe, heidegger, philosophie | | del.icio.us | | Digg | Facebook
por Alexander Dugin
E: http://paginatransversal.wordpress.com
La elección de Carlo Terracciano
Creo que Carlo Terracciano es uno de los más importantes geopolíticos europeos de los últimos decenios. Estoy convencido de que va a ser reconocido como uno de los clásicos autores modernos de esta disciplina. Tuve la oportunidad de conocer a Carlo Terracciano personalmente, y siempre he admirado la rectitud de su posición ideológica en la vida: La geopolítica era para él una elección existencial, vivió en plena conformidad con sus principios, lo que demuestra algo impensable en nuestra época: Una actitud personal romana, olímpica – la lealtad, el apego total a la causa, la integridad moral completa sin tener en cuenta los efectos de las presiones de la modernidad.
Carlo Terracciano era un hombre de ideas y un hombre de acción, al mismo tiempo. En su caso, la teoría y la práctica se fusionaron en algo indivisible. ¿Cuál era su idea principal y cuál fue su acto esencial?
El nacimiento de la geopolítica de la espuma del mar
Carlo Terracciano heredó la tradición geopolítica del continentalismo europeo. En sus escritos (recopilados en una serie de artículos en “Nel Fiume della storia”), traza la génesis ideológica de esta escuela. El imperialista británico H. Mackinder fue el primero en articular la principal ley geopolítica – oposición dualista entre la civilización del Mar (talasocracia) y la civilización de la Tierra (telurocracia). Mackinder mismo era un brillante representante de la talasocracia y se encargó de transmitir la tradición de la estrategia talasocrática, el procedimiento de la percepción geopolítica de Gran Bretaña a los Estados Unidos. Mackinder fue uno de los fundadores de la London School of Economics, contribuyó a la aparición de “Chattem House”, el Real Centro de Estudios Estratégicos e inspiró el primer equipo del CFR (Consejo de Relaciones Exteriores), publicando en «Foreign Affairs» sus posteriores artículos. De él al americano A. Mahan se puede trazar la línea recta de la geopolítica atlantista, pasando por el realismo americano (con algo de “liberalismo muscular”, transnacionalismo y globalización) hasta llegar a Kissinger, Brzezinski, D. Rockefeller, por un lado, y los neocons en el otro.
La hegemonía planetaria de Estados Unidos y la idea de talasocracia global con el Gobierno Mundial deriva de la visión planetaria de Mackinder, llevada a sus límites lógicos. El mundo puede llegar a ser realmente global, sólo cuando el poder del Mar definitivamente acabe con el poder de la Tierra (o viceversa). Ese fue el objetivo de la vida de Mackinder. Y ahora vemos que muchos de sus proyectos se cumplen: insistía en el desmantelamiento de Rusia, en la creación de un “cordón sanitario” en Europa del Este, en la necesidad de derrotar a Alemania y Rusia, y todo esto de alguna manera se realizó a finales del siglo XX, proporcionando así las condiciones para el surgimiento de un mundo unipolar y la hegemonía global de EE.UU. Este imperio talasocrático se convierte en una realidad ante nuestros ojos.
Respuesta Continental
Pero en el primer cuarto del siglo XX, el desafío conceptual de H. Mackinder fue contestado por los geopolíticos que se ubicaron en el lado de la telurocracia. Se trataba, en primer lugar, de la escuela alemana de Karl Haushofer, quien comenzó a desarrollar una base geopolítica telurocrática, Geopolítica-2 (mientras que la geopolítica talasocrática anglosajona se puede llamar “Geopolítica-1″). Así se sentaron las bases para la tradición continentalista.
La escuela de Haushofer ofreció a Alemania realizar su naturaleza telurocrática y unificar Europa sobre la base continental; para lograrlo era necesario concluir una alianza con la Unión Soviética y fortalecer los lazos con Japón y así destruir la talasocracia mundial – la alianza de Inglaterra, EE.UU. y Francia. La consolidación de todas las potencias terrestres era la única manera de deshacerse de las potencias marítimas y la tentación de organizar el espacio mundial bajo su modelo talasocrático. Este concepto fue desarrollado por el proyecto de una nueva división del mundo sobre la base de las Pan-ideas – cuatro áreas que iban a ser integradas económicamente, políticamente y estratégicamente a lo largo del meridiano – de norte a sur. Haushofer había creado un importante baluarte conceptual de la Geopolítica-2, con el cual se sentaban las bases para el continentalismo europeo en el que Alemania fue concebida como el centro de la telurocracia europea (un hecho natural reconocido por el propio Mackinder).
Tras la derrota de Alemania y las potencias del Eje en la Segunda Guerra Mundial la geopolítica telurocrática ha sido desacreditada durante mucho tiempo y se perdió entre las sombras. Autores americanos han llegado a sugerir que habría que distinguir la anglosajona «Geopolitics» de la alemana «Geopolitik», identificando la primera como un “método completamente aceptable de análisis de la ciencia política en el ámbito de las relaciones internacionales”, y la segunda como”Fantasías imperialistas”. En estas definiciones de lo que es “científico” y lo que no, vemos sólo el típico doble rasero y la clásica propaganda política de los ganadores. Las potencias marítimas derrotaron a las potencias terrestres, y establecieron una disciplina colonial – en particular en el campo de la ciencia, porque el conocimiento, como Michel Foucault ha mostrado, es sinónimo de poder.
Sin embargo, la escuela continentalista de la geopolítica telurocrática continuó existiendo en Europa en condiciones marginales también después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Los ejemplos son las obras del general austríaco Jordis von Lohausen, el teórico belga y fundador del movimiento pan-europeo “Joven Europa” Jean Thiriart (a quien, casualmente, Carlo Terracciano encontró por primera vez en Moscú en mi apartamento en 1992) y el destacado filósofo francés Alain de Benoist. La característica principal de esta continental Gepolítica 2 es la visión del mundo desde el punto de vista de la Tierra. De esto podemos deducir fácilmente el papel de cada jugador en la “gran guerra de los continentes.” Los que están en el lado de la Tierra están automáticamente contra el mar, es decir, contra el mundo anglosajón, en contra de la dominación de EE.UU. y en contra de la globalización occidental (mundialismo).
Testimonio telurocrático de Carlo Terracciano
Carlo Terracciano era un sucesor directo de la tradición geopolítica continentalista, el teórico más notable y persistente practicante de la Geopolítica-2. Su obra es quizás el ejemplo más completo y coherente de esta tradición. No se limita a seguir reciclando teorías pre-existentes, sino que aplica los principios básicos de la geopolítica telurocrática para analizar la situación actual en el mundo. No dejó una sombra de duda en su elección personal: habla en nombre de todo el continente de Europa, de la telurocracia. En las condiciones de ocupación y dominación atlantista talasocrática es un gesto viril de la rebelión espiritual y cognitiva. Así Terracciano lleva a cabo un acto simbólico importante: lo que constituye el polo subjetivo, dotado de la voluntad y de la mente, que surge del vertedero de la Europa post-moderna, convirtiéndose en un proyecto alternativo revolucionario de los países de Europa. Ésta posible pero aún no realizable Europa surge – aunque sea sólo en teoría – de entre las ruinas de la modernidad agonizante. Terracciano es una especie de testigo geopolítico, en sus escritos y acciones testifica que la victoria del Mar no es absoluta y que en Europa permanece una red de decidida resistencia geopolítica continentalista y que esta red es plenamente consciente de la naturaleza, finalidad y participaciones en la gran guerra de los continentes. Por lo tanto, Carlo Terracciano está salvando la geopolítica continental europea tradicional, preparando así el restablecimiento teórico de Europa.
Terracciano como Eurasiatista
Además, el momento decisivo en la evolución de las teorías Carlo Terracciano fue su encuentro con la tradición geopolítica eurasiatista restablecida en Rusia desde finales de los 80. La escuela moderna eurasiatista rusa de la geopolítica fue fundada a finales de los años 80 como una reflexión geopolítica post-soviética en la visión de mundo de Mackinder, como una especie de respuesta al desafío talasocrático. La lógica constituyente de la construcción de la geopolítica Eurasiatista era muy similar a la génesis de la geopolítica alemana de la escuela de Haushofer. Pero en el caso de Rusia, la simetría era aún más perfecta: Mackinder identificó como el principal enemigo del poder marítimo al Heartland, cuyo control garantiza a la talasocracia la dominación del mundo. Los eurasiatistas rusos en los últimos años 80 aceptaron el marco principal del mapa geopolítico y acordaron reconocer la esencia de la historia de Rusia en la telurocracia. La Rusia es el Heartland, así Geopolítica-2 es la causa rusa. Así se sentaron las bases del moderno neo-eurasismo.
La geopolítica euroasiática rusa se reunió con el continentalismo europeo en 1992 – durante una visita conjunta a Moscú de Carlo Terracciano y Jean Thiriart. Jean Thiriart fue el autor del concepto de “Imperio Euro- soviético de Vladivostok a Dublín” y Carlo Terracciano en esa época escribió su obra programática “En la espuma de la historia” (“Nel fiume della Storia”). Desde entonces el continentalismo europeo y el eurasismo ruso se convirtieron casi en la misma línea geopolítica. Algo similar se describe en el concepto de Haushofer del proyecto continental del bloque geopolítico “Berlín-Moscú-Tokio”. La misma idea fue revivida en el plano teórico en los años 90 en Rusia. El estrecho diálogo geopolítico ruso – europeo comenzó entonces en Moscú y sigue creciendo hasta la actualidad. Al mismo tiempo, otros geopolíticos europeos, en particular Alain de Benoist y Claudio Mutti, visitaron Moscú, entrando en la misma dirección de consideraciones geopolíticas. En Francia, unos puntos de vista muy similares fueron desarrollados por el excelente escritor tradicionalista Jean Parvulesco.
Carlo Terracciano tuvo en esa amistad eurasiática el papel principal. Con una energía apasionada comenzó a desarrollar la tendencia eurasiatista, invitando a la unión en un bloque continental telurocrático de todos aquellas fuerzas inconformistas contra el status quo. Su obra, aunque se ha desarrollado en el ámbito de una élite intelectual y de escuelas geopolíticas, ha tenido un impacto considerable. Las ideas son importantes, y cualquier acción política siempre se inicia con el proyecto, el programa, la estrategia.
Islam y telurocracia
El análisis de la situación actual ha llevado a Carlo Terracciano a la conclusión de que muchos países islámicos y la civilización islámica en su conjunto debe ser considerada como una aliada crucial en la alianza telurocrática en la lucha común contra la hegemonía estadounidense y la globalización plutocrática. Por lo tanto, la importancia del factor islámico se ha convertido en un componente vital del neocontinentalismo moderno. Terracciano debe considerarse como uno de sus fundadores. El Islam es un Poder telurocrático – esta fue la conclusión a la que llegó Carlo Terracciano. Se convirtió desde entonces en una especie de axioma geopolítico para el eurasismo contemporáneo.
Terracciano hizo una serie de viajes y dio una serie de conferencias en los países islámicos – Irán, Siria, etc, promoviendo por todas partes la geopolítica euroasiática continentalista. Ideas y acciones, como siempre en el caso de Carlo Terracciano no difirieron.
Nacional comunismo
La formación de puntos de vista geopolíticos han estado acompañados por Terracciano con los correspondientes cambios ideológicos y políticos. La apelación a los criterios geopolíticos, los conceptos y la evaluación del significado crucial de telurocracia exigió la revisión de los fundamentos políticos del patriotismo clásico europeo, que por lo general se refiere a la “Tercera Posición” (anti-liberalismo y anti-comunismo), en el espíritu de Evola, Heidegger y Yockey. Si aceptamos el punto de vista de la potencia terrestre, la Unión Soviética pasó inmediatamente de ser uno de los dos enemigos de Europa (junto con el Occidente capitalista liberal, personificada en los EE.UU.) a ser un aliado. Esto requiere una revisión radical de la “Tercera Posición” y la transición a una fusión entre el europeísmo y el sovietismo, el nacional-bolchevismo. Por una evolución semejante a mediados de los 80′ pasó el máximo teórico de la europea “Nouvelle Droite” Alain de Benoist. A diferencia de muchos otros “nacional revolucionarios” Carlo Terracciano, sin dudarlo, aceptó la dirección ideológica nacional-comunista y se convirtió en uno de los líderes del comunismo nacional en Italia. El Anti-sovietismo y el anticomunismo (sobre todo ahora, después de la caída de la Unión Soviética) se convirtieron en obsoletos y sirven como herramientas en las manos de talasocracia, los liberales y los globalistas. Así que cada ciudadano europeo coherentemente revolucionario debe resueltamente terminar con eso y cooperar activamente con todas las fuerzas de izquierda que luchan contra la hegemonía estadounidense y el capitalismo liberal, que encarnan la esencia de la talasocracia y la civilización del mar. Este giro a la izquierda de Terracciano fue la conclusión lógica de su análisis geopolítico, y él ha dado pasos más decisivos en esta dirección uniéndose así con la tradición de la “Joven Europa” (siguiendo el ejemplo de Claudio Mutti, amigo y colega de Carlo Terracciano ), y convirtiéndose en un pionero de las nuevas tendencias nacional-comunistas y eurasiatistas en la política moderna italiana y europea. Para esta posición política Carlo Terracciano consagró todo un libro bajo el expresivo nombre de “Comunismo Nacional”.
La justicia social es un valor de la sociedad tradicional. La jerarquía basada en el principio material y la estratificación de clases, que constituye la base del capitalismo, es el mal absoluto y debe ser abolida. La lucha contra el liberalismo, el capitalismo y la oligarquía global por la libertad, la justicia y el orden social basado en la solidaridad y la ayuda mutua es la principal tarea de los nacional-revolucionarios. No se puede tolerar compromiso alguno con la burguesía y sus valores mercantilistas, materialistas y egoístas. El hombre es un ser social. La tradición es una causa del ser colectivo, una causa social. Con el fin de afirmar la sociedad tradicional y aplicarla a escala mundial, es necesario destruir la cosmópolis capitalista fundada en la veneración incondicional del “becerro de oro”. Y en este caso las fuerzas de izquierdas que luchan por la justicia social, son aliadas y amigas, así como las fuerzas de la derecha, que defienden los valores tradicionales – como la espiritualidad, la fe y la fidelidad a las raíces (de hecho, todos éstos valores son incompatibles con el capitalismo y el espíritu comercial).
Tradicionalismo y la geopolítica de lo Sagrado
Por último, el aspecto crucial del pensamiento de Carlo Terracciano se asocia con el tradicionalismo y la Tradición. Terracciano siguió el camino trazado por Julius Evola, viéndose a sí mismo como portador de las tradiciones espirituales de Occidente, que se remontan a las profundidades de la antigüedad, al neoplatonismo greco-romano. Era respetuoso frente al Islam y el hinduismo, sentía simpatía por la ortodoxia griega y rusa, pero hasta el final de sus días se abstuvo de aclarar sus puntos de vista religiosos con una confesión concreta. Él era un tradicionalista y un fuerte partidario de los antiguos valores indoeuropeos. Estos valores, a su juicio, tenían que estar en el centro de la guerra santa que él libró contra el mundo moderno.
La tradición está ligada a la tierra. La modernidad está vinculada al mar. Telurocracia significa Tradición, la modernidad significa talasocracia. Así la geopolítica de Terracciano obtiene una dimensión sagrada. No es sólo un instrumento técnico para el correcto análisis político o la planificación estratégica, sino una ideología, una elección espiritual, una llamada para una batalla sagrada escatológica, un Endkampf, que nos exige movilizar todo nuestro ser.
Muy buen guerrero
Carlo Terracciano nos da un ejemplo de cómo debería ser la vida de un auténtico geopolítico en el campo de la ciencia, la teoría, la existencia, la ontología, la escatología. Esta es la movilización total del alma, el pago completo de las creencias de todo el contenido de la vida heroica y trágica.
Hoy en día muchos se quejan de que no hay más lugar para los actos heroicos y luchas, todo está condenado a perder desde el principio, nada puede dar resultados empíricos. Esto sólo demuestra debilidad, cobardía y bajeza. Si creemos en algo y nuestra fe es suficientemente fuerte, somos siempre capaces de cambiar el mundo. No hay enemigo imbatible para el ardiente espíritu humano. Carlo Terracciano nos da el ejemplo de un hombre que hasta su último aliento defendió sus creencias. Sus creencias son nuestras creencias. Su lucha es nuestra lucha. Y la lucha de aquellos que vendrán después de nosotros.
Confieso que no me interesa qué clase de hombre era Carlo Terracciano, aunque sus amigos afirman que era genial, amable, honesto. No importa. Es subjetivo. Objetivamente, él era un héroe. El verdadero héroe del continente, de la civilización de la tierra, de Eurasia. Y eso es mucho más importante. Sólo la idea sí importa. Y otra cosa también tiene importancia – la vida humana arrojada al fuego de una gran fe y una gran causa.
Un tradicional proverbio japonés dice: No sólo es bueno el guerrero que sirve honestamente a un buen Estado, bueno es el guerrero que sirve honestamente a cualquier estado – entre ellos el muy malo, y este servicio honesto es el que convierte al mal estado en uno bueno. Carlo Terracciano era un guerrero muy bueno. El guerrero de Europa.
Texto original: Open Revolt
Traducido para TM por Felix W.
Fuente: Tribulaciones Metapolíticas
00:05 Publié dans Eurasisme, Géopolitique | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : alexandre douguine, carlo terracciano, géopolitique, eurasisme, théorie politique, sciences politiques, politologie | | del.icio.us | | Digg | Facebook
Professor of the Moscow State University, Doctor of political sciences, founder of the contemporary Russian school of Geopolitics, leader of the International Social Movement “Eurasian Movement”, Moscow, Russian Federation.
I. Multipolarism and “Land Power”
Geopolitics of the Land in the Global World
In the previous part we discussed the subject of globalism, globalization, and mondialism in a view considered to be generally accepted and “conventional”. Geopolitical analysis of the phenomenon of the subject of globalism, globalization, and mondialism has showed that in the modern globalism we only deal with one of the two geopolitical powers, namely, with a thalassocracy, a “Sea Power” that from now on claims for uniqueness, totality, and normativeness and strives to pretend to be the only possible civilization, sociological and geopolitical condition of the world.
Therewith, the philosophy of globalism is based upon the internal surety with universalism of exactly the Western-European value system thought to be the summary of all the diverse experience of the human cultures on all stages of their history.
And finally, in its roots, globalization has an active ideology (mondialism) and power structures that spread and bring this ideology into use. If taking into account that the latter are the most authoritative intellectual US centers (such as CFR and neoconservatives), structures of the US Supreme Military Command and their analysts (Owens, Sibrowsky, Barnett, Garstka), international oligarchs (such as George Soros), a number of international organizations (The Bilderberg Club, Trilateral Commission, etc.), and innumerous amount of analysts, politicians, journalists, scientists, economists, people of culture and art, and IT sector employees spread all over the world, we can understand the reason why this ideology seems to be something that goes without saying for us. That we sometimes take globalization as an “objective process” is the result of a huge manipulation with public opinion and the fruit of a total information war.
Therefore, the picture of global processes we described is an affirmation of the real state of affairs just in part. In such a description, there is a significant share of a normative and imperative volitional (ideological) wish that everything should be quite so, which means, it is based upon wrenches and, to some extent, striving to represent our wishful thinking as reality.
In this part, we will describe an absolutely different point of view on globalization and globalism that is impossible from inside the “Sea Power”, i.e. out of the environment of the nominal “Global World”. Such a view is not taken into account either in antiglobalism or in alterglobalism because it refuses from the most fundamental philosophical and ideological grounds of Eurocentrism. Such a view rejects the faith in:
In other words, we proceed to the position of the “Land Power” and consider the present moment of the world history from the point of view of Geopolitics-2, or the thalassocratic geopolitics as an episode of the “Great Continent War”, not as its conclusion.
Of course, it is difficult to refuse that the present moment of historical development demonstrates a number of unique features that, if desired, can be interpreted as the ultimate victory of the Sea over the Land, Carthage over Rome and Leviathan over Behemoth. Indeed, never in history the “Sea Power” was such a serious success and stretched might and influence of its paradigm in such a scale. Of course, Geopolitics-2 acknowledges this fact and the consequences included. But it clearly realizes that globalization can be also interpreted otherwise, namely, as a series of victories in combats and battles, not as the ultimate win in the war.
Here, a historical analogy suggests itself: when German troops were approaching to Moscow in 1941, one could think that everything was lost and the end of the USSR was foredoomed. The Nazi propaganda commented the course of the war quiet so: the “New Order” is created in the occupied territory, the authorities work, economical and political hierarchy is created, and the social life is organized. But the Soviet people kept on violently resisting – at all the fronts as well as in the rear of the enemy, while systematically moving to their goal and their victory.
Now, there is precisely this moment in the geopolitical stand of the Sea and the Land. Information policy inside the “Sea Power” is built so as no-one has any doubt that globalism is an accomplished fact and the global society has come about in its essential features, that all the obstacles from now on are of a technical character. But from certain conceptual, philosophical, sociological, and geopolitical positions, all of it can be challenged by suggesting an absolutely different vision of the situation. All the point is in interpretation. Historical facts make no sense without interpretation. Likewise in geopolitics: any state of affairs in the field of geopolitics only makes sense in one or another interpretation. Globalism is interpreted today almost exclusively in the Atlantist meaning and, thus, the “sea” sense is put into it. A view from the Land’s position doesn’t change the state of affairs but it does change its sense. And this, in many cases, is of fundamental importance.
Further, we will represent the view on globalization and globalism from the Land’s position – geopolitical, sociological, philosophical, and strategical.
Grounds for Existence of Geopolitics-2 in the Global World
How can we substantiate the very possibility of a view on globalization on the part of the Land, assuming that the structure of the global world, as we have shown, presupposes marginalization and fragmentation of the Land?
There are several grounds for this.
Such an answer of the Land to the challenge of globalization (as a triumph of the “Sea Power”) is Multipolarism, as a theory, philosophy, strategy, policy, and practice.
Multipolarism as a Project of the World Order from the Land’s Position
Multipolarism represents a summary of Geopolitics-2 in actual conditions of the global process evolution. This is an extraordinarily capacious concept that demands a through consideration.
Multipolarism is a real antithesis for monopolarity in all its aspects: hard (imperialism, neocons, direct US domination), soft (multilateralism) and critical (alterglobalism, postmodernism, and neo-Marxism) ones.
The hard monopolarity version (radical American imperialism) is based upon the idea that the US represents the last citadel of the world order, prosperity, comfort, safety, and development surrounded by a chaos of underdeveloped societies. Multipolarism states the directly opposite: the US is a national state that exists among many others, its values are doubtful (or, at least, relative), its claims are disproportional, its appetites are excessive, methods of conducting its foreign policy are inacceptable, and its technological messianism is disastrous for the culture and ecology of the whole world. In this regard, the multipolar project is a hard antithesis to the US as an instance that methodically builds a unipolar world, and it is aimed to strongly disallow, break up, and prevent this construction.
The soft monopolarity version does not only act on behalf of the US, but on behalf of “humanity”, exclusively understanding it as the West and the societies that agree with universalism of Western values. Soft monopolarity does not claim to press by force, but persuade, not to compel, but explain profits peoples and countries will obtain from entering into globalization. Here the pole is not a single national state (the US), but Western civilization as a whole, as a quintessence of all the humanity.
Such, as it is sometimes called, “multilateral” monopolarity (multilateralism, multilateralization) is rejected by Multipolarism that considers Western culture and Western values to represent merely one axiological composition among many others, one culture among different other cultures, and cultures and value systems based on some absolutely different principles to have the full right for existence. Consequently, the West in a whole and those sharing its values, have no grounds to insist on universalism of democracy, human rights, market, individualism, individual freedom, secularity, etc. and build a global society on the base of these guidelines.
Against alterglobalism and postmodern antiglobalism, Multipolarism advances a thesis that a capitalist phase of development and construction of worldwide global capitalism is not a necessary phase of society development, that it is despotism and an ambition to dictate different societies some kind of single history scenario. In the meantime, confusion of mankind into the single global proletariat is not a way to a better future, but an incidental and absolutely negative aspect of the global capitalism, which does not open any new prospects and only leads to degradation of cultures, societies, and traditions. If peoples do have a chance to organize effective resistance to the global capitalism, it is only where Socialist ideas are combined with elements of a traditional society (archaic, agricultural, ethnical, etc.), as it was in the history of the USSR, China, North Korea, Vietnam and takes place today in some Latin-American countries (e. g., in Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba, etc.).
Further, Multipolarism is an absolutely different view on the space of land than bipolarity, a bipolar world.
Multipolarism represents a normative and imperative view on the present situation in the world on the part of the Land and it qualitatively differs from the model predominated in the Yalta World in the period of the “Cold War”.
The Bipolar World was constructed under the ideological principle, where two ideologies – Capitalism and Socialism – acted as poles. Socialism as an ideology did not challenge universalism of the West-European culture and represented a sociocultural and political tradition that threw back to the European Enlightenment. In a certain sense, Capitalism and Socialism competed with each other as two versions of Enlightenment, two versions of progress, two versions of universalism, two versions of the West-European sociopolitical idea.
Socialism and Marxism entered into a resonance with certain parameters of the “Land Power”, and therefore they did not win where Marx had supposed, but where he excluded this possibility – in an agricultural country with the predominant way of life of a traditional society and imperial organization of the political field. Another case of an (independent) victory of Socialism – China – also represented an agricultural, traditional society.
Multipolarism does not oppose monopolarity from the position of a single ideology that could claim for the second pole, but it does from the position of many ideologies, a plenty of cultures, world-views and religions that (each for its own reasons) have nothing in common with the Western liberal capitalism. In a situation, when the Sea has a unified ideological aspect (however, ever more going to the sphere of subauditions, not explicit declarations), and the Land itself doesn’t, representing itself as several different world-view and civilization ensembles, Multipolarism suggests creating a united front of the Land against the Sea.
Multipolarism is different from both the conservative project of conservation and reinforcement of national states. On the one hand, national states in both colonial and post-colonial period reflect the West-European understanding of a normative political organization (that ignores any religious, social, ethnical, and cultural features of specific societies) in their structures, i.e. the nations themselves are partially products of globalization. And on the other hand, it is only a minor part of the two hundred fifty-six countries officially itemized in the UN list today that are, if necessary, capable to defend their sovereignty by themselves, without entering into a block or alliance with other countries. It means that not each nominal sovereign state can be considered a pole, as the degree of strategical freedom of the vast majority of the countries acknowledged is negligible. Therefore, reinforcement of the Westphalian system that still mechanically exists today is not an issue of Multipolarism.
Being the opposition of monopolarity, Multipolarism does not call to either return to the bipolar world on the base of ideology or to fasten the order of national states, or to merely preserve the status quo. All these strategies will only play in hands of globalization and monopolarity centers, as they have a project, a plan, a goal, and a rational route of movement to future; and all the scenarios enumerated are at best an appeal to a delay of the globalization process, and at worst (restoration of bipolarity on the base of ideology) look like irresponsible fantasy and nostalgia.
Multipolarism is a vector of the Land’s geopolitics directed to the future. It is based upon a sociological paradigm whose consistency is historically proven in the past and which realistically takes into account the state of affairs existing in the modern world and basic trends and force lines of its probable transformations. But Multipolarism is constructed on this basis as a project, as a plan of the world order we yet only expect to create.
2 Multipolarism and its Theoretical Foundation
The absence of the Multipolarism Theory
In spite of the fact that the term “Multipolarism” is quite often used in political and international discussions recently, its meaning is rather diffuse and inconcrete. Different circles and separate analysts and politicians insert their own sense in it. Well-founded researches and solid scientific monographs devoted to Multipolarism can be counted on fingers[1]. Even serious articles on this topic are quite rare[2]. The reason for this is well understood: as the US and Western countries set the parameters of the normative political and ideological discourse in a global scale today, according to these rules, whatever you want can be discussed but the sharpest and most painful questions. Even those considering unipolarity to have been just a “moment[3]” in the 1990-s and a transfer to some new indefinite model to be taking place now are ready to discuss any versions but the “multipolar” one. Thus, for example, the modern head of CFR Richard Haass tells about “Non-Polarity” meaning such stage of globalization where necessity in presence of a rigid center falls off by itself[4]. Such wiles are explained by the fact that one of the aims of globalization is, as we have seen, marginalization of the “Land Power”. And as far as Multipolarism can only be a form of an active strategy of the “Land Power” in the new conditions, any reference to it is not welcome by the West that sets the trend in the structure of political analysis in the general global context. Still less one should expect that conventional ideologies of the West take up development of the Multipolarism Theory.
It would be logical to assume that the Multipolarism Theory will be developed in the countries that explicitly declare orientation upon a multipolar world as the general vector of their foreign policy. The number of such countries includes Russia, China, India, and some others. Besides, the address to Multipolarism can be encountered in texts and documents of some European political actors (e.g., former French minister of Foreign Affairs Hubert Vidrine[5]). But at the moment, we can as well hardly find something more than materials of several symposiums and conferences with rather vague phrases in this field. One has to state that the topic of Multipolarism is not properly conceptualized also in the countries that proclaim it as their strategical goal, not to mention the absence a distinct and integral theory of Multipolarism.
Nevertheless, on the base of the geopolitical method from the position of the “Land Power” and with due account for the analysis of a phenomenon called globalism, it is quite possible to formulate some absolute principles that must underlie the Multipolarism Theory when the matter comes to its more systemized and expanded development.
Multipolarism: Geopolitics and Meta-Ideology
Let’s blueprint some theoretical sources, on whose base a valuable theory of Multipolarism must be built.
It is only geopolitics that can be the base for this theory in the actual conditions. At the moment, no religious, economical, political, social, cultural or economical ideology is capable to pull together the critical mass of the countries and societies that refer to the “Land Power” in a single planetary front necessary to make a serious and effective antithesis to globalism and the unipolar world. This is the specificity of the historical moment (“The Unipolar Moment”[6]): the dominating ideology (the global liberalism/post-liberalism) has no symmetrical opposition on its own level. Hence, it is necessary to directly appeal to geopolitics by taking the principle of the Land, the Land Power, instead of the opposing ideology. It is only possible in the case if the sociological, philosophical, and civilization dimensions of geopolitics are realized to the full extent.
The “Sea Power” will serve us as a proof for this statement. We have seen that the very matrix of this civilization does not only occur in the Modem Period, but also in thalassocratic empires of the Antiquity (e.g., in Carthage), in the ancient Athens or in the Republic of Venice. And within the Modern World itself atlantism and liberalism do not as well find complete predominance over the other trends at once. And nevertheless, we can trace the conceptual sequence through a series of social formations: the “Sea Power” (as a geopolitical category) moves through history taking various forms till it finds its most complete and absolute aspect in the global world where its internal precepts become predominant in a planetary scale. In other words, ideology of the modern mondialism is only a historical form of a more common geopolitical paradigm. But there is a direct relation between this (probably, most absolute) form and the geopolitical matrix.
There is no such direct symmetry in case of the “Land Power”. The Communism ideology just partly (heroism, collectivism, antiliberalism) resonated with geopolitical percepts of the “ground” society (and this just in the concrete form of the Eurasian USSR and, to a lesser degree, of China), as the other aspects of this ideology (progressism, technology, materialism) fitted badly in the axiological structure of the “Land Power”. And today, even in theory, Communism cannot perform the mobilizing ideological function it used to perform in the 20th century in a planetary scale. From the ideological point of view the Land is really split into fragments and, in the nearest future, we can hardly expect some new ideology capable to symmetrically withstand the liberal globalism to appear. But the very geopolitical principle of the Land does not lose anything in its paradigmatic structure. It is this principle that must be taken as a foundation for construction of the Multipolarism Theory. This theory must address directly to geopolitics, draw principles, ideas, methods and terms out of it. This will allow to otherwise take both the wide range of existing non-globalist and counter-globalist ideologies, religions, cultures, and social trends. It is absolutely unnecessary to shape them to transform into something unified and systematized. They can well remain local or regional but be integrated into a front of common stand against globalization and “Western Civilization’s” domination on the meta-ideological level, on the paradigmatic level of Geopolitics-2 and this moment – plurality of ideologies – is already laid in the very term “Multi-polarism” (not only within the strategical space, but also in the field of the ideological, cultural, religious, social, and economical one).
Multipolarism is nothing but extension of Geopolitics-2 (geopolitics of the Land) into a new environment characterized with the advance of globalism (as atlantism) on a qualitatively new level and in qualitatively new proportions. Multipolarism has no other sense.
Geopolitics of the Land and its general vectors projected upon the modern conditions are the axis of the Multipolarism Theory, on which all the other aspects of this theory are threaded. These aspects constitute philosophical, sociological, axiological, economical, and ethical parts of this theory. But all of them are anyway conjugated with the acknowledged – in an extendedly sociological way – structure of the “Land Power” and with the direct sense of the very concept of “Multipolarism” that refers us to the principles of plurality, diversity, non-universalism, and variety.
3 Multipolarism and Neo-Eurasianism
Neo-Eurasianism as Weltanschauung
Neo-Eurasianism is positioned nearest to the theory of Multipolarism. This concept roots in geopolitics and operates par excellence with the formula of “Russia-Eurasia” (as Heartland) but at the same time develops a wide range of ideological, philosophical, sociological and politological fields, instead of being only limited with geostrategy and application analysis.
What is in the term of “Neo-Eurasianism” can be illustrated with fragments of the Manifesto of the International “Eurasian Movement” “Eurasian Mission»[7]. Its authors point out five levels in Neo-Eurasianism allowing to interpret it in a different way depending on a concrete context.
The first level: Eurasianism is a Weltanschauung.
According to the authors of the Manifesto, the term “Eurasianism” “is applied to a certain Weltanschauung, a certain political philosophy that combines in itself tradition, modernity and even elements of postmodern in an original manner. The philosophy of Eurasianism proceeds from priority of values of the traditional society, acknowledges the imperative of technical and social modernization (but without breaking off cultural roots), and strives to adapt its ideal program to the situation of a post-industrial, information society called “postmodern”.
The formal opposition between tradition and modernity is removed in postmodern. However, postmodernism in the atlantist aspect levels them from the position of indifference and exhaustiveness of contents. The Eurasian postmodern, on the contrary, considers the possibility for an alliance of tradition with modernity to be a creative, optimistic energetic impulse that induces imagination and development.
In the Eurasianism philosophy, the realities superseded by the period of Enlightenment obtain a legitimate place – these are religion, ethnos, empire, cult, legend, etc. In the same time, a technological breakthrough, economical development, social fairness, labour liberation, etc. are taken from the Modern. The oppositions are overcome by merging into a single harmonious and original theory that arouses fresh ideas and new decisions for eternal problems of humankind. (…)
The philosophy of Eurasianism is an open philosophy, it is free from any forms of dogmatism. It can be appended by diversified areas – history, religion, sociological and ethnological discoveries, geopolitics, economics, regional geography, culturology, various types of strategical and politological researches, etc. Moreover, Eurasianism as a philosophy assumes an original development in each concrete cultural and linguistic context: Eurasianism of the Russians will inevitably differ from Eurasianism of the French or Germans, Eurasianism of the Turks from Eurasianism of the Iranians; Eurasianism of the Arabs from Eurasianism of the Chinese, etc. Whereby, the main force lines of this philosophy will, in a whole, be preserved unalterable.(…)
The following items can be called general reference points of the Eurasianism philosophy:
Neo-Eurasianism as a Planetary Trend
On the second level: Neo-Eurasianism is a planetary trend. The authors of the Manifesto explain:
«Eurasianism on the level of a planetary trend is a global, revolutionary, civilization concept that is, by gradually improving, addressed to become a new ideological platform of mutual understanding and cooperation for a vast conglomerate of different forces, states, nations, cultures, and confessions that refuse from the Atlantic globalization.
It is worth carefully reading the statements of the most diverse powers all over the world: politicians, philosophers, and intellectuals and we will make sure that Eurasianists constitute the vast majority. Mentality of many nations, societies, confession, and states is, though they may not suspect about it themselves, Eurasianist.
If thinking about this multitude of different cultures, religions, confessions, and countries discordant with “the end of history” we are imposed by atlantism, our courage will grow up and the seriousness of risks of realization of the American 21st century strategical security concept related with a unipolar world establishment will sharply increase.
Eurasianism is an aggregate of all natural and artificial, objective and subjective obstacles on the way of unipolar globalization, whereby it is elevated from a mere negation to a positive project, a creative alternative. While these obstacles exist discretely and chaotically, the globalists deal with them separately. But it is worth just integrating, pulling them together in a single, consistent Weltanschauung of a planetary character and the chances for victory of Eurasianism all over the world will be very serious.»[9]
Neo-Eurasianism as an Integration Project
On the next level, Neo-Eurasianism is treated as a project of strategical integration of the Eurasian Continent:
“The concept “the Old World” usually defining Europe can be considered much wider. This huge multicivilization space populated with nations, states, cultures, ethnoses and confessions connected between each other historically and spatially by the community of dialectical destiny. The Old World is a product of organic development of human history.
The Old World is usually set against the New World, i.e. the American continent that was discovered by the Europeans and has become a platform for construction of an artificial civilization where the European projects of the Modern, the period of Enlightenment have taken shape. (…)
In the 20th century Europe realized its original essence and had gradually been moving to integration of all the European states into a single Union capable to provide all this space with sovereignty, independence, security, and freedom.
Creation of the European Union was the greatest milestone in the mission of Europe’s return in history. This was the response of “the Old World” to the exorbitant demands of the “New” one. If considering the alliance between the US and Western Europe – with US domination – to be the Atlantist vector of European development, then the integration of European nations themselves with predomination of the continental countries (France-Germany) can be considered Eurasianism in relation to Europe.
It becomes especially illustrative, if taking into account the theories that Europe geopolitically stretches from the Atlantic to the Urals (Ch. de Gaulle) or to Vladivostok. In other words, the interminable spaces of Russia are also valuably included in the field of the Old World subject to integration.
(…) Eurasianism in this context can be defined as a project of strategical, geopolitical, economical integration of the North of the Eurasian Continent realized as the cradle of European history, matrix of nations and cultures closely interlaced between each other.
And since Russia itself (like, by the way, the ancestors of many Europeans as well) is related in a large measure with the Turkish, Mongolian world, with Caucasian nations, through Russia – and in a parallel way through Turkey – does the integrating Europe as the Old World already acquire the Eurasianism dimension to full extent; and in this case, not only in symbolic sense, but also in geographical one. Here Eurasianism can be synonimically identified with Continentalism.[10]»
These three most general definitions of Neo-Eurasianism demonstrate that here we deal with a preparatory basis for construction of the Multipolarism Theory. This is the ground view on the sharpest challenges of modernity and attempt to give an adjust response to them taking into account geopolitical, civilization, sociological, historical and philosophical regularities.
[1] Murray D., Brown D. (eds.) Multipolarity in the 21st Century. A New World Order. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010; Ambrosio Th. Challenging America global Preeminence: Russian Quest for Multipolarity. Chippenheim, Wiltshire: Anthony Rose, 2005; Peral L. (ed.) Global Security in a Multi-polar World. Chaillot
[2] Turner Susan. Russia, Chine and the Multipolar World Order: the danger in the undefined// Asian Perspective. 2009. Vol. 33, No. 1. C. 159-184; Higgott Richard Multi-Polarity and Trans-Atlantic Relations: Normative Aspirations and Practical Limits of EU Foreign Policy. – www.garnet-eu.org. 2010. [Electronic resource] URL: http://www.garnet-eu.org/fileadmin/documents/working_papers/7610.pdf (дата обращения 28.08.2010); Katz M. Primakov Redux. Putin’s Pursuit of «Multipolarism» in Asia//Demokratizatsya. 2006. vol.14 № 4. C.144-152.
[3] Krauthammer Ch. The Unipolar Moment// Foreign Affairs. 1990 / 1991 Winter. Vol. 70, No 1. С. 23-33.
[4] Haass R. The Age of Non-polarity: What will follow US Dominance?’//Foreign Affairs.2008. 87 (3). С. 44-56.
[5] Déclaration de M. Hubert Védrine, ministre des affaires étrangères sur la reprise d’une dialogue approfondie entre la France et l’Hinde: les enjeux de la resistance a l’uniformisation culturelle et aux exces du monde unipolaire. New Delhi — 1 lesdiscours.vie-publique.fr. 7.02.2000. [Electronic resource] URL: http://lesdiscours.vie-publique.fr/pdf/003000733.pdf
[6] Krauthammer Ch. The Unipolar Moment. Op.cit.
[7] Евразийская миссия. Манифест Международного «Евразийского Движения». М.: Международное Евразийское Движение, 2005.
[8] Ibid
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
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An interview with Alexander Dugin on the Syrian crisis.
Prof. Dugin, the world faces right now in Syria the biggest international crisis since the downfall of the Eastern Block in 1989/90. Washington and Moscow find themselves in a proxy-confrontation on the Syrian battleground. Is this a new situation?
Dugin: We have to see the struggle for geopolitical power as the old conflict of land power represented by Russia and sea power represented by the USA and its NATO partners. This is not a new phenomenon; it is the continuation of the old geopolitical and geostrategic struggle. The 1990s was the time of the great defeat of the land power represented by the USSR. Mikhail Gorbachev refused the continuation of this struggle. This was a kind of treason and resignation in front of the unipolar world. But with President Vladimir Putin in the early years of this decade, came a reactivation of the geopolitical identity of Russia as a land power. This was the beginning of a new kind of competition between sea power and land power.
How did this reactivation start?
Dugin: It started with the second Chechen war (1999-2009). Russia by that time was under pressure by Chechen terrorist attacks and the possible separatism of the northern Caucasus. Putin had to realize all the West, including the USA and the European Union, took sides with the Chechen separatists and Islamic terrorists fighting against the Russian army. This is the same plot we witness today in Syria or recently in Libya. The West gave the Chechen guerrillas support, and this was the moment of revelation of the new conflict between land power and sea power. With Putin, land power reaffirmed itself. The second moment of revelation was in August 2008, when the Georgian pro-Western Saakashvili regime attacked Zchinwali in South Ossetia. The war between Russia and Georgia was the second moment of revelation.
Is the Syrian crisis now the third moment of revelation?
Dugin: Exactly. Maybe it is even the final one, because now all is at stake. If Washington doesn´t intervene and instead accepts the position of Russia and China, this would be the end of the USA as a kind of unique superpower. This is the reason why I think Obama will go far in Syria. But if Russia steps aside and accepts the US-American intervention and if Moscow eventually betrays Bashar al-Assad, this would mean immediately a very hard blow to the Russian political identity. This would signify the great defeat of the land power. After this, the attack on Iran would follow and also on northern Caucasus. Among the separatist powers in the northern Caucasus there are many individuals who are supported by the Anglo-American, Israeli and Saudi powers. If Syria falls, they will start immediately the war in Russia, our country. Meaning: Putin cannot step aside; he cannot give up Assad, because this would mean the geopolitical suicide of Russia. Maybe we are right now in the major crisis of modern geopolitical history.
So right now both dominant world powers, USA and Russia, are in a struggle about their future existence…
Dugin: Indeed. At the moment there is no any other possible solution. We cannot find any compromise. In this situation there is no solution which would satisfy both sides. We know this from other conflicts, such as the Armenian-Azeri or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is impossible to find a solution for both sides. We witness the same now in Syria, but on a bigger scale. The war is the only way to make a reality check.
Why?
Dugin: We have to imagine this conflict as a type of card game like Poker. The players have the possibility to hide their capacities, to make all kinds of psychological tricks, but when the war begins all cards are in. We are now witnessing the moment of the end of the card game, before the cards are thrown on the table. This is a very serious moment, because the place as a world power is at stake. If America succeeds, it could grant itself for some time an absolutely dominant position. This will be the continuation of unipolarity and US-American global liberalism. This would be a very important moment because until now the USA hasn´t been able to make its dominance stable, but the moment they win that war, they will. But if the West loses the third battle (the first one was the Chechen war, the second was the Georgian war), this would be the end of the USA and its dominance. So we see: neither USA nor Russia can resign from that situation. It is simply not possible for both not to react.
Why does US-president Barrack Obama hesitate with his aggression against Syria? Why did he appeal the decision to the US-Congress? Why does he ask for permission that he doesn´t need for his attack?
Dugin: We shouldn´t make the mistake and start doing psychological analyses about Obama. The main war is taking place right now behind the scenes. And this war is raging around Vladimir Putin. He is under great pressure from pro-American, pro-Israeli, liberal functionaries around the Russian president. They try to convince him to step aside. The situation in Russia is completely different to the situation in USA. One individual, Vladimir Putin, and the large majority of the Russian population which supports him are on one side, and the people around Putin are the Fifth column of the West. This means that Putin is alone. He has the population with him, but not the political elite. So we have to see the step of the Obama administration asking the Congress as a kind of waiting game. They try to put pressure on Putin. They use all their networks in the Russian political elite to influence Putin´s decision. This is the invisible war which is going on right now.
Is this a new phenomenon?
Dugin: (laughs) Not at all! It is the modern form of the archaic tribes trying to influence the chieftain of the enemy by loud noise, cries and war drums. They beat themselves on the chest to impose fear on the enemy. I think the attempts of the US to influence Putin are a modern form of this psychological warfare before the real battle starts. The US-Administration will try to win this war without the Russian opponent on the field. For this they have to convince Putin to stay out. They have many instruments to do so.
But again: What about the position of Barrack Obama?
Dugin: I think all those personal aspects on the American side are less important than on the Russian side. In Russia one person decides now about war and peace. In the USA Obama is more a type of bureaucratic administrator. Obama is much more predictable. He is not acting on his behalf; he simply follows the middle line of US-American foreign politics. We have to realize that Obama doesn´t decide anything at all. He is merely the figurehead of a political system that makes the really important decisions. The political elite makes the decisions, Obama follows the scenario written for him. To say it clearly, Obama is nothing, Putin is everything.
You said Vladimir Putin has the majority of the Russian population on his side. But now it is peace time. Would they also support him in a war in Syria?
Dugin: This is a very good question. First of all, Putin would lose much of his support if he does not react on a Western intervention in Syria. His position would be weakened by stepping aside. The people who support Putin do this because they want to support a strong leader. If he doesn´t react and steps aside because of the US pressure, it will be considered by the majority of the population as a personal defeat for Putin. So you see it is much more Putin´s war than Obama´s war. But if he intervenes in Syria he will face two problems: Russian society wants to be a strong world power, but it is not ready to pay the expenses. When the extent of these costs becomes clear, this could cause a kind of shock to the population. The second problem is what I mentioned already, that the majority of the political elite are pro-Western. They would immediately oppose the war and start their propaganda by criticizing the decisions of Putin. This could provoke an inner crisis. I think Putin is aware of these two problems.
When you say the Russians might be shocked by the costs of such a war, isn´t there a danger that they might not support Putin because of that?
Dugin: I don´t think so. Our people are very heroic. Let us look back in history. Our people were never ready to enter a war, but if they did, they won that war despite the costs and sacrifices. Look at the Napoleonic wars or World War II. We Russians lost many battles, but eventually won those wars. So we are never prepared, but we always win.
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